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The notion of technology is often consumed with its purely practical, equipmental 
interpretation in everyday life which assumes the neutrality of technical things, fully 
justifying the equivocation of the technical with the technological. However, technology, 
as a major constituent of contemporary society, is intimately connected with politics, 
economics, culture, and all forms of social and personal life.  Previous research followed 
a variety of approaches and analyzed the technology phenomena in organizations from 
structural or agency-based perspectives. The structuration theory, attempting to resolve 
the deep-seated ontological division in social sciences, has offered a way out from the 
impasse between structure and agency based perspectives, but a number of criticisms 
have been posed against it in the literature (Clegg 1989; Archer 1982, 1989, 1995; Layder 
1987; Callinicos 1985; Mouzelis 1995). Following the structuration theory, Orlikowski 
(1992) suggested the structurational model of technology and offered the duality of 
technology model. 
In this study, the recursive dualism of technology (RDT) model is developed as a 
new theoretical model to provide an understanding as to how technology is experienced 
and the way technology adaptation unfolds in organizations. The model explains how 
technology shapes and also is shaped by organizational affairs at macro, meso, and micro 
 xiii
levels in organizations. The RDT model combines structuration and institutionalization 
perspectives, reconsidering criticisms against the structuration theory. A set of theoretical 
propositions has been developed also drawing from the power literature to describe the 
interplay of actors and structures using “power-based institutionalization mechanisms” 
(Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001) during technology adaptation in organizations.  
Research propositions have been empirically studied in five cases of Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) software adaptation in four different organizations. ERP is a 
software technology frequently associated with organizational change and transformation 
in relation to its adaptation in organizations. Case studies are compared and contrasted to 
empirically evaluate the RDT model and discuss the process of technology adaptation in 
organizations in relation to structuration and institutionalization processes. The theoretical 
and practical implications of the study and potential further studies are also addressed. 
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Teknoloji kavramı günlük hayatta genellikle tamamen alet ve ekipman gibi 
algılanarak kullanım pratiği içinde anlamlandırılır. Bu yaklaşım teknik olan şeylerin 
tarafsız olduğu kabulüne dayandığı için teknik olanla teknolojik olanı birbirine 
eşitlemektedir. Ancak, günümüz toplumunun önemli bir bileşeni olarak teknoloji, sosyal 
ve kişisel hayatın politik, ekonomik ve kültürel olan her şekliyle yakından ilişkilidir. 
Önceki araştırmalar, bir çok yaklaşım kullanarak, örgütlerde teknoloji fenomenini yapı 
veya eylem perspektiflerinden analiz etmişlerdir. Yapılandırma teorisi, temeli derinlere 
dayanan sosyal bilimlerdeki bu ontolojik bölünmeyi çözmeyi deneyerek bu ayırımdan bir 
çıkış yolu önermişse de bir çok eleştiri almıştır (Clegg 1989; Archer 1982, 1989, 1995; 
Layder 1987; Callinicos 1985; Mouzelis 1995). Buna karşın, Orlikowski (1992) 
yapılandırma teorisine dayanarak teknolojinin ikiciliği modelini ortaya atmıştır.  
Bu çalışmada, teknolojinin özyineli ikiselliği modeli, teknolojinin örgütsel 
ortamlarda nasıl deneyimlendiği ve teknoloji adaptasyonun nasıl gerçekleştiğine yönelik 
bir anlayış sağlamak üzere yeni bir teorik model olarak geliştirilmiştir. Model teknolojinin 
bir örgüt içerisinde makro, mezo ve mikro seviyelerde örgütsel ilişkilerle nasıl 
şekillendiği ve bu ilişkileri nasıl şekillendirdiğini açıklamaktadır. Model, yapılandırma 
teorisi ile kurumsalcı yaklaşımları bir araya getirirken, yapılandırma teorisine yönelik 
 xv
eleştirileri de yeniden değerlendirmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, örgütsel yazındaki güç 
temelli yaklaşımlardan yola çıkıp “güç-temelli“ kurumsallaşma mekanizmalarını 
(Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001) kullanarak örgütlerde teknoloji adaptasyonu 
sırasında aktör ve yapıların ilişkilerini teorik önermeler biçiminde tarif etmektedir. 
Geliştirilen önermeler, dört farklı örgütte geçen beş Kurumsal Kaynak Planlama (KKP) 
vakasında ampirik olarak incelenmiştir. KKP, örgütlerdeki adaptasyonu ile genellikle 
örgütsel değişim ve transformasyonla ilişkilendirilen bir yazılım teknolojisidir. Vaka 
çalışmaları karşılaştırılarak, model ampirik olarak değerlendirilmekte ve örgütlerdeki 
teknoloji adaptasyonu süreci, yapılandırma ve kurumsallaşma süreçleri ile ilişkili olarak 
tartışılmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, çalışmanın teorik ve pratik sonuçları tartışılmakta ve 
takiben yapılabilecek potansiyel çalışmalar önerilmektedir. 
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1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Technology, as a major constituent of contemporary society, is intimately 
connected to all forms of human affairs and is considered as an important topic in 
organization studies, social theory, and philosophy.  The increasing involvement of new 
technologies in organizations has revitalized debates on the relationship between 
technology and organizations.  To develop a comprehensive understanding of the 
interactions between technology and organizations, the adaptation processes through 
which technology structures organizational action as well as agency enacts technology 
needs to be thoroughly explored.   
The origin of the word “technology” can be traced back to Greek word technologia, 
which was a combination of techne, which means "craft" and logia, which means 
"saying". The meaning of the term encompasses the knowledge of humanity's tools and 
crafts and can be defined as "the practical application of knowledge" (Merriam-Webster, 
2006). If all technology can be considered in terms of applied knowledge, this would 
imply that there is no inherent difference between the various types of technology. 
However, scholars of technology usually classify technologies as hardware, software and 
knowledgeware or more generally as being hard or soft. 
Hardware is a physical artifact that is used in solving a problem or performing a 
task, whereas software corresponds to the program or set of instructions that describes the 
method of a task. Knowledgeware, on the other hand, is the knowledge of techniques that 
covers methods, materials, tools and processes. Hard technologies are usually composed 
of mostly hardware and include the plant, equipment such as computer numerical control 
(CNC) machines, and robots (Whittaker, 1990) whereas soft technologies are easier to 
change compared to hard technologies, and composed of software and knowledgeware 
(Chase and Aquilano, 1995).   
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Similar to the adaptation of organisms, adaptation in organizations is the process by 
which organizations and their participants maintain consistency in and among themselves 
against short-term environmental fluctuations and long-term changes in the composition 
and structure of their environments (Rappaport, 1971).  Despite the widespread use of the 
term technology “adoption” in the literature, I have chosen to use the term “adaptation” 
since adoption implies  “choosing something voluntarily, accepting it formally, putting 
into effect and using it in practice” (Merriam-Webster, 2006). Whereas adaptation leaves 
room for adjustment to local, environmental conditions and allows “to make fit for a 
specific or new use or situation, often by modification” (Merriam-Webster, 2006).  
Hence, the term adaptation is purposefully used in this dissertation to refer to the mutual 
adjustments in structural and agency based elements of technology in organizations.   
 
 
1.1. Research Problem and Objectives 
 
 
Reviewing earlier theoretical approaches to technology in organizations, the 
objective of this study is to develop a comprehensive understanding of how technology is 
experienced and the way technology adaptation unfolds in organizations. My aim is to 
understand how technologies are locking organizations in particular patterns of practice 
and at the same time, how technologies are also enacted to unlock and destabilize 
established practices in organizations.  
In this study, I am considering technology adaptation both as structuration and 
institutionalization.  I am considering structuration as a set of dynamic relationships 
historically and contextually embedded into the action realm, whereas institutionalization 
is understood as another set of dynamic relationships embedded into the structure realm.  I 
call this model of technology adaptation as “Recursive Dualism of Technology” (RDT) 
because the structural changes may originate from either structure or action realms of 
technology and may propagate each other during technology adaptation since both realms 
are recursively implicated.   
The model assumes a dynamic and highly non-linear nature due to the feedback 
mechanisms between action and structure realms of technology, by either supporting or 
undermining each other's effects.  It is capable of explaining both emergent and 
discontinuous changes during the process of technology adaptation.   
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While developing a model to explain the complex web of relationships between 
technology and organizations, I am also interested in reviewing some ideas on living with 
technology adaptation in organizations but I am not offering a set of “managerial 
prescriptions” on how to use technology to successfully implement change.   
In this study, I attempt to make three types of contributions: First, I develop a 
comprehensive model of technology adaptation in organizations to build on the 
accumulated knowledge of technology, especially the Operations Management (OM) 
related technologies such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Total Quality 
Management (TQM), Just-In-Time production (JIT) and Knowledge Management 
Systems (KMS) from an Organization Studies (OS) perspective.  Second, the dissertation 
is expected to contribute to theory building in organization theory, sociology of 
technology, and operations management through empirical investigation of technology 
adaptation using the RDT model, taking into consideration both local, contingent aspects 
of socio-technical change and the broader social structures at the same time.  Finally, the 
dissertation attempts to contribute to the field of organization studies by combining 
structuration and institutionalization processes in the RDT model to expand the 
understanding of social institutions and the process of construction and maintenance of a 
social institution.   
In the rest of this dissertation, the prior approaches and models on technology in 
organizations are reviewed with a special emphasis on structuration and 
institutionalization perspectives, in Chapter 2.  A limited review of organizational change 
literature and process of institutional change is also presented in that chapter.  
Structuration Theory of Giddens (1984) is reviewed with critiques and alternatives, 
especially those provided by Mouzelis (1995) and Archer (1982, 1989, 1995).  In Chapter 
3, I develop and present the RDT model together with a set of theoretical propositions that 
describe RDT.  In the same chapter, the RDT model is further discussed in relation to 
Enterprise Resource Planning technologies, which is the technology under focus for the 
cases of this study.  Research methodology and design are presented in Chapter 4.  
Following that, ERP adaptation case studies in different organizational situations are 
presented and the theoretical results and implications are discussed. In Chapters 5, 6, 7 
and 8, ERP adaptation cases are presented and discussed within the framework of the 
RDT model.  In Chapter 9, all case studies are compared and contrasted to discuss the 
empirical validity of the RDT model together with the limitations of this study and 
potential further studies. 
 4
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2  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe and critically reappraise the earlier literature that the RDT 
model is built on. Institutional approaches to stability and change are described and 
agency based and structural explanations of technology and organizational phenomena are 
discussed together with power mechanisms within organizations. I also review, 
structuration theory of Giddens, and present its critiques and alternatives. 
 
 
2.1. Technology and Organizations 
 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s rational models had dominated social analyses of 
technology.  Over the past 25 years, researchers have developed a variety of explanations 
on the relationship between organizations and technology, including structuration 
(Orlikowski 1992, DeSanctis and Poole 1994), organizational learning (Robey et al.  
2000), and actor network theory (Walsham 1997) to name a few.  All these perspectives 
consider technology within its social context and in relation to organizational processes 
leading to stability and change in organizations.  The desire to explain the technology and 
organization relationship usually leads to theoretical positions that privilege either human 
agencies over social structures and technological features (agency position) or social 
structures and technological features over human agencies (structural position) (Boudreau 
and Robey, 2005).   
An agency position suggests that humans are relatively free to enact technologies in 
any way they like.  Humans can devise novel uses of technologies and cause 
unanticipated consequences (Orlikowski and Barley 2001).  For example, Orlikowski 
(2000) concluded that transformations in organizations were enacted by actual practices 
 6
rather than caused by the structural aspects of a technology.  According to this 
perspective, as users enact technologies in response to their local experiences and needs, 
significant organizational changes may result over time.  Such changes are not realized 
from the social structures that are embodied in the technology, but rather "every 
engagement with a technology is temporally and contextually provisional, and thus there 
is, in every use, always the possibility of a different structure being enacted" (Orlikowski 
2000, p.  412).   
On the other hand, structural perspectives treat technology as a determinant of 
change and organizational action.  They hold the view that technologies play active roles 
in creating and maintaining social order by embodying rules for action and limiting 
choice alternatives (Huber 1990, Zuboff 1988).  Thus technologies can constrain social 
action in a manner similar to that of social structures.  Although technologies are 
acknowledged to be the products of human action, they become constraints on the human 
agency once they are in use.   
In addition to these approaches which privilege organizational action or social 
structure, structurational perspectives on organizations and technology try to establish a 
balance between them based on Giddens' (1984) structuration theory (DeSanctis and 
Poole 1994, Orlikowski 1992, Orlikowski and Robey 1991, Poole and DeSanctis 2004).  
For example, Barley (1986) considered computerized imaging technologies as 
"occasions" for structural changes in organizations, showing that each were enacted 
differently in different settings despite their similar technical features.  According to this 
perspective, human action is not determined by social structures or technologies.  As 
Jones (1999) argued, both agency and structure operate in both a dialectic and emergent 
manner, each mutually affecting and transforming the other, creating an adaptation of 
structure and agency: 
The particular trajectory of emergence is not wholly determined either by 
the intentions of the human actors or by the material properties of 
technology, but rather by the interplay of the two. ... These interactions 
would seem particularly complex in relation to information technologies 
with their intangible products and their extensive involvement in a diverse 
range of organizational work practices (p.297).   
Despite the intended balance between structure and agency, structurational 
perspectives usually lead to a more agency based outlook, reducing social structures to 
repeating patterns in human actions and loosing institutional influences on technology 
adaptation.  Therefore, while trying to develop the RDT model as a comprehensive model 
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of technology adaptation, I have drawn from institutional theory and power based 
perspectives in addition to structuration theory.   
Institutional theory explains that social conditions effectively constrain but do not 
completely determine human action (DiMaggio 1988, 1991; Oliver 1991).  According to 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) organizational change theories can be grouped into four 
ideal type explanations, namely life-cycle, dialectical, teleological, and evolutionary.  
Institutional theory represents a combination of life-cycle and dialectical explanations of 
organizational change.  Some institutional theorists also acknowledge that “individuals 
and organizations can deliberately modify and even eliminate institutions” (Barley & 
Tolbert 1997) through choice and action, opening the theory for the teleological 
explanation.  Structuration theory, on the other hand, is more teleological and 
evolutionary because it centers on purposefulness of the conscious actor and evolutionary 
change.  In RDT, I augment institutional theory with structuration theory, aiming to 
develop a comprehensive and dynamic model of technology adaptation that accounts for 
how actions and structures are “recursively related” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  I 
consider this combination unproblematic because principal tenets of institutional theory 
resemble the premises of structuration theory as articulated by Giddens (1976, 1979) and 
by those who followed structuration theory in organization studies (Barley, 1986; 
Manning 1982; Pettigrew, 1987; Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980; Roberts and 
Scapens 1985; Smith 1983; Spybey 1984; Willmott 1987).   
 
 
2.2. Institutional Explanations of Stability and Change 
 
 
The concept of institutions has been a concern within sociological theory (Hughes 
1936, 1939; Parsons 1951; Selznick 1949, 1957).  Institutions have also become a central 
notion in organizational research with the development of institutional theory of 
organizations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Meyer & Rowan 1977; Powell & DiMaggio 
1991; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Zucker 1977, 1983). According to Scott, “Institutions 
consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide 
stability and meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers – 
cultures, structures and routines- and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdictions.” 
(Scott, 1995, p.33).  
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Institutional theorists maintain that organizations and individuals are strongly 
intertwined in a web of values, norms, rules, beliefs, and assumptions; some of which are 
beyond individual choice. The central theme of institutional theory has been to explain the 
isomorphism within organizational fields and the establishment of institutional norms 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989; Levitt and Nass 
1989; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Institutional theory proposes that organizational 
environments '...are characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which 
individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy...' 
(Scott and Meyer 1983, p. 149). Therefore, environments provide blueprints for 
organizing by specifying the forms and procedures an organization should take to be 
considered as legitimate (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Forms and procedures are derived and 
facilitated institutionally by normative, coercive, and mimetic forces (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983).   
Institutions impose constraints on individual and collective actions. They, however, 
are open to modification and reconfiguration over time.  Whether institutions are 
considered as cognitive, normative or regulative structures, they “must be constructed and 
maintained as well as adapted and changed” (Scott & Christensen, 1995, p.  303).  
Institutional theory has primarily focused on understanding stability, convergence and 
isomorphism within organizations. However recently, the dynamics of institutionalization 
and institutional change also have received attention (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Dacin, 
Goodstein & Scott, 2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Fligstein, 1997; Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings 2002; Hoffman, 1999; Kitchener 2002; Scott & Christensen, 1995; 
Seo & Creed, 2002).   
Institutionalization is defined by Berger and Luckmann (1967) as a core process in 
the creation and maintenance of stable social groups. An institution is described as 
"reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors" (Berger and Luckmann 
1967, p. 54) and the process that creates an institution is defined as institutionalization. 
Tolbert and Zucker (1996) suggest three key component processes for the initial 
formation and maintenance of institutions: Habitualization, objectification and 
sedimentation. Habitualization refers to the development of patterned problem solving 
behaviors with particular stimuli. Objectification, refers to the development of general 
shared social meanings attached to these behaviors. It is considered necessary for the 
transplantation of actions to contexts beyond their point of origination (Tolbert and 
Zucker 1996).  The third process is referred to as sedimentation by Tolbert and Zucker 
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(1996). It is the process through which actions acquire exteriority. Extority refers to the 
degree that typifications are ‘experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality 
that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact’ (Zucker, 1977). It is about 
historical continuity of typifications (Zucker, 1977) and especially their transmission to 
the new members who treat them as social given facts (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). 
Zucker (1977) demonstrated that as the degree of objectification and exteriority of an 
action increased, so did the degree of institutionalization. They defined institutionalization 
as the individuals’ conformity to others’ behavior. The study showed that when 
institutionalization is high, the transmission of the action, maintenance of that action over 
time, and resistance of that action to change are all also high.  
 
Figure 1-1 Component processes of institutionalization  
(Source: Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) 
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Regarding institutional change, existing literature mainly has two basic 
explanations: structural and agency based.  The structural explanation suggests that 
change occurs when an external contradiction disrupts the existing institutional order.  
Change is the result of a reconfiguration process, is context dependent, and involves no 
particular causal agent.  The agency-based explanation suggests, on the contrary, that the 
origin of change is in human action at the individual level (Seo & Creed, 2002; Zucker, 
1988), the group level (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002), or the organizational level 
(Holm, 1995).  The human action leading to change may be purposeful (Barley & Tolbert, 
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1997) or not (Lawrence et al, 2002).  Such explanations of organizational change 
acknowledge a rational actor, who acts mostly independent of his context, which is, as an 
argument, controversial to the sociological foundations of organization studies and 
institutional theory in particular.   
A major contribution to the processual understanding of institutional change is 
provided by Barley and Tolbert’s (1997) conceptual model.  Since Giddens' perspective is 
implicitly temporal (Burns and Scapens 2000), Barley and Tolbert (1997) redefined 
structuration as a processual model that describes the relationship between agency and 
structure over time and made a theoretical attempt to combine the institutionalist 
perspective with structuration theory.  Similar to this study, they do not conceive structure 
and agency as a conflated duality, but as rather two distinct recursively linked realms.  
According to Barley and Tolbert (1997), institutions are encoded in scripts and actors 
enact these scripts in practice to replicate structures and develop new structures by 
revising them. The revised scripts are further externalized and objectified to form the 
behavioral regularities that are “observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction 
characteristic of a particular setting” (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, p.  98).   
 
2.2.1. Power and Institutions 
 
During technology adaptation in an organization, power based institutionalization 
mechanisms are expected to operate.  The needs and goals of different agents, (Cyert, 
Dill, & March, 1958) or orientations of different structures (Mouzelis, 1995) may 
inevitably conflict or contradict. In organization studies, existing perspectives of power 
mostly focus on forms of power “as ... manifested in willful acts of influence” (Lawrence, 
Winn and Jennings 2001) in relation to hierarchical relationships within a collective of 
individuals. However, institutionalization and structuration of a technology in an 
organization involves a variety of agents and structures. Hence, consideration of a broader 
range of power forms (such as incarceration, violence, surveillance, examination, 
discrimination, processual domination, etc.) is necessary. Lawrence, Winn and Jennings 
(2001) propose a typology of power-based mechanisms that can support development and 
maintenance of institutions. Their typology categorizes “power-based institutionalization 
mechanisms” according to the dimensions of whether the source of power is agency 
(episodic) or structural (systemic) and whether the target of power acts as an object or a 
subject.  If the target has no ability to choose, then the source is omnipotent, completely in 
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control over the target’s future whereas, if the target has the ability to choose, then it 
always has some potential to act otherwise.  Based on these differences, their typology is 
categorized into four power based institutionalization mechanisms (See Figure 2.2.) that 
have been extensively examined in the literature: influence, force, discipline, and 
domination (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001).  Influence is identified as agency-
based power exercised on subjects who have the ability to choose.  If power is exercised 
by an agency-based source and the target has to obey the source, than the mechanism is 
identified as a force.  If the source of power is structure-based and the target has capacity 
to choose, the power-based mechanism that operates between them is discipline.  If power 
from a systemic source acts on objects with no choice, then the mechanism is called 
domination.  Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001) proposed that pace and stability of an 
institutionalization process is related with the degree and nature of inherent power 
mechanisms employed.  Their typology is valuable for my study since it differentiates 
between structure and action based sources of power and, unlike most accounts of power 
in the literature, takes into consideration the capacity of the power source in determining 
the target’s future.  The mechanisms described in this typology enable us to locate 
different power-based mechanisms applicable to the different processes operating 
between structures and actions during technology adaptation.   
 
Figure 2-2 Power Mechanisms in Institutionalization 
Source: (Adapted from Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001) 
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2.3. Structuration of Stability and Change 
 
 
Although “structuration” as a term is generally used to refer to the formation of 
social structures, it is predominantly used in the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984).  
Structuration theory attempts to resolve the deep-seated ontological division in the social 
sciences between paradigms and has offered a way out from the impasse. It was 
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developed (Giddens, 1976; Giddens, 1979; Giddens 1984) as an attempt to resolve the 
fundamental division in the social sciences between the naturalistic and interpretive 
tradition. By incorporating both subjective and objective interpretations of the world, 
Giddens proposed a view of human agents and social structure as a mutually 
interdependent duality rather than a dualism. In other words, instead of seeing human 
action taking place within the context of the ‘outside’ constraints of social structure (a 
dualism), action and structure are seen as two aspects of the same whole (a duality).  
According to Giddens, structuration refers to the “formation and maintenance of 
social structures and systems by conceptualizing the relation between the subjective 
powers of the actors and the objective powers of the social structures they produce” 
(Parker, 2000).  According to Giddens, humans are essentially involved within society: 
they actively construct, support, and change it.  While humans are affected by society they 
also affect it. They are capable of resisting imposed constraints However, as Layder 
(1994, p. 128) says ”Giddens is careful of not stepping in the foot print of the 
ethnomethodologists or phenomenologists who do not recognize the existence of society 
beyond every day life and recognize that social institutions pre-exist individuals”. 
Regular actions of knowledgeable and reflexive agents establish patterns of 
interaction that become standardized practices. Habitual use of standardized practices 
becomes institutionalized forming the structural properties of organizations and societies. 
Structure is the rules and resources that constitute the structural properties of social 
systems. Giddens defines structure as ”rules and resources recursively implicated in social 
reproduction; institutionalized features of social systems have structural properties in the 
sense that relationships are stabilized across time and space”. (Giddens 1984). Structure 
”exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and is 
instantiated in action” (Giddens 1984). Giddens regards structure not merely as 
constraining, but also as enabling. ”The structural properties of social systems are both 
medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize” (Giddens 1984).  
Structuration refers to the conditions governing the continuity or transformation of 
structures, and therefore their reproduction. It is an ongoing process rather than a static 
property where the duality of structure evolves and is reproduced over time space. Agents 
in their actions constantly produce and reproduce and develop the social structures, which 
both constrain and enable them. “All structural properties of social systems … are the 
medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors. The 
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reflexive monitoring of action in situations of co-presence is the main anchoring feature 
of social integration” (Giddens, 1984, p. 191).  
Giddens also draws the attention to the notion of power. Although human action is 
motivational and intentional, motivation and intention are not prime causes of action. 
According to Giddens, all human action implies power—the capacity to produce an effect 
(Layder, 1994, p. 137). Giddens is very concerned regarding to the unequal distribution of 
power. The extent of one’s influence is limited by the resources at her/his disposal. 
However, he believes that even subordinates will have some resources at their disposal to 
balance the power relationship (Layder, 1994, p. 137). 
Giddens points out that structuration theory does not carry any particular 
methodological implications but sensitizes the researcher to particular concepts, such as 
the relationship between action and structure, which might otherwise be ignored.  Giddens’ 
work on structuration has received considerable attention from many fields including 
organization studies and information technology (Jones 1998).   
 
2.3.1. Structuration of Technology 
 
Orlikowski (1992) has reconsidered the various conceptualizations of technology in 
the literature and building on structuration theory, suggested a structurational model of 
technology.  The model is based on the notions of the duality and interpretive flexibility of 
technology and proposes that human actions are both enabled and constrained by 
technology, yet technology exists as a result of previous actions of human agents (See 
Figure 2-3).   
The duality of technology aims to eliminate the dichotomy between the objective 
view of technology as ”hardware”, equipment, machines, and instruments and the social 
view of technology (Barley, 1986; Davis, Bagozzi and Warshaw 1989). According to this 
view, any technology has both an actual component such as a material artifact and a social 
component such as a meaning that actors attach to a technology. 
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Figure 2-3 Structurational Model of Technology (Source: Orlikowski, 1992) 
 
 
A consequence of the duality concept is the interpretive flexibility of technology, 
which means that the interaction of technology and organization is a function of the 
different actors and socio-historical contexts in technology design and use. Instead of 
seeing design and use as disconnected stages in the life-cycle of a technology, the 
structurational model of technology argues that users can change a technology actually 
and socially through their interactions –interpret, appropriate, and manipulate it in various 
ways– under the influence of various social and individual factors. Orlikowski (1992) 
suggests that both opportunities for change, as well as rigid and routinized views of 
technology often develop as a function of the interaction between technology and 
organizations.  She argues that they are not embedded into the nature of the technology. 
Therefore, human agency can shape technology and also get shaped by it. 
Orlikowski later developed a practice-based action perspective on the 
organizational change issue which she calls “Situated Change Perspective”, building more 
on the action side of the structuration theory (Orlikowski, 1996). She questions the belief 
that organizational change must be planned, and technology is the primary cause of 
technology related organizational transformation, and radical changes always occur 
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rapidly and discontinuously. She focuses on changes in the on-going practices of 
individuals. Orlikoswski (1996) criticizes the punctuated equilibrium models where the 
change is rapid, episodic, and radical for being still based on the primacy of structure and 
suggests that extant perspectives neglect "emergent change", where the realization of a 
new pattern of organizing establishes without prior intentions. She considers 
organizational transformation as an on-going improvisation enacted by organizational 
actors trying to make sense of and act coherently in the world. She considers 
organizational design as emergent phenomena that become only visible after the fact. 
According to this perspective, each change in practice creates the conditions for further 
breakdowns, unanticipated outcomes, and innovations. Organizations are considered as 
enacted creatures that are constituted by the ongoing agency of actors. Actions either 
reproduce existing organizational properties or alter them (Orlikoswski, 1996).  
Because the structuration theory has an abstract formulation, its empirical 
application has been a rare event (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Thrift (1985) and Gregson 
(1989) even claimed that the structuration theory is empirically irrelevant. Hence both the 
duality of technology model and the related empirical tests (Orlikowski & Gash 1994; 
Orlikowski 1993) are critically important for the structuration theory. 
 
 
2.4. Critics and Alternatives of Structuration 
 
 
A number of criticisms, which also apply to most of the other studies that take a 
structurational perspective, have been posed against structuration theory.  First, some 
critics charge that structuration theory conflates action to structure, structure to action 
(Clegg 1989; Archer 1982, 1989, 1995; Layder 1987; Callinicos 1985; Mouzelis 1995).  
If we deny the existence of structure apart from action, how can we empirically 
investigate them separately? If action and structure are not analytically and 
phenomenologically distinct, which induces change or leads to order and stability? The 
structurational perspective has also been criticized since it assumes that any 
organizational intervention can be interpreted and appropriated relatively independent of 
the constraining effects of the social structure.  How and where structuration constrains 
and enables action is also ambiguous.  Walsham (1997) notes that Giddens' work offers 
few methodological guidelines, making it difficult to answer some important questions 
such as why one technology is successful while another is not. Furthermore, structuration 
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theory is difficult to apply empirically, since it is a meta-theory which remains 
fundamentally non-propositional.  
Mouzelis (1995) and  Archer  (1995) offer alternatives to the structuration theory. 
While Mouzelis provides an internal critique and reconstruction of Giddens' theory, 
Archer provides a distinct, external alternative. However, both authors reintroduced the 
dualism of agency and structure to avoid the pitfalls of the duality concept (Healy, 1998).  
In the following sections, I will consider these critics and alternatives.   
 
2.4.1. Reconstruction of Structuration  
 
Mouzelis (1989, 1995) considers the reduction of the structure-agency dualism into 
a duality as incomplete.  “The type of subject-object relationship that the duality-of-
structure scheme implies does not exhaust the types of relationship subjects have vis-à-vis 
rules and resources, or towards social objects in general” (Mouzelis 1995, p.  119). He 
introduces the paradigm-syntagm distinction to differentiate general rules (paradigm) 
from their specific instances (syntagm) (Healy, 1998).   
According to Mouzelis, the actors’ orientation may change depending on their 
situation: they “may unthinkingly enact rules (paradigmatic duality) or contemplate them 
(paradigmatic dualism); or consciously deal with it as a game (syntagmatic duality) or be 
powerless to affect it (syntagmatic dualism)” (Healy, 1998, p.  511). These alternative 
orientations do not eliminate either duality or dualism concepts but consider both of them 
simultaneously.   
Mouzelis (1989, 1995) also proposes that an individual’s orientation depends 
largely on his/her position in the social hierarchy.  Thus, agents who are higher up in the 
hierarchy influence agents at lower levels “by creating both limits and opportunities for 
them” (Mouzelis 1995, p. 142).  Decisions therefore taken by a macro actor may establish 
lower level structures for meso and micro actors creating limits for their actions, whereas 
issues that can be considered as external for a micro actor might be more malleable for a 
meso or macro actor, as described by Mouzelis (1995, p. 120-1): 
Occupants of subordinate positions tend to relate to games played at 
higher organizational levels in terms of syntagmatic dualism (since as 
single individuals they cannot affect them significantly); whereas they 
relate to rules initiated from above predominantly in terms of 
paradigmatic duality (since they are supposed to, and often do, follow 
them in a taken-for-granted manner). The opposite combination 
(syntagmatic duality and paradigmatic dualism) obtains if one looks at 
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how occupants of super-ordinate positions relate to games and rules 
respectively on lower organizational levels. 
Mouzelis’ argument suggests that both structures and actors exist simultaneously at 
different levels.  “Talk about micro-macro, or about participant-social-whole linkages 
without taking into account social hierarchies is like trying to swim in an empty pool” 
(Mouzelis 1995, p.126). Since all complex social wholes, including organizations, are 
hierarchical, an orientation of an individual to system or rules which depends largely on 
her/his position in the hierarchy. Thus, “whenever games are hierarchised, players higher 
up influence games and players at the lower levels by creating both limits and 
opportunities”(Mouzelis 1995, p.142). So, “what is an external and non-malleable game 
from the perspective of a micro or meso actor, may be less external, and more malleable 
from the point of view of a macro actor” (Mouzelis 1995, p. 141). According to Mouzelis, 
“actor” can be an operational team member of a company (micro) or a branch manager 
(meso) or the company president (macro) whose decisions directly affect all  other people 
in the company.  Mouzelis (1995) suggests that institutional structures and actors exist at 
different levels with different powers and reaches. Therefore, macro-actors can have a 
strong influence on the local conditions of micro-actors. Mouzelis (1995) also suggests 
that, similar to the multi-level nature of actors, institutions are also constructed and 
maintained to varying degrees of “durability” (Mouzelis 1996). The variation in durability 
of institutions does not come from their "materiality" or weakness, but from the fact that, 
“on the level of social integration, powerful interest groups support them more or less 
purposely” (Mouzelis 1996, p. 3). Therefore, unlike Giddens, Mouzelis (1996) can 
classify power and durability variations within a social hierarchy. Considering that some 
structures are much harder to change than others, and actors' orientation vary on the basis 
of their position, is a significant improvement, to get an empirical leverage on a problem 
(Healy, 1998).  
 
2.4.2. Morphogenetic Approach 
 
Archer (1995) argues that conflating structure and action in the Structuration 
Theory not only weakens the concepts analytically but also challenges the distinction 
between original concepts ”social” and ”system” integration by Lockwood (1956, 1964), 
which she considers as necessary to be able to understand why things are ”so and not 
otherwise”. According to Archer (1995), structure and agency are ”phased over different 
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tracts of time”.  Human actions are effective over the short term whereas structures are 
clearly more enduring, which also allows their analytical separation. She considers 
Giddens’ conceptualization of structure as ”rules and resources” in memory traces of 
individuals that are -instantiated in action, as loose and abstract. In this sense, Archer 
(1995) is closer to the structuralist tradition of social thought, whereas structure has a far 
more tangible function in constraining human action. Thus Archer (1982) argues that 
Giddens undermines structures’ very nature of being “a priori” and autonomous.  
In the light of these criticisms, Archer (1995) develops the morphogenetic approach 
to provide an alternative to structuration theory.  The term “morphogenesis” refers to 
social processes that alter or change systems, given state or form (Buckley, 1967). She 
conceptualizes change as a socio-historical interplay of structure and agency as a 
historical process.  According to Archer (1995), actors influence social structures through 
their daily activities.  However, their degree of influence depends on their position in 
society and their resources. Therefore, Archer (1995) accepts we all, more or less, have 
the ability to affect social structures. However this depends on the specific context that we 
were born or find ourselves in at any given point in time.  
Archer (1995) posits that, social structures are the product of human interaction, but 
they can act to constrain or enable individuals who then reproduce or transform the 
structural arrangements by their actions. Structures therefore are dependent upon actors, 
but due to their own causal capacity can be considered as apart from human agency that 
had created them. In other words, structures have their own ability to cause things to 
happen, hence they are real entities enduring through time and space, following the 
philosophical realism of Bhaskar (1989).  
According to Archer (1995), actors do not actively construct social reality everyday; 
rather they are born into an existing social order.  Therefore, unlike structuration theory, 
Archer’s perspective proposes that social structures exist prior to action. Therefore, 
Archer (1995) notes that structuration theory ignores the fact that although people create 
and re-create the social structure they live within, they are always born into existing 
structural arrangements. However, Archer (1995) does not implicitly mean to legitimize 
the status-quo, instead, being able to analytically define it, she suggests asking more 
fundamental questions, regarding to the existing state of relations and structures. For 
example, Archer(1995) considers the structuration theory’s conceptual explanation of 
reproduction of social structure as insufficient to explain why we have to be in the system 
that we are in the first place. A more crucial question according to Archer is: ”why do 
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some forms of social reproduction succeed and become institutionalized, and others do 
not?”(Archer, 1995). A similar question in technology domain might be ‘why does one 
technology become institutionalized in organizational life, and another does not?’. For 
such questions, Archer (1995) argues that the structuration theory has no direct answers. 
Archer (1995) uses social integration (state of relations between actors) and system 
integration (state of relations between social structures) concepts (Lockwood, 1964) to 
explore the necessary level of interaction for the creation of a favorable or an unfavorable 
condition for social change.  She asserts that the sufficient impetus for change must exist 
at both social and system integration levels to have enduring social change.   
 
 
2.5. Combining Structuration and Institutionalization 
 
 
Arguments of structuration theory as articulated by Giddens (1976, 1979) and those 
who worked with the ideas of structuration in organization studies (Ranson et al. 1980; 
Pettigrew 1985,1987; Willmott 1987) bear a resemblance to some of the tenets of 
institutional  theory.  Like institutional theorists, structuration theorists acknowledge that 
social conditions significantly constrain but do not completely determine human action. 
Although it is not as frequent, “individuals and organizations can deliberately modify, and 
even eliminate, institutions” (Barley and Tolbert 1997) through choice and action. As 
suggested by Barley and Tolbert (1997), structuration theory may augment institutional 
theory to develop “dynamic models of institutions and devise methodologies for 
investigating how actions and institutions are recursively related”. 
An attempt to combine institutionalization and structuration is provided by Barley 
and Tolbert (1997) in their recursive model of institutionalization based on Giddens' 
concept of structuration (Figure 2.4) to explain the dynamic interaction between 
institutions and human action. Since Giddens' models do not incorporate historical time 
(Burns and Scapens 2000) and are implicitly temporal, Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
translate Giddens' static portrayal of structuration into a more dynamic model that 
describes the relationship between agency and institutions over time. They also discussed 
methodological requirements of studying institutionalization as structuration. With regard 
to day-to-day interactions, they perceive institutions as being enacted through “scripts” 
(Barley 1986). They define scripts not primarily as cognitive phenomena (Schank and 
Ableson 1977) but as behavioral regularities. From their perspective, scripts are 
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observable and recurrent activities, and patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular 
setting. Their version of “scripts” encode the social logic of what Goffman (1983) called 
an “interaction order”.  
Their model combines institutionalization with structuration and considers it as a 
continuous process whose operation can be observed only through time. The distinct 
horizontal arrows signify the temporal extensions of Giddens' two realms of social 
structure: institution and action. The vertical and diagonal arrows linking the two realms 
denote the recursive dualism of social systems. Since their model no longer conceives 
structure and agency as a dual whole but rather two distinct realms, it is the reintroduction 
of dualism in a recursive manner instead of duality. Vertical arrows represent 
”institutional constraints on action”, while diagonal arrows represent ”maintenance or 
modification of the institution through action”, that is, dualism of social systems. 
According to the model of Barley and Tolbert (1997), ”social behaviors constitute 
institutions diachronically, while institutions constrain action synchronically”. 
 
Figure 2-4 A sequential model of institutionalization                                                
(Source: Barley & Tolbert 1997) 
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The first arrow (a) represents the encoding of institutional principles in the scripts 
used in specific settings. It frequently takes place during socialization and involves an 
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individual internalization of rules and interpretations of behavior appropriate for particular 
settings.  
The second arrow (b) occurs when ”actors enact scripts that encode institutional 
principles”. Enacting a script may or may not entail conscious choice or an awareness of 
alternatives. In many cases enactment does not involve awareness or intention: ”actors 
simply behave according to their perception of the way things are”.  
The third arrow (c) is about the degree to which behaviors revise or replicate the 
scripts.  Usually an attempt to alter scripts is more likely to lead to institutional change 
than are unconscious, unintended deviations from a script (see Boisot and Child 1988). 
Changes in technology, cross-cultural contacts, economic downturns, and similar events 
increase the potential that actors will realize that an institution should be modified 
(Ranson et al. 1980). However, their ability to apply change is likely to be constrained by 
the inflexibility that got disturbed by the change in the status quo. Those people are likely 
to resist change in an existing set of arrangements (Pettigrew 1987). Thus, Barley and 
Tolbert (1997) believe that contextual change is usually necessary before actors can 
assemble the resources and rationales that are necessary for collectively questioning 
scripted patterns of behavior. Otherwise idiosyncratic deviations from scripts occur but 
they are apt to have only passing impact on social arrangements. 
The fourth arrow (d) represents the objectification and externalization of the 
patterned behaviors and interactions produced. This involves the disassociation of patterns 
with particular actors and particular historical circumstances: the patterns acquire a 
normative, “factual” quality.  
Studies on the structuration can complement models of institutionalization. As 
suggested by many prior studies on technology adaptation, as time passes, technology 
tends to become taken-for-granted in use. The significant insight of this work is that the 
process of this dynamic interplay between the action and structure is understood as 
institutionalization and structuration. 
 
 
2.6. Enterprise Resource Planning Technology 
 
 
In order to empirically observe the model, I have selected Enterprise Resource 
Planning technology to be the case technology to study empirically in organizational 
settings. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is a complex software technology that 
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integrates business processes in organizations such as financial administration, human 
resource management, manufacturing, and supply chain management around a common 
database.  Since ERP is a ready-made software solution, it allows limited modification 
during its design, implementation, and use in an organization and poses limits on 
organizational action (Kallinikos 2004, Robey et al.  2002). Fundamental modifications 
on the work processes embedded in the vendor's software are discouraged and plain 
implementations are recommended (Robey et al.  2002).  The integrated nature of an ERP 
system imposes more constraints on its users, as their work is tightly coupled with this 
highly integrated software and limits users’ enactments. 
Implementation of an ERP system is reported to be challenging, typically taking 
one to five years and with significant costs (Mabert et al., 2000).  Despite investing 
significantly in time and resources, many companies have struggled and sometimes failed 
in ERP adaptation (Mabert, Soni and Venkataramaan 2000; 2003).  Considering the issue 
as a planned organizational change attempt, this is not surprising because theorizing and 
practicing change in organizations are among the most challenging issues in management 
theory and practice. Therefore, organizational changes experienced during design, 
implementation and use of ERP that interact with the various facets of an organization are 
expected to be problematic.  The difficulties organizations face during this complex and 
resource intensive implementation process also suggest the need for developing a better 
understanding of ERP adaptation in organizations (Bradforda and Florin, 2003; 
Krumbholz and Maiden, 2001; Rajagopal, 2002).   
Adaptation in organizations is the process by which organizations and their 
participants change to maintain consistency in and amongst themselves against short-term 
environmental fluctuations and long-term changes in the composition and structure of 
their environments, like adaptation of organisms (Rappaport, 1971).  There are many 
approaches that attempt to understand the patterns and mechanisms of organizational 
change and adaptation as technology changes.  For example, despite views of gradual 
adaptation, Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) suggest that the pattern of adaptation for an 
individual new technology is often "lumpy" or episodic and highly discontinuous.   
Since ERP has generic functionality sets related to specific business processes, its 
adaptation requires disruptive organizational change in their implementation (Asbrand, 
1998; Edmondson, Baker and Cortese, 1997; Filipczak, 1997; Hecht, 1997; White, Clark 
and Ascarelli, 1997).  The main challenge of ERP implementation is not about 
configuration of the technology and setting off the appropriate control parameters.  ERP is 
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a software application and therefore its inherent design imposes certain constraints on the 
design, implementation, and use. There are usually gaps between the software's generic 
functionality and the way the organization currently operates (Soh et al., 2000).  When 
built-in functionality cannot be configured to exactly match the way the organization 
works, organizational processes need to be adapted to fit the basic procedures embedded 
in the software.  If the gap between desired/existing functionality and ERP functionality 
cannot be bridged, then certain processes may be handled outside the software, the base 
code may be changed, or additional modules can be developed.  Therefore, ERP 
implementation requires a comprehensive understanding of the critical organizational 
processes, and a detailed knowledge of the very complex ERP software.   
The ERP concept was developed to integrate isolated systems and business 
processes to allow information sharing and real-time transaction functionality across 
business units and locations.  However most of the available ERP related research tends 
to view ERP only as software rather than a concept.  Furthermore most ERP research 
related to ERP adaptation only targets performance related issues such as cost, time, and 
success usually in an atheoretical manner, using mostly exploratory surveys.  However, 
when ERP is being investigated, it is critical to make a clear distinction between the ERP 
concept and the ERP system and develop a comprehensive understanding of both (Jacobs 
and Bendoly, 2003).  For example, Mabert, Soni and Venkataraman (2000) present a 
concept-based definition of ERP as the ”seamless integration of processes across 
functional areas with improved workflow, standardization of various business practices, 
improved order management, accurate accounting of inventory and better supply chain 
management”, whereas they perceive the ERP system as a software vehicle that provides 
this desired functionality.   
Based on this distinction between the ERP concept and the ERP system Jacobs and 
Bendoly (2003) identify two broad streams of ERP research. They state that ERP concept 
research tends to focus more on the potential impact of ERP on the performance of 
various business functions.  In contrast, ERP systems research tends to focus on the 
intricacies of the application and process design to meet conceptual objectives.  Research 
on ERP adaptation is reported to fit predominantly in the second category (Jacobs and 
Bendoly, 2003).   
Having reviewed theoretical approaches to institutionalization and structuration and 
research on ERP technology, in the next chapter I develop and present the RDT model, 
first in general terms, than specifically for ERP technology. 
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3  
 
 
THE RECURSIVE DUALISM OF TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I develop and present the Recursive Dualism of Technology (RDT) 
model including a set of theoretical propositions regarding to the processes explained by 
the RDT model.  In developing the model, I primarily reconsider the duality of 
technology model of Orlikowski (1992) and the sequential model of institutionalization 
and structuration by Barley and Tolbert (1997) to address both action and structure based 
aspects of technology.  Both models are built on structuration theory (Giddens, 1984) the 
fundamental premises of which have been criticized by several researchers (Archer 1982, 
1989, 1995; Callinicos 1985; Layder 1987; Mouzelis 1995) as discussed in Chapter 2.  In 
one of the authoritative criticisms of structuration theory, Archer (1982, 1989) reminds 
that people are always born into already existing structural arrangements resulting in the 
primacy of structure over action.  Archer emphasizes that structure may well be the 
medium and outcome of human action, but in the concept of duality structure doesn’t 
have an existence outside human action although it has real consequences for agency 
prior to inception.  Considering these critics, I introduce the concept of recursive dualism 
and reflect on the distinct effects both structure and action may have on the technology 
adaptation process in organizations.   
 
 
3.1. Recursive Dualism of Technology Model (RDT) 
 
 
In the RDT model technologies are identified as social institutions, comprised of 
two distinct realms: namely, structure and action.  These two realms are recursively 
implicated in a “recursive dualism”.  Recursive dualism assumes a fundamental 
distinction between the action and structure realms considering them as two ontologically 
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separate entities that are irreducibly distinct. However, it also acknowledges that both 
realms are recursively linked where each instance of one is related to a preceding instance 
of the other.  
In the RDT model, the structure realm covers all elements that virtually govern 
organizational practices in the action realm.  However, the structural realm is both 
dependent upon and has direct consequences on the action realm, due to its own “causal 
capacity” (Archer, 1995).  In this sense, the action realm is disposed but not 
predetermined by the structure realm in time and space.   
If elements in the action realm are to be sustained or reinforced over time, the 
existing or emergent structures must support them.  In the absence of this condition, they 
would eventually fade away and be abandoned.  Similarly, structural elements tend to 
perish if action elements do not back them.  The strength of the supportive relationship 
between structure and action elements determines stability.  The weakness or 
discontinuity of mutual support may lead to institutional decay or the 
deinstitutionalization of the existing order (Greenwood, et al. 2002; Jepperson 1991; Scott 
2001) or to impermanency of the changes in action and structure.  However this does not 
mean that the structure realm of technology is completely malleable by the action realm.  
The structure realm of technology has a primacy of existence over action (Archer, 1995) 
and enables agency “not by imposing a single and mechanical functionality but by 
inviting or excluding agency in special courses of action” (Kallinikos, 2002).   
The hierarchical variability of agency allows some actors to have differential levels 
of power because of associations, positions in hierarchies, and orientations to rules and 
resources (Mouzelis 1995).  Represented by the layers in the structure and action realm 
elements, such power asymmetries among different actors and structures are explicitly 
considered in the RDT model.  Following Mouzelis (1995), agency and structure are 
considered to vary at three hierarchical levels, termed macro, meso, and micro.  A certain 
macro actor or groups of macro actors, (i.e. top managers, technology officers) have the 
power to design the technology while meso actors (i.e. implementers, engineers) are 
responsible for implementation, and micro actors (i.e. users) for the use of that 
technology.   
The RDT model explains technology adaptation in an organization based on two 
separate but interacting realms: a structure realm that consists of paradigms, schemas, 
logics; and an action realm that consists of design, implementation, and use. The interplay 
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of these distinct elements at three hierarchical levels and their relationship with external 
structural forces depict technology adaptation in organizations over time (See Figure 3.1).   
Elements in the structural realm are “shared rules and typifications that identify 
social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley and Tolbert 1997; 
Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992). They may have normative, regulative, and cognitive natures 
in providing stability and meaning to elements in the action realm. The normative nature 
implies "normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory 
dimension into social life" (Scott, 1995, p. 37). Being regulative involves the presence of 
"explicit regulative processes: rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (Scott, 
1995, p. 35) and the cognitive nature covers “the rules that specify what types of actors 
are allowed to exist, what structural features they exhibit, what procedures they can 
follow, and what meanings are associated with these actions” (Ruef and Scott 1998).  
Paradigms refer to the underlying shared philosophies and general conceptions that 
define a specific technology, its domain of application, organization of knowledge 
regarding to its functions and experience in its artifacts.  Paradigms are available in the 
institutional environment and are inscribed into actors by their professional memberships 
and their formal as well as informal interactions with a technology.  They encompass a set 
of standards, obligations, and expectations, which implies moral commitments and codes 
of conduct.  Design involves making basic governance decisions by macro actors, such as 
designers to outline how technology should be defined for the organization.  Meso actors 
implement schemas of technology created in design and create technology artifacts that 
initiate and influence daily practices related with a technology in a specific organization.  
Users draw on their embedded knowledge, assumptions, experiences, and rules 
(Orlikowski and Robey 1991; Orlikowski 2000) from the logics of their technology 
practice (Bourdieu, 1990).  Logics refer to the knowledge, assumptions, experiences, and 
rules that are inscribed in users and govern a specific technology use.  The term includes 
the implicit or explicit judgments of micro actors on possibilities and constraints of a 
particular setting.  Logics structure technology use similar to the way on which paradigms 
and schemas structure design and implementation, but logics are highly contextualized for 
the particular conditions of the organization.  Use refers to how technology is employed, 
interpreted, and re-interpreted on a day-to-day basis by different actors as well as the 
likely conditions and consequences associated with technology use.  Use also involves 
changes and modifications through conscious and unconscious deviations by actors.   
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Following the tenets of new institutionalism (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), cognitive nature of paradigms, schemas, and logics 
provide the basis on which normative and regulative features are constructed. Therefore, 
these elements have both a cognitive (Schank and Ableson 1977) and behavioral nature, 
possessing regulative and normative characteristics. Hence, technology related rules, 
laws, sanctions, related certifications, accreditations, and the corresponding prevalent 
isomorphisms (Scott, 1995) are all part of different structural features of paradigms, 
schemas, and logics. 
 
Figure 3-1 Recursive dualism of technology model 
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Formation and maintenance of systems integration between the elements of the 
structural realm give rise to the legitimacy of a technology within an organization and 
defined as "a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance 
with relevant rules or laws" (Scott, 1995, p. 45) to reach expedience, become a social 
obligation, and have a taken-for-granted status within an organization. Hence, the 
prevalence of a high level of systems integration between elements in the structural realm 
can be an indicator of the gained legitimacy and institutionalization of a technology in an 
organization. 
The RDT model portrays technology as the medium and the product of the 
relationship between human agents and the social structure. In this respect, I am in 
agreement with Barley (1986, 1990) who stated that: “Technologies do influence 
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organizational structures in orderly ways, but their influence depends on the specific 
historical process in which they are embedded”.  Therefore, technology cannot be the 
mere cause, but a trigger of change in action and structure realms. 
In their model, Barley and Tolbert (1997) uses the term “scripts” as pivots between 
institution and action to maintain their duality and to explicate actor’s inferences 
regarding to the regularities in his/her actions.  However, this conception of duality does 
not apply in the same manner in the RDT model. It reintroduces the concept of dualism 
by acknowledging the separate existence of structure and action realms and represents 
their recursive relationship through their interactions. 
The RDT model also argues that some technical and social aspects of a technology 
are socially constructed within its local context for a specific time period, whereas some 
other technical and social aspects remain similar across all times and contexts. Hence, 
unlike Barley (1986, 1990), the RDT model enables us to understand both the social and 
physical modification of a technology during its design, implementation, and use. 
The RDT model employs the typology of Lawrence, Winn and Jennings (2001) to 
locate the expected power mechanisms and considers influence, force, discipline, and 
domination as fundamental power mechanisms that operate between levels of actors and 
structures while describing the power processes between the elements of the RDT model. 
I expect fundamental differences in the power mechanisms pertaining to technology 
adaptation, depending on whether technology is classified as hard or soft (Aggarwal, 
1995).  Since hard technologies tend to be designed, implemented, and used more strictly, 
they are considered to have a dominating impact on the way that individuals work with 
the technology.  The ”black box” nature of a hard technology creates lower interpretive 
flexibility whereas, soft technologies are more open to interpretation by several actors.  
Hard technologies are more systemic in nature and therefore have fewer contradictions 
between their structural elements.  In contrast, soft technologies are less systemic and 
have more potential contradictions within their structures. Therefore, I argue that hard 
technologies require higher levels of system integration and are more dominating on 
actors, compared to soft technologies, which, with their lower levels of system 
integration, are less dominating but more disciplinary on the way individuals work with 
technology.   
In the following sections, I present theoretical propositions of the RDT model to 
describe how structures and actors at various levels in the associated organizational 
context, dispose, contextualize, conflict, modify and contradict with each other. 
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3.1.1. Organizational Context 
 
According to RDT, structural forces in the wider and immediate environment are 
expected to influence the aspects of interaction between technology and organization.  
These forces may create a tendency for or inertia against change during technology 
adaptation.  If they are in partial or in complete contradiction with some arrangements, 
this may create an impetus for change at the system integration or social integration levels 
(Archer, 1979; Lockwood, 1964).  Forces originating from the wider organizational 
environment are called isomorphic forces whereas forces more directly attributed to 
specific organizational conditions are called organizational forces in the model.   
Isomorphic forces are coercive, normative, and mimetic forces as described by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991).  A coercive force such as a legal obligation may 
force an organization to employ a certain reporting system and hence adopt a certain 
technology, whereas a normative force originating from an organization’s memberships 
and associations may create a general expectancy among others to adopt a specific 
technology.  On the other hand, if a technology is widely used in a specific industry or 
organizational field, this use may impose a mimetic force on other organizations, which 
are not users yet.   
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and 
logics in an organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic 
forces in the wider environment.   
Unlike institutional forces, organizational forces originate from the primary context 
of a technology, that is, an organization itself.  They are often linked with the wider 
organizational environment; however, they may be quite different across various 
organizations even in the same organizational field, due to their levels of diffusion 
(Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings 2002).  Accepted and commonly shared 
institutionalized facts, norms, and structures in an organization, existing social 
arrangements, explicit or implicit political disputes and arguments, technical 
considerations by various actors all create numerous social, political, and technical forces 
on a technology in an organization.   
Social forces are comprised of local forces which construct the expectations and 
understanding of the opportunities, constraints, and organizationally defined routes to 
change (Kelly and Amburgey, 1991, p. 610). Social forces can both promote certain 
 30
options and devalue others during the process of technology adaptation. By incorporating 
the local social dynamics of an organization, the RDT model is able to accommodate the 
existence and impact of multiple organizational narratives and competing histories of 
change, as part of the social texture of the organization. 
Political forces are comprised of the political status of consultation, negotiation, 
conflict and resistance, which occur at various levels in an organization. They are taken to 
refer to the political structuring within an organization, such as the power disputes 
between several individuals or organizational units.  Other examples of political forces 
might be negotiations between trade union representatives and management, between 
consultants and various organizational groups, and between and within managerial, 
supervisory and operative personnel. These forces can influence decisions and the setting 
of agendas at critical moments during the process of technology adaptation.   
Technical forces represent state and related dynamics of the existing technology and 
technical affairs in an organization.  Technology adaptation does not take place in a 
technical vacuum, but it should always be considered in relation not only to the existing 
social and political arrangements but also the technical requirements of an organization.  
Therefore, in the process of technology design, implementation and use, social, political, 
and technical situations continue influencing actions.  These influences are represented as 
a set of social, political, and technical forces originating from the local organizational 
context in the RDT model.   
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and 
logics in an organization is positively related with social, political, and technical 
organizational forces in the immediate environment.   
 
3.1.2. Dispose Design, Implementation and Use 
 
The arrows (a) in the RDT model signify a structural element disposing an action, 
which involves internalization and mobilization of paradigms, schemas, and logics to 
dispose design, implementation, and use.   
Paradigms dispose technology design and are mobilized by designers.  The macro 
agency of designers oversees the acquisition of a technology in an organization.  
Technology designers, top managers, program managers all have macro level agency 
capacities to create and change design, such as choosing a technology as well as changing 
the organizational scope or technology of choice.  However, this argument should not 
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lead us to technological determinism.  Paradigms are by no means entirely unambiguous 
but susceptible to interpretation in multiple ways by different macro agents; in other 
words, paradigms have interpretive flexibility (Orlikowski, 1992).   
Schemas dispose technology implementation and are mobilized by meso agents 
during preparation and execution of configuration and implementation plans.  Schemas of 
technology can also be interpreted in different ways by implementers.  Designers who at 
the meso level agency may decide and modify the implementation of technology artifacts, 
hence dispose technology implementation from schemas.  Likewise, logics dispose action 
of technology use and are mobilized by micro agents.  They are shared among agents; 
however, they can also be interpreted differently by different agents (Orlikowski, 1992).   
The degree of the interpretive flexibility of paradigms, schemas, and logics depends 
not only on the stage of technology adaptation as articulated by Orlikowski (1992) but 
also on whether the technology is hard or soft.  As previously described, the power 
mechanism in disposing of action is expected to be based on discipline or domination, 
depending on whether its target has the ability to choose or not.  For hard technologies, 
the mechanism is expected to be domination, whereas for soft technologies, expected 
mechanism is discipline since targets have more ability to interpret the technology 
differently.   
Proposition 3: Paradigms dispose the technology design by dominating the 
designers when the subject is a hard technology and disciplining them when the subject is 
a soft technology.   
Proposition 4: Schemas dispose the technology implementation by dominating the 
implementers when the subject is a hard technology and disciplining them when the 
subject is a soft technology.   
Proposition 5: Logics dispose the technology use by dominating users when the 
subject is a hard technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft technology.   
 
3.1.3. Contextualization of Schemas and Logics 
 
The arrows (b) in the RDT model stand for the actors’ contextualization of 
structural elements for their organizational context.  Contextualization refers to translating 
the  paradigms into schemas via design and reconciling the schemas with logics via 
implementation.  Design is contextualized into schemas by macro agents; whereas 
implementation is contextualized into logics by meso agents.   
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Actors at higher levels create both limits and opportunities for actors who are at 
lower levels (Mouzelis, 1995) during contextualization of paradigms into schemas or 
schemas into logics.  Schemas and logics are created with the contextualization process 
and have no capacity to resists initially; therefore the related power mechanism is 
expected to be force (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001).  This also leads to an indirect 
exertion of force by designers on implementers and by implementers on users through the 
shaping of schemas and logics.   
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize the  paradigms into schemas with force.   
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize the  schemas into logics with force.   
 
3.1.4. Conflicts between Use, Implementation, and Design 
 
The arrows (c) in the RDT model refer to those actions that conflict with their prior 
actions.  Causally explainable conflicts among groups of actors in the organization may 
lead to revisions of prior actions.  The action of using technology may conflict with its 
prior action of implementing.  Likewise, the action of implementing may conflict with its 
prior action of designing.  Such conflicts may build up organizational pressures for 
change at the social integration level, i.e. the action realm (Archer 1982; Archer 1995).   
Technology decisions taken at macro and meso levels tend to become taken-for-
granted premises for users because they have little influence on such decisions.  This, 
however, does not deny the possibility of the lower level agency to act independent of the 
meso or macro agency.  The patterns of practice at the micro or meso levels cannot be 
completely defined from a higher level.  Users have micro level agency and can modify 
the way they employ the technology.  They may stretch the appropriate protocol of using 
a technology on their own or ignore some functions of a technology, causing some small 
changes in some technology artifacts, which can accumulate over time.  In addition to 
their chances of challenging the rules and resources (e.g., technical features) of 
technology in everyday use, they may interact and accumulate their revisions to produce a 
higher order of change in implementation.  Additionally, users can strategically develop a 
collective agency to compete with implementers and influence implementation.  
Similarly, modifications in implementation by implementers or due to accumulated 
conflicts between design and implementation by users can create conflicts and cause 
changes in design.   
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In these processes, the expected power mechanism to be exercised is influence 
(Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 2001) because the source of the power is agency based 
which is not omnipotent over its target.  Conflicts originate from lower level agents and 
target higher levels.   
Proposition 8: When technology use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts 
influence on technology implementation.   
Proposition 9: When technology implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts 
with and exerts influence on technology design.   
 
3.1.5. Modification of Logics, Schemas and Paradigms 
 
The arrows (d) in the RDT model correspond to modification of the structural 
elements with habitualized actions.  Several agents in an organization may revise their 
scripts of action and drift from the original actions disposed by their respective structural 
element.  Such changes may create pressures for change at the structural realm, i.e.  at the 
system integration level.  Because of the interpretive flexibility of technology 
(Orlikowski, 1992), such drifts may still be accommodated within the multiple 
dispositions of the same structural element; and hence structural elements, such as 
paradigms, schemas or logics, may support the drifted action.  However, if drifts move 
beyond a level and become a shift in action, the structural element may become unable to 
keep supporting the action.  In this case, changes in action either fade away or become 
objectified requiring modifications in the structural realm.   
For example, users of a technology may start using it quite differently from the 
purposes that were initially projected or may ignore some functionality of the technology.    
Similarly implementation may be changed by implementers or by accumulated revisions 
of users.  Such drifts may still be accommodated within the dispositions of schemas.  
However, if drifts are fundamentally beyond the dispositions of logics or schemas, then 
they may fade away and the use or implementation may drift back to a level that can be 
justified by the original logics or schemas.  Alternatively, if the agents who use 
technology differently or revise its implementation exercise enough influence, the 
situation may become objectified and the logics or schemas may change towards a new 
state that would justify the new use.  A similar mechanism is expected to work at design.  
However, due to the external nature of paradigms, it is expected to happen quite rarely, 
since influence required to change the external paradigms would be very high.   
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Since action realm components have limited effect on their structural counterparts, 
the process from the action realm towards the structural realm can only have an 
influencing power on its target.   
Proposition 10: When drifts in technology use cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of logics, technology use modifies logics through influence.  If 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in use would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
Proposition 11: When drifts in technology implementation cannot be 
accommodated within multiple interpretations of schemas, technology implementation 
modifies schemas through influence.  If schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in 
implementation would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
Proposition 12: When drifts in technology design cannot be accommodated within 
the multiple interpretations of paradigms, technology design modifies paradigms through 
influence.  If paradigms cannot be modified, then drifts in design would eventually recede 
and be abandoned. 
 
3.1.6. Structural Contradictions and Reconfiguration  
 
At any point in time, contradictions may arise among the components of the 
structural realm.  In such cases, a structural reconfiguration is expected to get initiated in 
structural order without the participation of a causal agent.  Such structural contradictions 
may be due to accumulated objectified changes coming from prior actions or diffusion 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) of a new institution from a wider organizational 
environment.  Structural reconfiguration would then influence the action realm as well.   
The processes between structural realm components, namely logics, schemas and 
paradigms are expected to operate with domination.  Both sources and targets are 
structural, and order gets established with domination between conflicting structural 
elements.   
Proposition 13: When logics and schemas contradict, they regulate each other with 
domination.   
Proposition 14: When schemas and paradigms contradict, they regulate each other 
with domination.   
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3.2. Recursive Dualism of Enterprise Resource Planning 
 
 
Following the RDT model, ERP is comprised of two distinct realms, namely, the 
structure realm and the action realm.  The structure realm corresponds to the ERP concept 
and is entirely social, covering all elements that virtually governs organizational practices 
on ERP in the action realm, whereas the action realm corresponds to the ERP system and 
is therefore artifactual.  Both realms of ERP are recursively implicated as proposed by 
RDT.   
Thus, the ERP concept (structure realm) is dependent upon, but due to its own 
causal capacity (Archer, 1995), has direct consequences for the ERP system (action 
realm).  In this sense, the ERP system is disposed but not predetermined by the ERP 
concept in time and space (Figure 3.2). The use of the term “ERP system” is beyond usual 
perception of an ERP system as an ERP software application and covers all artifacts and 
related practices by organizational participants.   
 
Figure 3-2 Recursive dualism of ERP concept and ERP system 
ERP Concept
ERP System
 
 
If elements of the ERP system are to be sustained or reinforced over time, the 
existing or emergent ERP concepts must support them.  In the absence of this 
condition the ERP system and related changes in action are expected to eventually 
fade away and be abandoned.  Similarly, ERP conceptual elements tend to perish if 
elements of the ERP system do not support them.  An ERP system beyond the limits of an 
ERP concept is possible with the conscious changes and unconscious deviations in action 
that changes  artifacts of ERP technology in a specific organization. The degree of support 
determines the endurance of the ERP adaptation.  A weak and discontinuous support 
between the concept and the system may lead to institutional decay or 
deinstitutionalization of the existing order in ERP (Greenwood, et al., 2002; Jepperson 
1991; Scott 2001), or passing away of the newly introduced changes in the ERP system or 
the ERP concept.   
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Figure 3-3 Recursive dualism of enterprise resource planning 
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Following the RDT model, I am describing ERP technology in organizations in 
relation to (i) contextual forces, (ii) an ERP concept (structural realm) that consists of 
ERP paradigms, ERP schemas and ERP logics, and (iii) an ERP system (action realm) 
that consists of ERP design, ERP implementation, ERP use and their interaction processes 
(See Figure 3.3).  Based on the RDT model propositions developed in this chapter, 
research propositions are devised to explain ERP adaptation as a special case of 
technology adaptation in organizations and presented in Table 3-1. 
The RDT model offers a comprehensive understanding of technology adaptation in 
organizations. Reconstructing duality of technology model (Orlikowski, 1992) 
considering recent work in social theory (Archer 1995; Mouzelis 1995) and organization 
studies (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), it provides a way of understanding technology as 
institutionalized in the social structure and enacted by human agency.  Incorporating 
institutional and structurational views, the RDT model provides the basis for explaining 
how technology evolves and transforms with the actions and interactions of actors who 
are also embedded in social structure.   
Our study to empirically investigate the RDT model for ERP technology is also an 
attempt to bridge the gap between the ERP concept and the ERP system research streams. 
This perspective provides a comprehensive understanding of the ERP concept, that is 
entirely social, and the ERP system, that is entirely artifactual, which are recursively 
related.  Using the RDT model, I consider both the ERP concept and the ERP system 
simultaneously but distinctly during the process of ERP adaptation.   
Having applied the RDT model propositions to ERP adaptation in this chapter, I 
present the case research design in the next chapter to describe how I study these 
propositions in various organizational situations.  
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Table 3-1 ERP adaptation propositions based on the RDT model 
 
Time
Action Realm
Structural Realm
a = dispose
Paradigms
Design Use
a d
Schemas
Implement
b b
c c
t
Isomorphic Forces
Normative Coercive Mimetic
Organizational Forces
Social Political Technical
e e
Logics
a da d
b = contextualize c = conflict d = modify e = contradict
 
Structural Context of ERP Adaptation 
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in an 
organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic forces in the 
wider environment.   
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in an 
organization is positively related with social, political, and technical organizational forces in 
the immediate environment.   
Disposition of ERP System 
Proposition 3: ERP paradigms dispose ERP design by dominating the designers when the 
subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP 
technology.   
Proposition 4: ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation by dominating the implementers 
when the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft 
ERP technology.   
Proposition 5: ERP logics dispose ERP use by dominating users when the subject is a hard 
ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP technology.   
Contextualization of ERP Concept 
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize ERP paradigms into ERP schemas with force.   
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize ERP schemas into ERP logics with force.   
Conflicts in ERP System 
Proposition 8: When ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts influence on 
ERP implementation.   
Proposition 9: When ERP implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts 
influence on the ERP design.   
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Table 3-2 Adaptation Propositions Based on the RDT model (cont.) 
Modification of ERP System and ERP Concept 
Proposition 10: When drifts in ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple 
interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use modifies ERP logics through influence.  If ERP 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP use would eventually recede and be 
abandoned.   
Proposition 11: When drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies ERP schemas 
through influence.  If ERP schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP implementation 
would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
Proposition 12: When drifts in ERP design cannot be accommodated within the multiple 
interpretations of ERP paradigms, ERP design modifies ERP paradigms through influence.  
If ERP paradigms cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP design would eventually recede 
and be abandoned. 
Structural Contradictions and Reconfiguration in ERP Concept 
Proposition 13: When ERP logics and ERP schemas contradict, they regulate each other 
with domination.   
Proposition 14: When ERP schemas and ERP paradigms contradict, they regulate each 
other with domination.   
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4  
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I describe the overall research process and explain how I decided on 
the case study sites, selected methods for data collection and analysis.  In particular, I 
explain how ERP histories at the case sites are traced to learn about the process of ERP 
adaptation  within its organizational context over time.   
There are many research design alternatives available to a researcher, such as 
experiments, surveys, archival analyses, histories, and case studies.  Choosing the right 
design requires the careful consideration of several criteria which include (a) “the type of 
research question posed”, (b) “the extent of control an investigator has over actual 
behavioral events”, and (c) “the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events” (Yin, 2002).  Case study is a method of empirical inquiry that “studies a 
contemporary phenomenon within its context where research questions are in the form of 
“how" and "why" rather than "who" and "where" and the researcher has limited control 
over the phenomenon” (Yin, 2002).  The case study method is considered appropriate for 
the purposes of this study, since I have limited control over the phenomenon, which is 
embedded in its context and research questions seek to identify “how” and “why” the 
adaptation takes place. The study does not require having control over behavioral events 
but focuses on describing and analyzing both contemporary and historical events during 
technology adaptation.   
A number of difficulties arise in research when measuring and testing social 
processes such as structuration or institutionalization.  First of all, any pure quantitative 
inquiry of structuration and institutionalization would face significant data unavailability.  
Structural formations and changes are rarely recorded systematically and such archival 
data are scarce.  To deal with this problem, one can resort to a qualitative study, 
acknowledging that even the best qualitative approach cannot entirely eliminate the 
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associated difficulties.  For instance a sample-selection problem bothers qualitative and 
quantitative research alike; documentary evidence and retrospective interviews are very 
likely to over-represent the success stories and to overlook the issues that are missed in 
records and memories.  Nonetheless, qualitative methods, such as case studies offer 
flexibility that is unavailable in statistical models and quantitative investigations (Yin, 
2002). 
 
 
4.1.  Case Study Research 
 
 
We followed the guidelines offered by Yin (2002) and Eisenhardt (1989) in the 
design of the case research. Yin (2002) provides the details of designing the case study 
research, whereas Eisenhardt (1989) describes the process of developing theories from 
case study research.  The case study strategy can be contrasted to the ethnographic 
approach, which is an alternative strategy for studying “how” and “why” type research 
questions.  Some qualitative researchers follow ethnographic methods and seek to satisfy 
two conditions: (a) the use of close-up, detailed observation of the natural world by the 
researcher and (b) the attempt to avoid prior commitment to any theoretical 
approach.  Since I have developed the RDT model theoretically based on previous 
theory and research, ethnographic approach is not appropriate.  However, ethnographic 
research does not always produce case studies, nor are case studies limited with these two 
conditions.  Instead, case studies can be based on prior theories and can be “supported by 
quantitative or qualitative evidence”.  In addition, “case studies need not always require 
direct, detailed observations as the primary source of evidence” (Yin 2002, p.15).  Case 
study research requires the researcher to deal with many different sources of evidence: 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, 
and physical artifacts.  It "attempts to thoroughly assess a cluster of factors by focusing on 
a small number of cases" (Adams and Schvaneveldt, 1985).  Yin (2003, p.5) identifies six 
kinds of case studies based on a 2x3 matrix. In the first axis of differentiation, the study 
can be based on a single case or multiple cases. In the second axis, the study can be 
exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory.  An exploratory case study aims at defining the 
questions and hypotheses of a subsequent study.  A descriptive case study covers a 
complete description of a phenomenon within its context.  Whereas an explanatory case 
study reports on data that explains how phenomenon occurred reflecting a causal 
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relationship (Yin, 2003, p.5).  Obviously, selecting any of the case study approaches 
requires different orientations in research design.   
 
 
4.2.  Case Study Issues 
 
 
Since the focus is to explain why and how technology adaptation unfolds in a 
specific way, I selected explanatory case study as the preferred research design orientation 
(Yin, 2002).  The RDT model is used to explain how ERP adaptation takes place in 
organizations.  Case studies have often been criticized for not being representative 
enough, their limitations in reaching general conclusions , and the potential investigator 
bias.  It is clear that case studies cannot “prove” a proposition, with the certainty of “true 
experiments”, which allow researchers to make causal conclusions based on study results.  
However, since a true experiment approach cannot be used for this research, “an 
explanatory case study with multiple cases” (Yin 2003, p.69) is considered to be the most 
appropriate.  After further development and empirical analysis of RDT, related constructs 
can be developed and quantitative techniques such as survey instruments might be 
employed. The study makes use of several case study tactics and case sampling 
approaches to improve the validity and reliability of the study and to reach better 
generalizations.   
Since the main focus of the study is to develop an understanding of technology 
adaptation in organizations, the unit of analysis is an ERP project in an organization.  If an 
organization had two different ERP projects then it is considered as two different cases.  
Since such a case couple allows us to control some of the variability inherent in the 
context of the cases, it becomes possible to make more informed between-case 
comparisons.   
 
 
4.3. Case Study Design 
 
 
To establish the quality of any empirical social research, four tests, which are 
also relevant to case study research, have been commonly addressed: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Yin 1994).   
Construct validity refers to establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied.  This test is especially problematic in case research since 
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subjective judgments are used to collect the data.  Internal validity is concerned with 
causal case studies that determine whether one event (x) leads to another event (y).  If the 
investigator incorrectly concludes that there is a causal relationship between x and y 
without knowing that some third factor, z, has actually caused y, the research design will 
fail internal validity.     
External validity deals with the problem of knowing whether a study's findings can 
be generalized beyond the immediate case study.  This concern especially arises in a 
single case research design. In order to improve external validity of this study, I followed 
a multiple case-study approach in a number of polar organizational conditions to identify 
whether the theory is capable of explaining such conditions.   
 
Table 4-1 Case study tactics employed in the research design 
Tests Case study tactic Research Design 
Use multiple sources 
of evidence  
Multiple interviews with multiple stakeholders 
from different instances of the adaptation 
Other modes of interaction—over dinner, e-mail, 
telephone, etc. 
Documentary evidence, and participant 
observation 
Establish chain of 
evidence  
Detailed processual narratives referencing 
interview transcripts 
Taping and transcription of interviews 
immediately 
Construct 
validity 
Have key informants 
review case study 
drafts 
Some key informants checking drafts of the case 
study reports 
Do pattern-matching Patterns identified across cases Empirical patterns matched with propositions 
Do explanation-
building Some causal links and explanations using RDT 
Internal 
validity 
 Do time series 
analysis 
Adaptation chronology from interviews and 
archival sources 
Use replication logic 
in multiple-case 
studies 
Utilization of the same protocol in each case 
Each case as a separate study evaluating same 
set of propositions 
Increasing degrees 
of freedom 
Multiple observations for each proposition 
Multiple embedded cases 
External 
validity 
Use existing theory Analytical generalizations using existing theory 
Use case study 
protocol  
Utilization of case study and interview protocols 
in all cases 
Reliability Develop case study 
data base 
Case study notes (annotated transcripts) 
Case documents (documents, brochures, etc.) 
Case narratives 
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Reliability makes sure that, if a later investigator follows exactly the same 
procedures described by an earlier investigator and conducts the case study all over again; 
s/he will reach at the same findings and conclusions.  In preparing case studies, several 
tactics are used to increase the validity and reliability of the research (See Table 4.1).  
We followed a consistent protocol during the preparation of all case studies.  The 
most suitable personnel (typically the ERP project director and if possible their manager 
in the organization) were identified.  These potential informants were contacted via 
electronic mail, which outlined the research and requested their cooperation.  The 
electronic mail was followed up with a telephone call to further explain the study, get an 
approval and arrange a meeting to plan the study.  In the initial planning meeting, these 
initial contacts were also asked to provide other potential informants who were involved 
in the adaptation of ERP from varying levels of the organization.  Each site was then 
visited 6 – 7 times for semi-structured oral interviews, archival data analysis, and 
participant observation at the sites.  The interview protocols were developed to get 
information regarding to the elements of RDT.  Each element of the RDT model was 
targeted with a set of questions presented in Appendix A. Three interview protocols for 
macro, meso and micro agents were derived from these questions and are included in  
Appendix B.  
Yin (1994) discusses six sources of evidence: documentation, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant-observation, and physical artifacts.  All these 
sources have their own strengths and weaknesses.  Yin (1994) recommends using 
different sources for achieving triangulation.  Although no single source has a complete 
advantage over all the others, documentary evidence is considered important for 
verification and extension of interview evidence (Yin 1994).  We used three sources of 
evidence in preparing the cases—interviews, non-participant observations, and analysis of 
secondary data (organizational documents and archives) to ensure “that the concepts and 
patterns identified are grounded in the experiences and terminology of actors” (Glick et 
al.  1990, p.  302).   
Analyzing case study evidence consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, and 
rearranging the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study.  Two dominant 
analytic techniques are used in analyzing case study data: pattern matching, and 
explanation-building(Yin 1994).  Developed patterns, explanations, and observations 
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matching to the RDT model propositions are described in case narratives together with 
time-based chronologies of ERP adaptation in Chapters 5 – 8. 
 
4.3.1. Qualitative Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews were performed following the three interview protocols 
(See Appendix A) for designers, implementers, and users, which lasted approximately 60-
90 minutes each.  Most interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim.  Some of 
the meetings with top managers could not be tape-recorded, however, detailed 
handwritten notes were taken and the sessions were transcribed following the interview.  
All interviews were planned as one-to-one interviews and they were also supplemented 
by multi-participant discussions, where possible.  Informants were also asked to fill out a 
project history in the form of a timeline, showing when activities were undertaken, and 
when unusual events (e.g. resignation of a project manager, an ERP module going live) 
took place.  These descriptions were consolidated and reconciled from archival sources 
for correctness and completeness to prepare project chronology.   
In an effort to address different levels of actors and structures in the RDT model 
and the potential limitations of retrospective interviews, multiple informants from 
different hierarchical levels and with varying responsibilities ranging across operations, 
finance, human resources, and information technology were interviewed.  External 
consultants who took part in ERP adaptation were also interviewed where available.   
The selection of the individuals who were active during the ERP design, 
implementation, and use for interviews was carried out through systematic, snowball 
sampling, “where one informant gives the researcher the name of another informant, who 
in turn provides the name of a third and so on” (Vogt, 1999).  Since the goal of these 
interviews was to collect the complex threads of social experience, considerations of 
variety rather than representativeness governed the sampling.  The objective was to 
collect a full range of possible accounts, not to measure the frequency of ERP adaptation 
accounts of organizational participants.  Thus, the research design attempted to locate 
informants with distinctive social locations in relation to design, implementation and use 
of the ERP technology in the organization.  In order to minimize the possibility of 
encountering idiosyncratic sub-groups, samples were generated with multiple snowballs, 
each originating separately from different individuals in the organization.     
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In addition to collecting information on pre-specified topics these semi-structured, 
open-ended-question interviews represent a valuable check on the RDT model, providing 
empirical feedback with a minimum of paradigmatic presuppositions.  In combination 
with the other methods employed, this qualitative analysis permits a substantial amount of 
"empirical triangulation" (Jick 1979), enhancing both the depth and the multi-method 
validity of the resulting conclusions. 
In order to assure external validity and reliability, preliminary interview protocols 
were prepared with a wording that reflects the on-going nature of design, implementation, 
and use. Interview questions were developed to question the RDT model concepts at 
different moments of adaptation and constructed with a perspective that acknowledges 
differences in time. Interview protocols are included in Appendix A. 
 Both the structuration view of change (which requires identifying a sequence of 
critical events in action) and the institutionalization view (looking for changes in the 
social structure) were taken as starting points.  The protocols were used to ensure a 
repeatable base of common discussion across interviews, but all participants were 
encouraged to talk about the issues that were important to them so that new dimensions 
could emerge. 
As the interviews were completed, they were transcribed and analyzed.  Interview 
analysis consisted of reviewing the transcriptions of the interviews to identify critical 
episodes and interactions as well as areas where changes and processes described in the 
model are observable.  Common themes were identified, and then the interview 
transcripts were re-examined to further develop the themes and explanations.  Interviews 
and observations at different organizations were used in comparison to further elaborate 
on the RDT model.  The intention was to "uncover the underlying generative mechanisms 
that cause events to happen and the particular circumstances or contingencies that exist 
when these mechanisms operate" (Van de Ven and Huber, 1995, p.  vii), and see whether 
they follow the RDT model thus to empirically evaluate the RDT model considering the 
empirical evidence (Van de Ven, 1987).   
 
4.3.2. Non-participant, systematic observations  
 
Non-participant observation was chosen as one of the sources of evidence that 
makes it possible to describe what might have happened during agency interactions: who 
or what was involved, when and where the decisions were made, how they were made, 
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and why the decisions were as they were.  The methodology for non-participant 
observation is ideal for studying intra- and inter-organizational interactions, because it "is 
exceptional for studying processes, relationships among people and events, the 
organization of people and events, continuities over time, and patterns, as well as the 
immediate socio-cultural contexts in which human existence enfolds" (Jorgensen, 1989, p.  
12).   
Schwartzman describes an overview of what is looked for and analyzed in these 
observations as: participants, channels of communication and interaction codes, spatial 
and time arrangements, frame, meeting talks, norms of interpretation, goals and outcomes 
(Schwartzman, 1993, p.  63-66), which correspond to the following issues in the research:  
Participants – Their relationships, roles and responsibilities in terms of ERP 
adaptation.  How do the relations set up and what roles did the participants seem to 
assume for themselves and others in ERP adaptation? 
Channels of communication and interactive codes – How do the participants 
communicate before, during, and after their encounters about ERP? 
Spatial and time arrangements – How much time and space were allocated to the 
ERP adaptation activities. 
Frame – What marks the beginning, middle, and end of the observed events in ERP 
adaptation as well as their duration? 
Meeting talks – Observation of the topic and the results, use of technology, 
communication genres and styles employed, interest and participation, decision-making 
strategies, degree of formality and degree of preparedness in ERP-related meetings.   
Norms of Interpretation – The development and maintenance of a central focus of 
ERP related discussions.   
Goals and Outcomes – Distinction between the ERP related goals of each 
individual and the outcomes pertaining to the organization to reveal conflicts and 
contradictions surrounding ERP adaptation.   
Considering these issues imposed a structure and formalism to observations at 
different instances in multiple cases. Non-participant observations were not used to 
establish any causal link however it helped us to make sense of the web of social relations 
and relate the evidence collected from various sources at case sites.  
 
4.3.3. Organizational Documents 
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Along with the interviews, the examination of archival sources provides multiple 
perspectives and helps us reconstruct informants’ initial expectations and their activities 
and experiences over time, retrospectively. The main aim of this step is to collect 
information regarding to the past ERP implementation experience of the organizations, to 
collect information regarding to state and changes in the ERP concept and system using 
organizational and public literature.  It includes a thorough analysis of key records and 
documents regarding to ERP focusing on: 
• Organizational records, such as organizational charts and ERP project budgets,  
results of any prior surveys, ERP project meeting agendas, minutes, and system 
change requests.   
• Personal records, such as electronic mail, paper correspondence, memos, and 
notes from meetings related with ERP design, implementation and use.   
• Publications and internal written communications that were commonly referred in 
the organization.  This includes journal articles, brochures, and annual reports 
especially when they include ERP related issues.   
• Computer-based research study of many of the actual electronic records and sites, 
such as the current and old web sites of ERP vendors, the online ERP system and 
subsystems.   
During data analysis a three-step procedure was followed.  First I searched for 
temporal patterns in adaptation.  Second, I examined the identified patterns for evidence 
of conflicts and contradictions and whether they had been resolved or not.  I was  
particularly interested in instances where a conflict or contradiction related to ERP came 
into existence.  Third, having identified patterns, I searched for evidence of underlying 
forces that would explain their occurrence at the case site.  This method also follows 
Eisenhardt’s (1989) suggestion that observed relationship be validated by seeking reasons 
from them in the local context.  
 
4.3.4. Selection of Case Sites 
 
Any case study can be performed with single or multiple cases.  Although it is 
partly possible to make some generalizations from single cases in some analytic way, 
multiple-case studies strengthen or broaden such generalizations like similar situations in 
multiple experiments.  Yin (2002) distinguishes between literal replication where the 
 49
cases are designed to back each other and theoretical replication where the cases are 
designed to cover polar theoretical conditions.  In order to evaluate the theory empirically 
on varying conditions, I selected the latter approach where one might expect different 
results but for predictable reasons.  I aimed to observe the RDT model in diverse settings 
and polar organizational situations.  In total I planned five cases in four organizations with 
implementations of four different ERP systems involving different designer / implementer 
/ user groups.  The cases were selected on the basis of contextual and prior information 
from public sources.  Due to the confidentiality reasons of the participating companies, I 
could not use the actual names of the companies, their consultant companies, and ERP 
software vendors in the dissertation. Therefore, pseudonyms in capital letters are used in 
order to keep each company name anonymous (See Table 4-2).  
 
Table 4-2 Case study sites 
Company Industry ERP Technology Time  Number of Interviews 
ALPHA Service MERCURY   1Q2004 10 
ALPHA Service MINERVA 1Q2004 10 
BETA Manufacturing PHAROS 4Q2004 9 
KAPPA Chemicals MERCURY 2Q2004 12 
ZETA Automotive NEPTUNE 3Q2004 12 
 
For each company, I started the interviews with three key informants from different 
levels of agency (macro, meso and micro agents for ERP decisions) and generated a 
snowball sample until many diverse views were collected and the interviews significantly 
converged in terms of their content.  Since the objective of the field study was to capture 
insights from various perspectives, informants were selected from people who have taken 
different roles during ERP adaptation ranging across operations, finance, human 
resources, and information technology departments.   
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5  
 
 
SIMULTANEOUS ADAPTATION OF TWO ERP TECHNOLOGIES IN 
ALPHA CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the simultaneous adaptation of two ERP software 
applications in the ALPHA Corporation(ALPHA) and explain how ALPHA has 
undergone an adaptation while establishing its ERP infrastructure.  First, I describe 
ALPHA and its ERP adaptation history.  Then, I discuss immediate and wider 
institutional context and the process of adaptation. I conclude with a theoretical discussion 
of the ERP adaptation in ALPHA. 
 
 
5.1. ALPHA Corporation and ERP Technology 
 
 
ALPHA is a service company, founded in 1993 and headquartered in İstanbul, 
Turkey and employed nearly 2,300 personnel as of January 2004.  It is the industry leader 
in Turkey and it is among the top tier firms in Europe.  I selected ALPHA for a case study 
in ERP adaptation because with concurrent adaptations of two ERP systems for different 
functionalities in the same organization, it represents a polar situation, which is 
empirically richer to observe the explanatory nature of the RDT model.  Due to the non-
disclosure agreements with ALPHA, further details of the industry and the demographics 
of the company cannot be disclosed in the study. The ERP Adaptation chronology and a 
summary of the RDT model based dynamics of ALPHA are included in Appendix C.  
ALPHA management decided to consider having an ERP software application in 
the beginning of 1997.  Following the general practice followed by large companies, 
ALPHA decided to choose its ERP solution with the guidance of a big management 
consulting company.  Proposals were collected from two major management consultant 
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companies, APOLLO Consulting and ATHENA Consulting.  In the middle of 1997, 
ALPHA selected APOLLO as its consultant for ERP selection and design.  However, the 
selection process could not start until 1998, since, according to the IT manager, the 
company had “higher priority items in its agenda” (ALPHA Designer Interviews, 2004).   
In the first quarter of 1998, APOLLO started the ERP selection project and asked 
for their ERP priorities from the top managers and functional ERP requirements from the 
users.  APOLLO performed a series of workshops and process analysis studies to describe 
the existing situation of the related business processes, where available.  APOLLO could 
not make an as-is process mapping of the whole ERP scope, because ALPHA was 
planning to acquire ERP to support some business processes, which were non-existent at 
that time.  In the middle of 1998, ALPHA issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) to three 
different international ERP vendors.  As part of the RFP evaluation process, ALPHA 
design team made site visits to vendor-supplied reference sites in Turkey and other 
European countries. At the end, APOLLO suggested NEPTUNE ERP  to ALPHA.  
However, some of the managers did not agree with this suggestion claiming that it was 
not strongly justified and was subject to some questionable assumptions on the functional 
requirements of ALPHA.  Meantime, ALPHA’s largest competitor decided on 
NEPTUNE as its ERP system.  ALPHA wanted a second opinion on ERP selection and 
asked a local consulting company called POSEIDON  for a re-evaluation of APOLLO’s 
work.  At the end of this “counter-consulting”, POSEIDON recommended that ALPHA 
should go with MERCURY’s proposal.  In MERCURY’s proposal, two different ERP 
applications were planned to work as an integrated ERP system.  MERCURY offered its 
solution in conjunction with MINERVA, a different ERP application, since MERCURY’s 
functionality did not cover asset and maintenance management functionality.  Therefore, 
MINERVA had to be implemented as an integral module of MERCURY in ALPHA.  
Both MERCURY and MINERVA implementation projects started by the end of 
1998 and continued into 1999.  In 1999, a software company was contracted by ALPHA 
to make significant revisions and customizations on MINERVA according to ALPHA’s 
specifications.  After that, MERCURY implementation had continued like a typical off-
the-shelf software implementation, without any major modifications but MINERVA had 
undergone a major change in terms of both its internal structure and outside integrations 
with other systems.  In the last quarter of 1999, MINERVA, and following that in January 
1, 2000, MERCURY implementation covering finance and accounting became live.  
Following that, after users familiarized themselves with the system, they started to 
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demand some technical modifications both in MINERVA and MERCURY, increasing the 
number of technical change requests for both systems as shown in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 
respectively for MERCURY and MINERVA. These change requests originating from 
users and the target of the request (meso actors) has an option to act otherwise, 
exemplifying an influence-type situation. 
 
Figure 5-1 Number of change requests for MERCURY 
 
 
 
At the beginning of 2000, ALPHA’s accounting auditor ARAMIS visited ALPHA, 
to perform the accounting audit of the previous year and also to check the financial 
accuracy of the new ERP system.  In this audit, ARAMIS required several additional 
accounting controls in the MERCURY implementation and demanded some changes in 
MERCURY Finance module, increasing the number of change requests for MERCURY 
Finance in the first quarter of 2000.  
In order to keep up with the timing requirements of additional financial controls, 
ALPHA contracted another software company to change the MERCURY implementation 
and to prepare the required financial controls.  In the meantime, the implementation team 
of MINERVA had been working on the modifications asked by the users and decreasing 
the total number of open technical change requests for MINERVA. 
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Figure 5-2 Number of change requests for MINERVA 
 
 
 
In the middle of 2000, organizational units covering the majority of MINERVA 
users had been given the authority to make modifications on MINERVA as they needed.   
ALPHA had also contracted BOSPHORO company for more complicated modifications.  
After this agreement, the contractor started collecting technical change requests annually 
and routinely made the requested changes, as shown in Figure 5-2. Meantime ALPHA 
has become listed in the stock exchange and user dissatisfaction with MERCURY peaked 
during 2000.  In the second half of 2000, ERP project manager had to leave ALPHA 
when user’s collectively resisted against him and influenced their managers to act against 
him, while the number of change requests was also increasing for the MERCURY 
Finance (See Figure 5-1). 
At the beginning of 2001, a new project manager was recruited and assigned to 
continue with the rest of the MERCURY implementation and to perform a major version 
upgrade for MERCURY.  The implementation team performed extensive tests in the first 
half of 2001 on this version upgrade.  However, following the testing period, the new 
project manager decided to upgrade MERCURY to an untested higher version.  Due to 
this untested upgrade, the ERP system crashed and could not resume its normal operations 
for nearly 3 days. During this crash, sensitive financial data was lost creating major 
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problems in accounting.  After that crisis, the second project manager was asked to resign 
and the number of change requests reached the highest point in its history for MERCURY 
Finance. 
After the crisis due to MERCURY upgrade passed, a third project manager was 
assigned to implement purchase order, fixed assets, and inventory modules of 
MERCURY Logistics. This was started and finished within the year 2002, without many 
problems.  In 2003, MERCURY implementation reached stability and further 
implementations and version upgrades were postponed to an unforeseen future, together 
with MINERVA, which had been facing upgrade problems due to extensive 
customization.  In the middle of 2004 APOLLO Consulting returned to ALPHA for ERP 
post-implementation assessment and they suggested implementation of some of the 
modules that were purchased but not implemented.  However, their suggestions had not 
been followed until the middle of 2005.   
After years of adaptation, the scope and nature of MINERVA has been significantly 
changed and its footprint in ALPHA over-expanded with a large increase in the 
functionality covered by the original and custom built modules. On the other hand the 
scope of MERCURY has significantly narrowed, where some of the modules are 
purchased but not implemented.  In all stages of ERP adaptation, significant signs of 
instability and resistance appeared for MERCURY in the form of the high number of 
change requests (see Figure 5-1), whereas MINERVA adaptation had been rather 
unproblematic, showing a regular pattern in terms of the number of change requests (see 
Figure 5-2).  Similar to MINERVA, the logistics module of MERCURY had shown a 
rather regular pattern for adaptation, whereas the MERCURY Finance module seems to 
be the center of debate.  Most of the problematic issues mentioned during the interviews 
were about the MERCURY Finance module.   
 
5.1.1. The Wider Context 
 
Before ERP, ALPHA had been using a typical financial accounting software 
application, which is “most appropriate for a medium sized company” and “would not be 
enough for ALPHA” (Alpha ERP Designer Interviews, 2004). Equipment vendors and 
maintenance service providers were also complaining about the complexity and speed of 
asset and maintenance management processes in ALPHA. With similar comments and 
expectations, some stakeholders had clearly been expecting ALPHA to carry out its 
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operations using an ERP system, supporting ALPHA to implement some of the ERP 
software.   
Most of the large-scale companies were announcing their ERP decisions and 
implementing ERP was an industrial norm.  Since it is one of the largest among those 
companies, both the software industry and the competitors were expecting the 
announcement of ALPHA’s ERP decision.  As one manager described: 
It seemed that only we were left.  All large accounts, even some dealer 
networks had already decided on or had even been using some ERP 
systems.  We were supposed to be the leader in technology, however our 
competitor was about to implement ERP. We couldn’t have lagged 
behind; there was a strong expectation in the industry. (ALPHA Designer 
Interviews, 2004) 
Additionally, ALPHA had been operating in a recently regulated industry.  The 
regulatory authority had been asking for precise reports regarding to ALPHA’s business 
parameters and performance metrics.  ALPHA was obliged to provide detailed and 
precise data to the authority; otherwise, it would face significant fines due to 
noncompliance in reporting.  In addition to the coercion of regulatory reporting, ALPHA 
was planning to be listed in the stock exchange markets, which would extensively 
increase the complexity and necessity for precision in financial reporting and control.  
However, without employing some ERP technology, generating reports that were in 
compliance with regulatory authority and stock market regulations could have been very 
problematic, if not impossible.  Not surprisingly, ALPHA later faced with such 
allegations from both the investors and the regulatory authority before the completion of 
its ERP implementation and paid significant fines to the government and investors. This 
extensively motivated the top managers to finalize the ERP project.   
By that time, almost all of the worldwide players in the industry were in the process 
of purchasing ERP software and announcing their decisions.  A large shareholder of 
ALPHA also announced its ERP decision and started deployment in Europe.  Some 
common operations between ALPHA and their large shareholder might have required 
integration of some operations, increasing the normative expectation on ALPHA to start 
its ERP project.   
Such expectations have supported ERP in ALPHA not only at the beginning of the 
purchasing decision, but also throughout the adaptation process.  For instance, lately in 
2005, the large shareholder company had a potential to increase its market share and 
asked to integrate its ERP system with ALPHA for financial and operational reporting 
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and consolidation. This inquiry triggered a postponed implementation phase of 
MERCURY that covers version upgrading and implementation of modules that had been 
purchased but not implemented previously.   
In addition to those normative and coercive expectations, ALPHA also took other 
companies in its industry in Europe as role models, including its large European 
shareholder.  The ALPHA ERP project teams made a number of site visits to “learn from” 
other companies in the same industry, in Europe.  They also frequently referred to their 
observations and lessons learned in their discussions of “how ERP can work in a 
company in the same industry, such as …” in the meeting minutes for the ERP design, 
implementation, and follow-up in use.  An interesting anecdote of this “mimetic” 
behavior can be observed materially in ERP project newsletters, which highly resembles 
to another ERP project newsletter collected in a site visit.   
 
Table 5-1 Observations on the wider context of ERP adaptation in ALPHA 
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic forces in 
the wider environment. 
Normative 
• Having an ERP system was the industry norm.  
• Stakeholders had been expecting an ERP system. Later, some of 
them integrated their systems for data exchange.  
Coercive 
• Legal and regulatory requirements of precise and timely reporting 
of financial results and operational metrics 
• Later, with significant fines due to reporting problems supported 
ERP implementation to overcome some barriers. 
• A large shareholder wanted to integrate its ERP system. When the 
shareholder had an option to increase its shares, related phase of 
ERP project had restarted.  
Mimetic 
• Site visits to European companies in the same industry and taking 
them as role models during the adaptation. 
• Largest competitor’s ERP announcement increased the speed of 
decision making in ALPHA. However, in order to differentiate 
itself ALPHA switched to the alternative ERP vendor. 
 
As mentioned before, while ALPHA was in the extended period of ERP vendor 
evaluation, its largest competitor announced its decision to acquire ERP and their 
preferred vendor, forcing ALPHA to speed up to make its own decision.  ALPHA was 
also about to select NEPTUNE as its ERP system at that time, as observed from the 
project documentation.  However, after the competitor’s announcement, ALPHA 
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switched to MERCURY from NEPTUNE.  As one manager described in his interview 
this was to “differentiate itself from the competitor as the market leader”.  Although, this 
may seem contrary to the mimetic expectation, competitor announcement actually 
motivated ALPHA to finalize its decision.  The announcement of the competitor made 
ALPHA change its vendor decision, not the decision for ERP acquisition. According to 
these observations, ERP adaptation in ALPHA have been positively related with the 
support of normative, coercive and mimetic forces in the wider institutional context on 
having an ERP technology (See Table 5-1).  
 
5.1.2. The Immediate Context 
 
ALPHA had the great majority of the market share and was a dominant power in 
the market. It faced limited competition despite the frequent marketing campaigns of its 
competitors to attack its customer base.  Since the company was recently established, it 
did not have many legacy applications that would substitute for ERP functionality.    A 
few applications were running for vital functions such as accounting and shipment.  
Managerial decisions were usually made with limited support of viable data. 
In its early years, the focus of ALPHA was to reach the whole national market with 
its local dealers and centers as soon as possible which required making fast and heavy 
investments in technology infrastructure.  Being in an investment race to cope with the 
booming demand, competitor moves, and to stay as the dominant player, efficiency was 
not a major concern for ALPHA.  Consequently, the company faced many problems in 
tracking, controlling, and coordinating its technical infrastructure and equipment 
inventory.  For example, prior to the ERP project, major equipment vendors had been 
complaining about the complexity and manual nature of the asset management and 
maintenance and ALPHA outsourced its technical equipment inventory, without any form 
of control to one of its largest vendors.  The vendor who was providing most of the 
technical assets and equipment started controlling ALPHA’s warehouse operations, 
without ALPHA’s exact knowledge on what really was in the warehouse and what was 
shipped to the field.  Therefore ALPHA had to manage complex financial control 
processes and do manual checks on asset lists and financial accounts to track the material 
flows precisely. This was a strong technical factor that motivated ALPHA to adapt some 
ERP technology for financial accounting and equipment logistics.   
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Table 5-2 Observations on the immediate context of ERP adaptation in ALPHA 
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with social, political, and technical organizational 
forces in the immediate environment. 
Social 
• Existing applications did not meet the user expectations.  
• Strong expectation among people that the “status-quo” had to 
change. 
• ERP had not been considered in relation to savings in headcount 
hence no employee anxiety had developed about job security. 
Political 
• Two strong groups within ALPHA (Finance and IT) demanded ERP 
for various reasons.  
• Finance manager wanted to control spending and operations in the 
IT department but the IT manager did not want to be controlled by 
Finance. 
Technical 
• Previous problems in tracking, controlling, and coordinating its 
technical infrastructure, equipment inventory and related financial 
accounts.  
• Later, ALPHA switched to MERCURY on January 1st, 2000 to 
survive against the Y2K software digit problem.   
 
By implementing ERP, managers of ALPHA aimed to become capable of 
controlling all technical equipment in the warehouse and in the field.  In addition to that, 
ALPHA was not sure about the Y2K (software digit problem) compliance of the old 
applications that were to be replaced by MERCURY and MINERVA.  Therefore, 
technically ALPHA was in need of an ERP system, preferably on January 1, 2000 at the 
latest.  
At the beginning of the ERP project, the company’s administrative processes had 
already been in place for some years.  However, ALPHA was divided into powerful 
groups reporting to two different vice presidents (VPs).  These were the Information 
Technology (IT) group and the rest of the company which included Finance.  The IT  
group was making large-scale investments and also enjoying significant power within the 
company.  The Finance group was actively asking for a better control of the technical 
spending of the IT group.  Therefore, ERP initiative in ALPHA started from two different 
sources.  First, the IT group wanted an asset tracking and management functionality to be 
able to control its warehouses and infrastructure investments in the field.  Second, the 
Finance group wanted better controlling and reporting of financial data, especially for the 
IT group. Therefore both IT and non-IT sides of the organization supported the ERP 
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project on their own terms. The divided nature of the ERP schemas and ERP logics also 
continued at later stages of the project leading to a two-sided and poorly integrated ERP 
system and further dominated ERP paradigm in the organization.   
At the initial stages neither the organizational units, nor the individuals had resisted 
to adapt to the ERP technology.  The existing systems did not meet the requirements and 
expectations of ALPHA users.  Hence many people expected that the situation could not 
continue as it had been.  By that time, ERP had not been considered in relation to 
“headcount” savings; therefore employees did not link it to issues regarding to job 
security.  Therefore, the social condition in ALPHA supported having an ERP system 
(See Table 5-2).   
 
5.1.3. The Macro Level  
 
Interviews and meeting minutes and presentations taken from ALPHA’s archives 
reveal that the ERP paradigm of the macro actors, who selected the ERP vendor and 
prepared the high-level design for ALPHA, significantly resembles the general ERP 
discourse in the IT industry, at the beginning of the adaptation.  At the macro level, ERP 
technology was considered as a large-scale, central software application with a number of 
tightly integrated modules and a database as the central repository of applications and data 
for the whole company.  ERP technology was considered as “the medium of operational 
and financial best practices”    (ALPHA Designer Interviews, 2004).  The briefing 
sessions with top-managers in ALPHA emphasized that these best practices had been 
“distilled by ERP vendors over different companies and industries” (ALPHA Designer 
Interviews, 2004) and ALPHA should not try to change the structure of the ERP system. 
ERP design in ALPHA was developed by a senior project team composed of the 
ERP project sponsor, who was a top manager in ALPHA, other top managers, and ERP 
consultants, who participated in ERP vendor selection according to the functional 
requirements of ALPHA.  After the design stage, following the ERP paradigm, designers 
initially planned almost no customization on MERCURY and limited customization on 
MINERVA. MERCURY and MINERVA were supposed to establish a tightly integrated 
ERP system to provide “timely and accurate” data for decision-making and financial 
reporting and to standardize substandard business processes.  Despite the gradual 
implementation strategy, since ERP was aimed to be a comprehensive business backbone 
to cover the whole company, all modules of MERCURY and two modules of MINERVA 
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were (Asset Management and Maintenance Management) included in the design and later 
purchased by ALPHA.   
One of the main technical purposes of ERP in ALPHA was to control the fixed 
assets in inventory and at the sites. In order to be able to provide precise financial reports, 
bill of materials (BOMs) were prepared in great detail. Every single nut-and-bolt at every 
location in the country had to be tracked and maintained by MINERVA. Since 
MINERVA was a comprehensive asset and maintenance management module of the 
MERCURY ERP system, all planned integrations were tight, which required online 
creation and exchange of data between applications.   
MERCURY and MINERVA are two different software technologies and they 
present different levels of difficulty against change.  MERCURY is a configurable ERP 
technology, where by choosing several parameters in the software, the nature and flow of 
the business processes within the software can be controlled.  However, changing the 
business process itself extensively and making it fundamentally different from what is 
available in the software is not possible or “not recommended” by the vendor.  Whereas, 
the situation is different for MINERVA, which is more like a set of functions, procedures, 
and sub-modules organized in a series of libraries where the designers and implementers 
can develop their own versions of business processes within the software.  It can be 
considered as a development framework where the designers and implementers have the 
option to act different from what the ERP software requires.  MINERVA imposes some 
requirements but actors can mostly construct their own processes.  In addition to that, 
finance and accounting, which are to be followed by MERCURY, are more rule-based 
and defined by laws and regulations, making MERCURY a harder domain technology 
compared to MINERVA.   
The difference between the properties and the nature of the two ERP applications 
and ALPHA’s experience with them supports the related proposition for ERP adaptation 
for ALPHA (See Table 5-3).  While developing the design of MERCURY, ERP paradigm 
dominated the designers since they had no option to design differently from what 
MERCURY required.  The preparation of the process blueprints, accounting and 
inventory identification conventions were strictly dictated by MERCURY.  Whereas, 
MINERVA designers were relatively free to act as they wished, but were disciplined with 
the general nature and limits of MINERVA, since it allowed extensive customizations and 
changes in the software.   
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Table 5-3 Macro Level Observations in ALPHA 
Proposition 3: ERP paradigms dispose ERP design by dominating the designers when 
the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP 
technology.   
• Designers considered ERP as an application repository and the two ERP 
applications were designed to operate in tight integration. 
• Designers considered ERP as a business backbone covering the whole company. 
All MERCURY modules were purchased, although there were no plans of 
implementing all of them. 
• Designers considered MINERVA as a data repository.  
• Asset BOMs and locations defined with great detail in MINERVA. 
• Almost no modification was planned for MERCURY in design. Minimal 
modification was planned for MINERVA. 
 
5.1.4. Structuration of the Meso Level 
 
After ERP design was complete ALPHA formed two implementation teams one for 
MERCURY and the other for MINERVA. Teams composed of experts from finance, 
accounting, and information technology for MERCURY and logistics, field engineering 
and IT for MINERVA.  The meeting notes of both ERP implementation teams reveal that 
many details of “how the business should be carried out according to ERP best practices” 
had been widely discussed in ALPHA during the implementation.  However, none of the 
initial design assumptions were modified by the implementation team.  
In the beginning of implementation, the implementation team was handed the 
MERCURY and MINERVA design schemas, which reflect the fundamental assumptions 
and expectations on ERP implementation. Implementation team could not question those 
schemas for implementation initially and accepted them. Ideas of changing the design 
schemas were mostly rejected by the implementation team leaders.  Only a few of them 
were taken to the ERP Steering Committee meetings, all of which had been rejected by 
the top management.  
For example, a group of implementation team members proposed to change the 
phasing of implementation for the MERCURY modules, which were all purchased. 
However, the ERP Steering Committee, led by the IT director rejected the proposal. The 
ERP Steering Committee insisted that time was critical for the project and that the 
implementation should start immediately. This message further forced the implementation 
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team members to not question the fundamentals, and quickly proceed with the 
implementation work. As one of the engineers described:  
It was claimed that the available design was the best practice.  When we 
told the consultants that there were other ways of managing processes 
using MERCURY or MINERVA, discussions just got longer and longer.  
After long hours, even days or weeks of discussions, we either had to 
agree or were forced to come to an agreement.  The initial ERP framework 
determined the rules, we didn’t have any option” (ALPHA Implementer 
Interviews, 2004) 
Although, the implementation team had made some changes on ERP schemas in 
later stages of adaptation, in the beginning the ERP schemas underlying how 
implementation should be carried out in ALPHA had created the boundaries for 
implementation, supporting the related proposition for ERP adaptation in ALPHA (See 
Table 5-4). 
 
Table 5-4 Macro–to–Meso level observations in ALPHA 
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize ERP paradigms into ERP schemas with force.   
• The ERP Steering Committee and the implementation team leaders rejected 
change requests in implementation. 
• ERP Steering Committee ordered the implementation team to immediately start 
implementation, without any modifications in implementation plans and designs. 
 
 
5.1.5. The Meso Level 
 
As previously described, MERCURY is a harder technology compared to 
MINERVA.  The consequences of this difference are also observable at the 
implementation stage of the ERP adaptation in ALPHA.  The nature of the interpretation 
of the ERP schemas and the implementation had been different for MERCURY and 
MINERVA from the beginning.  For MERCURY, consultants and engineers tried to 
configure the ERP system by discussing its parameters.  All the existing numbering 
schemes, process flows, and business rules in MERCURY were implemented in the 
MERCURY modules.  In cases where these business rules were clearly inappropriate for 
ALPHA, they were implemented with minimal changes and turnarounds devised to make 
the software act differently without making changes in the software itself (e.g. creating a 
fake inventory to record missing parts).   
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However, for MINERVA, from the very first day of implementation, a software 
development company was contracted to customize MINERVA according to the 
requirements described by the implementation team.  At the implementation stage, the 
contractor company constructed new business processes for MINERVA as the 
implementation team wanted. MINERVA functioned as a framework for implementation; 
however developments and extensions were coded by the contractor.  As these clearly 
indicate, structures imposed by the ERP schemas of MINERVA have disciplined; 
whereas, the MERCURY ERP schemas have dominated the implementation.  These 
observations support the related proposition for ERP Adaptation in ALPHA (See Table 5-
5). 
 
Table 5-5 Meso level observations in ALPHA 
Proposition 4: ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation by dominating the 
implementers when the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the 
subject is a soft ERP technology. 
• ERP Schemas were implemented with minimal changes and turnarounds devised 
to make the software act differently without making changes in the software itself. 
• A software development company was hired for customization according to 
requirements described by the implementation team using MINERVA as a 
framework 
 
 
5.1.6. Structuration of the Micro Level 
 
MINERVA became operational in the last quarter of 1999, whereas MERCURY, 
started operation in the beginning of 2000. Towards the end of the implementation stage, 
extensive trainings were given to users to describe how MERCURY and MINERVA 
would be used in ALPHA.  The users had been instructed on what ERP was and how it 
should be used.  The daily practices of users were determined and printed in user manuals 
and taught in training sessions.  These were actually proposed logics for the daily 
practices of users.  Both the MERCURY and the MINERVA trainings included 
recommended ways for understanding how MERCURY and MINERVA should be used 
and screen-by-screen tutorials for using both systems in daily practice.  Preparing the user 
training materials, exercises, and scenarios of ERP in use, both implementation teams 
actually created and offered the logics of using ERP for the ERP users. 
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Primary users of MINERVA were responsible for defining and updating asset 
information, tracking of assets, “trouble ticketing” and following the service levels for 
MINERVA. Since there were no related prior business process or software applications 
for these functions, the logic presented in the training sessions and peer-to-peer 
workshops were all new.  Due to limited knowledge and experience of the MINERVA 
users, they did not have an option to act different from what was instructed in the training 
sessions. 
However, the situation was different for MERCURY. Potential users of 
MERCURY, such as the finance and accounting users were previously using Logo, a 
local software application for accounting and basic finance functionality.  Compared to 
MERCURY, using Logo was much simpler, enabling the users to handle information in 
fewer “screens” and to perform user tasks more quickly.  Therefore users initially resisted 
using MERCURY.   In the beginning, the implementation team attempted to make users 
believe that MERCURY was superior to Logo.  However, since some of the users did not 
stop complaining, the implementation team leader reported the situation to the immediate 
managers and the HR department of ALPHA.  The “acclaimed leader of the resistance” 
was assigned to a different location. This move forced all the resisting users to accept the 
new system, forcefully.  In addition to this move, implementation team decided not to run 
the old and new accounting systems in parallel. Instead, the old system was terminated 
and replaced by the new system to force the users to perform their jobs on MERCURY, 
supporting the related proposition, together with the above observations (See Table 5-6).   
 
Table 5-6 Meso-to-Micro level observations in ALPHA 
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize ERP schemas into ERP logics with force.   
• The users had been instructed on what MERCURY and MINERVA were and how 
they should be used.   
• Resisting users were forced to use and the person who resisted the system most 
was relocated to a different position. 
• MERCURY change took place on the New Year day without a concurrent-run, to 
force the users to use the system as described.  
• MINERVA users did not have an option to act otherwise because this was their 
first system and they were not experienced. 
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5.1.7. The Micro Level 
 
After ERP system became operational, training sessions continued for MERCURY 
and MINERVA users “to minimize the problems” and “to make people clearly 
understand what the software was for”, as described by the MERCURY implementation 
team member, who was in charge of user trainings.  ALPHA followed a more structured 
training program with formal training sessions and special training materials for 
MERCURY, whereas, for MINERVA an informal training approach was taken based on 
peer influence. “Power users” who were involved in implementation directly trained their 
peers in their unit performing short formal sessions and longer informal workshops.  
Although the initial user tendency of not using MERCURY was overcome, the 
user’s resistance did not completely go away. Since the users were expecting a more 
intuitive interface, they had to use more time than expected and considered using the 
system a difficult job. As one of the MERCURY users described in an interview:  
It was new. In the beginning the whole thing was new.  We tried to 
understand what it was.  How can it help my job; how will it make my day 
better?[laughs]  Then we understood that it would not be so easy and 
started using the system as it was described in the training sessions. 
(ALPHA User Interviews, 2004) 
The main problem was the complexity of a typical transaction in MERCURY. For 
example, an average financial transaction required the MERCURY user to enter values 
into several fields over five different screens instead of one as it was in Logo. Therefore, 
they covertly continued to resist MERCURY and tried not to follow the instructions for 
use. Some people even tried to collect their entries over Microsoft Excel files and wanted 
periodic importing of those files into the system. However, managers clearly and 
repeatedly declared that the users had to “accept working with the new system or better 
leave the company” since “changing MERCURY just because some users wanted it to 
change was not so easy”.   
Actually, the main problem wasn’t about making or not making changes on the 
external features of MERCURY, it was about changing the inherent logic of how to use 
the system. The described sequences of multi-screen use were actually designed to ensure 
the integrity of a financial transaction. The changes demanded by the users could make 
using MERCURY much easier but would decrease the controls inherent in the system, 
threatening the correctness of the accounting.  Therefore, the users had to obey the rules 
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of using MERCURY and started accepting the logic, as described by one of the 
accounting users: 
When I got used to MERCURY, I actually started liking it, especially 
when I could create fancy reports and do new analyses that were not 
possible with prior systems.(ALPHA Implementer Interviews, 2004) 
While MERCURY users were having struggles with the implementation team, 
MINERVA users were trying to figure out their own routines of using the system, with 
informal trainings and coaching of trained peers. The informal approach to user training 
actually encouraged them to develop their own logic for using MINERVA. The 
implementation team was very accommodating with respect to the change requests as 
long as they did not harm other system components (Figure 5-2). These observations 
support the related proposition for ERP adaptation in ALPHA (See Table 5-7). 
 
Table 5-7 Micro level observations in ALPHA 
Proposition 5: ERP logics dispose ERP use by dominating users when the subject is a 
hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP technology.   
• Users had no option but use the system as implemented, since it wasn’t easy to 
change MERCURY. 
• Integrity of a financial transaction could be damaged, if users did not follow the 
described sequences of MERCURY use. 
• MINERVA users were devising their own routines of using the system with the 
guidance of peers and informal training. 
• MINERVA changes that wouldn’t be harmful for another system component were 
readily accepted. 
 
 
5.1.8. Changes at the Micro Level 
 
As described in the previous section, the MINERVA users had been providing 
some logic on using the system even in the beginning. Shortly after they became more 
familiar with the system, they started developing their own routines of using MINERVA, 
which were different from what had been prescribed to them initially. For example, 
instead of filling required fields on the screens, they started entering dots to make fake 
entries. Another example of novel use is that, small user groups started using some text 
fields on the screen for purposes different from what was intended in the implementation 
phase, to share different data fields amongst themselves. 
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When MINERVA users went too far in inventing novel uses of the fields in 
MINERVA, the MINERVA implementation team, made fundamental changes in 
MINERVA implementation to accommodate these changes. They either developed some 
new modules or significantly altered the existing modules for new uses.  
For example, at one point in time, MINERVA users started assigning legal court 
cases as if they were IT equipment and attached related files as if they were equipment 
documentations, to be able to follow different legal actions going on at various locations 
in Turkey.  The user, who invented this use, influenced others in his group to do the same 
for their own practices, which then became a de-facto standard usage for the specific 
team.  In ALPHA, there appeared several teams of experts who applied the same scheme. 
With the emergence of such a use, other groups also followed this scheme and started 
organizing their files as if they were equipments of the related sites.  When such changes 
in use started creating integration and performance problems, the users were asked to 
abandon parts of this usage.  However, parts of this novel use, that could be 
accommodated within the limits of the existing system were accepted and became a 
legitimate use of MINERVA.   
The nature of the transactions followed by MINERVA was significantly different 
than MERCURY.  The functional sequences of using the system were not as critical as 
those of a financial transaction. Hence, the MINERVA implementation team could 
consolidate screens of basic transactions into a single screen. As one implementation team 
member described:  
MINERVA was made to accommodate the USA standards.  It was 
suitable neither for us nor for ALPHA.  So we modified it according to our 
standards and the local requirements during and after implementation.  
Now, you cannot find any single installation of MINERVA worldwide 
that is like what we have here (ALPHA Implementer Interviews, 2004) 
Initially, MINERVA was designed to follow every device and its components with 
precise location information all over Turkey. For example, for a network device sitting in 
a system room in the Ankara office, hardware basis was recorded with the exact location 
of the system room and the exact location of the equipment within the system room. 
Furthermore, any additional hardware cards installed to the network equipment was 
further recorded specifying the identification of the slot the card was located in on the 
equipment. ALPHA designed and implemented MINERVA to keep track of and follow 
this information online for all their locations in Turkey. After users started using 
MINERVA, this logic had been followed for some time. However, keeping track of this 
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information with so much precision created significant user resistance, since the tasks 
related with installing, replacing, and moving equipments became heavily involved data 
processing, which wasn’t the case before. Rather than entering location-related 
information of equipments at one time, users started to collect this data in local files and 
later entered them in batches manually. However, the batching time got longer and some 
of the users actually started forgetting or ignoring to update the location data. This 
modification in system use, have accumulated reliability problems on MINERVA. Since, 
MINERVA implementation could not force the individuals to enter this data, batch data 
entry became a commonly accepted practice.  Due to forgotten data entries, ALPHA 
started making annual asset counts to update the data on the each system. 
On the other hand, for MERCURY, some of the users stopped using some of the 
side functionalities offered. Implementation team did not consider this behavior harmful 
or dangerous, since it did not influence any of the critical functions of MERCURY.  
However, this trend got only further, and users started ignoring many additional features, 
which were critically emphasized in the design and implementation phases of 
MERCURY. As one implementation team member described:  
XYZ functionality was initially planned for online usage. It was in fact, 
one of the key requirements defined in the design phase that each ERP 
vendor was asked to comply with.  It took long hours to discuss the design 
and even a longer time to implement related functions to prepare the 
reports, screens, and everything.(ALPHA Implementer Interviews, 2004) 
One user in accounting describes how she first stopped using this function online 
and totally ignored it later, as follows: 
In the beginning we were using it online.  But after the first year, I decided 
to collect the data sheets daily and enter everything in the system later in 
batches.  Then due to the daily rush, I started missing days.  Now, I don’t 
do it at all.  I keep the data in Excel and import it in MERCURY whenever 
they want me to.  Since no body insists on using the system online, this 
change does not create any problems for me. (ALPHA User Interviews, 
2004) 
In both cases, for MERCURY and MINERVA, users started making some minor 
changes in their use. These modifications got accumulated and even amplified over time. 
However when the accumulated changes started acting against the fundamental logic of 
using the system, either the new use influenced the logic or the modified uses were 
eventually abandoned to reconcile with the existing logics of system use. These 
observations support the related proposition for the ERP adaptation in ALPHA (See Table 
5-8). 
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Table 5-7 Observations on Micro Level Changes in ALPHA 
Proposition 10: When drifts in ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple 
interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use modifies ERP logics through influence.  If ERP 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP use would eventually recede and be 
abandoned.   
• MERCURY users stopped using some of the side functionalities that were heavily 
emphasized during design and implementation. 
• Since this change did not threaten any critical function of MERCURY it was 
allowed within the existing logic of system use.  
• MINERVA users modified their logic of using the system shortly after they 
became familiar with the system and started storing some site-specific documents  
by creating valueless assets on locations.  
• Later this modified use created performance problems, reviewed by the 
implementation experts and partially prevented, but some documents allowed 
making the modified logics a legitimate use of MINERVA. 
• Although, users were asked to immediately enter any changes in asset information 
into MINERVA, they started making batch data entries, which the implementation 
team later accepted.  However, users became neglectful later and ALPHA started 
making annual asset counts all over Turkey to update data. 
 
 
5.1.9. Propagation of Changes to the Meso Level 
 
The changes in use made MINERVA evolve into a site management platform, since 
more and more site related information and documentation had been integrated into 
MINERVA. Before those integrations, MINERVA had been referred to in ALPHA 
documents as an “asset management platform” representing the fundamental schema of 
the implementation. However, after the modifications in use, the user’s reference for 
MINERVA as a “site management tool” dominated the terminology. The implementation 
team switched from the term “asset management” to “site management” while referring to 
MINERVA. After that discourses in secondary sources regarding to MINERVA had also 
shifted to “site management” representing a change in ALPHA’s perception of 
MINERVA. 
In addition to the changes in the users’ and the implementation engineers’ 
perceptions of MINERVA, some changes took place during the implementation.  For 
example, the implementation team, influenced by the users’ habitualized use of 
MINERVA for site-related issues, transferred other site-related issues, such as recording 
site-related invoices for accounting, that were initially planned on MERCURY to 
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MINERVA.  Moreover, MERCURY inventory module was canceled due to problems in 
use and site-related parts of inventory functionality were transferred to a new module of 
MINERVA.  These changes required a new integration between MERCURY and 
MINERVA to enable MERCURY to import the related data from MINERVA, which was 
not prepared during implementation. 
MINERVA was primarily used to follow manually opened, non-technical “trouble-
tickets” regarding to sites, which are used to follow problems. Network-based technical 
problems were followed separately on the System Management Server (SMS) of 
Microsoft. Later, users suggested changing the implementation on MINERVA and 
influenced the implementation team to integrate MINERVA with SMS for an automatic 
opening of the technical trouble tickets on MINERVA. 
However, the required changes for the new integration were not in the design and 
were carried out with minimal planning. The integration was developed without any prior 
analysis and carried out more or less, with a trial-and-error method. Therefore, the new 
functionality created performance problems in other MINERVA modules. In order to 
resolve these problems, the implementation team performed a total re-evaluation of the 
current situation and changed implementation schemas to avoid unexpected side effects of 
the SMS integration.   
In addition to the “legal case” and “site maintenance” teams, the teams that follow 
up the site renting contracts with individual owners (private renting team) also wanted to 
use MINERVA. They influenced the MINERVA implementation team to integrate their 
processes into MINERVA. 
MINERVA implementation engineers made a total re-interpretation of the 
previously unused MINERVA Measurement module by changing screens, labels, fields, 
and flows and by adding new fields, attributes, and reports.  They made the old 
measurement module an entirely new one. Private Renting teams were very satisfied with 
the new module and they suggested it to other teams that deal with renting contracts with 
corporate owners (corporate renting teams). Corporate Renting Teams followed the 
suggestion and influenced MINERVA implementation engineers to modify the new 
module according to their own requirements. Interviews reveal that both renting teams 
demanded their integration into MINERVA, quite informally, during the tea talks and 
cigarette breaks and managed to influence the implementation team to enlarge the 
footprint of MINERVA. 
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Table 5-8 Propagation of changes from micro to meso level in ALPHA 
Proposition 13: When ERP logics and ERP schemas contradict, they regulate each other 
with domination. 
• Some MERCURY users did not use certain functionalities. Therefore some of the 
modules were postponed and cancelled.  
• Due to problems in use, some of the MERCURY functions such as workflow and 
human resources were moved to the best-of-breed independent applications. 
• MINERVA was an “asset management platform” but with alternations in its use, 
it is now perceived by the implementation team as a “site management tool”. 
• Users’ logic of “all information in one screen” dominated MINERVA  schemas, 
changing the application implementation accordingly.   
Proposition 8: When ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts influence 
on ERP implementation.   
• MERCURY users stopped using some of the side functionalities that were heavily 
emphasized during design and implementation. 
• Since this change did not threaten any critical function of MERCURY it was 
accepted within the existing logic of system use.  
• MINERVA users modified their logic of using the system shortly after they 
became familiar with the system and started storing some site-specific documents  
by creating valueless assets on locations.  
• Later this modified use created performance problems, reviewed by the 
implementation experts and partially cancelled but some documents kept in the 
system, legitimizing the logics related the modified use of MINERVA. 
• Although, users were asked to immediately enter any changes in asset information 
into MINERVA, they started making batch data entries, which the implementation 
team later accepted.  However, users became neglectful later and ALPHA started 
making annual asset counts all over Turkey to update data. 
 
Although MINERVA increased its footprint significantly with the integration of 
new data sources and functions, preventive maintenance and resource planning modules 
of MINERVA could not be implemented. Users’ logic of “we should enter all information 
in one screen” also dominated schemas, some screens of MINERVA increased from 10 to 
50-60 data fields to enable users to enter all related information on one screen.  Therefore 
the total number of screens significantly decreased, changing the application 
implementation accordingly.   
At the same time, drifts in the use of MERCURY were not as extreme. However, 
MERCURY users simply rejected some functions and modules and insisted on not using 
them. This changed the implementation plans accordingly and some of the modules that 
were planned for implementation in later stages were postponed and cancelled. Some of 
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the functions, such as workflow and human resources that were planned for 
implementation on MERCURY, were moved to the best-of-breed independent 
applications,    
 
5.1.10. Changes at the Meso Level 
 
The MINERVA implementation team almost always accepted changes requested by 
the users since “they were not restricted by the software” and they perceived these 
changes as “a way to win users’ commitment in using the software”.  (ALPHA 
Implementer Interviews, 2004). 
As they received and accepted more suggestions from users, they started to 
reconceptualize MINERVA as a platform for “site management”. They even suggested 
that all other teams performing site-related functions to integrate their business processes 
and data sources in MINERVA. Therefore, other users asked the implementation team to 
also cover other business processes, which required them to keep complex Microsoft 
Excel workbooks and integrate the related data into MINERVA.  As the implementation 
team incorporated such requests into the application successfully, more users placed 
similar requests about site management influencing the implementation team and their 
managers.  As this trend progressed, MINERVA’s implementation schemas changed to a 
“site management platform” at the meso level of ERP adaptation in ALPHA. 
At this stage, ALPHA went one step further and enabled MINERVA power users to 
make simple changes to screen designs and started formally accepting the use of some 
data fields entirely for purposes that were not planned in the beginning.  This further 
fueled the users’ re-interpretation and changing of MINERVA.   
The implementation team later transferred authority of decisions on all 
implementation changes to a specific technical unit, where majority of the MINERVA 
users are located.   Since the operation and maintenance of MINERVA were handed over 
to this specific technical group, users became freer in changing the software according to 
their wishes. The technical unit made a contract with a third party software company and 
started developing a set of ALPHA specific add-ons and modifications on MINERVA for 
such enduring changes.   
In the meantime, MERCURY implementation had reduced to a functional 
minimum and additional phases of implementation were postponed or canceled. 
Implementation schemas were modified and reduced into a subset that only covered what 
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the users accepted, in order to “complete” the project. The implementation team turned 
into a maintenance team and started dealing with only day-to-day problems rather then 
implementing additional functions to the system. Some members of the implementation 
team returned to their previous positions in the organization and left the team. 
 
Table 5-9 Changes at the meso level in ALPHA 
Proposition 11: When drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies ERP schemas 
through influence.  If ERP schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP 
implementation would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• MERCURY implementation had reduced to a functional minimum. Schemas were 
modified and reduced into what was accepted and therefore “completed”. 
• MINERVA schemas were turned into a “Site Management Platform” and they 
asked other site management related teams to get integrated with MINERVA. 
• Some power-users were given the authority to make changes on the user 
interfaces of MINERVA and non-proper uses of screens and fields were accepted. 
• A user division was given the authority to continue with the MINERVA 
implementation, as they deemed appropriate, with the help of a contractor.  
 
Although the initial design and implementation for MERCURY included financial 
reporting, a manager in the finance department decided to purchase a different reporting 
system that imports data from MERCURY.  Other managers in finance followed stopping 
to use the built-in reporting templates of MERCURY and started developing their own 
reporting templates.  Currently ALPHA doesn’t use any of the original reporting 
functions of MERCURY.  It developed its own reporting infrastructure and canceled the 
reporting functionality of MERCURY implementation, which was considered to be 
critical in ERP vendor selection during the ERP design. 
 
5.1.11. Propagation of Changes to the Macro Level  
 
During implementation, especially before MERCURY went live, implementation 
issues, which seemed to be in contradiction with the schemas, were taken to the ERP 
Steering Committee that was made of macro agents, who initially decided on the specifics 
of the ERP design. Therefore, for significant alterations in implementation, the team took 
the guidance of designers in revising the schemas. This approach seems to have aligned 
the macro and meso level decisions in ERP adaptation and ensured the domination of 
ERP paradigms during the implementation.  
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Despite the initial comprehensive design for MERCURY, many of the modules that 
were initially planned have not been implemented in ALPHA.  Some of the modules were 
cancelled and some others were postponed.  Financial reporting, which was once used as 
a main source of justification for an ERP system, was taken out of the MERCURY 
Finance module and another application was purchased for reporting for investor 
relations. 
The initial design required all information to be kept online in a very detailed 
manner for MINERVA.  However, currently, the information on MINERVA is hardly up-
to-date.  Instead of online data entry and use, sub-contractors were hired periodically to 
make enterprise-wide asset counts and report missing assets and unreported location 
changes by updating the information on MINERVA quarterly.  Such changes created 
doubts and questions regarding to the ERP systems, especially among the top managers.  
As MINERVA evolved into a site management platform, some of the fundamental 
financial functions such as depreciation, costing, asset bookkeeping were moved to 
MINERVA for site management.   
When SMS integration with MINERVA created problems, the ERP Steering 
Committee, who had not held any meetings for several months, organized a meeting and 
decided on a complete analysis of the situation in MINERVA. The arranged audit team 
investigated the system and ordered cancellation of some of the changes they were going 
to make on the system according to user requests. Legal case files, which were entered to 
the system, were cancelled.  The audit team considered it risky against confidentiality 
breaches, since the system was not designed to store such documentation.  At this stage, 
ERP paradigms dominated this change as one top manager described:  
 “It was an ERP application, not a document management or case tracking 
software.  What do the legal case files have to do with asset depreciation, 
site inventory and maintenance management?” (ALPHA Designer 
Interviews, 2004) 
Initially, MERCURY and MINERVA were planned to be tightly integrated 
software applications establishing a functional whole as the ERP backbone.  However 
after years of adaptation, the two software became only loosely integrated, with off-line 
and batch integration at the data level.  Trouble ticketing, alarm management, and 
depreciation integration were all modified and added to the initial designs of MINERVA, 
and the number of modules had also increased.  Whereas, MERCURY had some custom 
built modules and reports were discontinued and their MINERVA counterparts were 
purchased instead.   
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Significant changes and module cancellations in implementation deviating from the 
initial design created doubts and questions among designers and other managers regarding 
the current status and viability of the ERP system on hand.  Therefore, ALPHA again 
asked APOLLO, the management consulting company who worked during the selection 
and design, to make an enterprise-wide ERP post-implementation assessment and 
describe the areas that didn’t fit “the objectives of the ERP currently in use in ALPHA”.  
During its study, APOLLO reviewed the initial design, the implementation experience 
and the evolution of use in ALPHA and reported the areas, which did not match to the 
initial design. APOLLO reported that the extensive level of customizations and changes 
prevented upgrades for both for MERCURY and MINERVA.  APOLLO also reported 
some “areas of opportunity” according to “recent advancements in the ERP arena”. 
Together with APOLLO, macro actors of ALPHA decided to cancel some of the 
customizations and functionalities to enable software upgrades for both MERCURY and 
MINERVA.  This study presents an example of how “updated” ERP paradigms work to 
dominate the existing ERP schemas and logics of ERP use, which had a potential to 
change the established institutional order around ERP technology and restart the ERP 
adaptation in ALPHA. At the time of the study, ALPHA started considering a new ERP 
project, to lay off MINERVA and consolidating the functionality on a newer version of 
MERCURY, which now also covers functionality offered by MINERVA. 
 
Table 5-10 Propagation of changes from meso to macro level in ALPHA 
Proposition 9: When ERP implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts 
influence on the ERP design.   
• Many of the MERCURY modules had not been implemented and the design was 
updated. Some functions were taken out of the scope to other applications.  
• The data in MINERVA was not up-to-date and the level of detail decreased. This 
influenced updating the ERP design and arranging annual asset counts.  
• MINERVA evolved into a site management platform, some of the fundamental 
financial functions about sites were transferred from MERCURY to MINERVA. 
Proposition 14: When ERP schemas and ERP paradigms contradict, they regulate each 
other with domination. 
• MERCURY related issues that contradict with ERP schemas were taken to the 
ERP Steering Committee, which ensured the domination of ERP paradigms.  
• ERP Steering Committee arranged an audit team and later ordered the cancellation 
of some of the changes schemas. Hence ERP paradigms dominated. 
• ALPHA ordered an ERP post-implementation audit from APOLLO, covering 
MERCURY and MINERVA to reassure domination of ERP paradigms. 
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5.1.12. Changes at the Macro Level 
 
Although some of the changes on MINERVA were cancelled, many changes 
remained. It is observed that ERP designers accommodated these remaining changes by 
adhering to the “site management system” schema. In addition to that, in 2005, new 
modules of MINERVA were purchased for some additional financial transactions at the 
ALPHA sites. ALPHA top managers started describing “site management” within their 
descriptions of regular ERP functions. This cannot be observed in their prior descriptions.  
Even in some meeting minutes, some top managers argued that MINERVA became not 
an integrated enterprise system but rather an “amorphous dragon”. However, such 
accounts were forgotten later.  Macro actors of ALPHA, being very sure regarding to the 
merits of an ERP system at the beginning, have changed their expectations and 
perceptions of the ERP later and started stating their doubts regarding to the ERP concept 
(ALPHA Designer Interviews, 2004). 
 
Table 5-11 Changes at the macro level in ALPHA 
Proposition 12: When drifts in ERP design cannot be accommodated within the multiple 
interpretations of ERP paradigms, ERP design modifies ERP paradigms through 
influence.  If ERP paradigms cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP design would 
eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• Revision in the ERP schemas and contradictory problems created doubts and 
questions about the ERP systems especially among top managers.  
• Site Management, which was once denied as an ERP task by some of the top 
managers, was later accounted for as part of the ERP functionality. 
• ALPHA revised its perception of ERP from being “enterprise-wide” and “tightly-
integrated” to be more receptive to the current state of the system.  
 
 
5.2. Conclusion 
 
 
ALPHA is a special case of ERP adaptation, where two different ERP technologies 
are concurrently adapted in connection with each other. Considering their structural 
properties, each ERP technology, namely MERCURY and MINERVA, represent 
different levels of hardness for organizational action. Observation of ERP adaptation 
within the same organization, enabled us to control the variability inherent in comparing 
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two different organizations and evaluate the impact of hardness and softness of 
technology during technology adaptation. 
 
5.2.1. Institutionalization of MERCURY AND MINERVA in ALPHA 
 
After eight years of adaptation, both MINERVA and MERCURY reached a highly 
stable state and have institutionalized in ALPHA. However, ALPHA significantly 
diverted from the initial ERP paradigm that was shaped by the institutional environment..  
For instance, in the “Project Objectives” presentations prepared in the beginning of the 
project, the most frequently referenced issues were enterprise-wide and tight integration 
with ERP technology. In those presentations, MERCURY was especially recommended 
for its advanced financial accounting and reporting capabilities, whereas MINERVA was 
proposed as a closely integrated part of the completely integrated ERP system. However, 
currently all of these are hardly true.  MINERVA is not a closely integrated ERP module, 
but it stands almost as a separate ERP system and loosely integrated with MERCURY. 
Against the initial recommendation, MERCURY had its greatest problems in financials 
and most of its reporting functionality is not being used.  The ERP system does not cover 
the whole enterprise, but rather stands as an accounting and logistics software.  Most of 
the modules planned at the beginning (e.g. HR-Payroll, HR-Performance Management) as 
a part of ERP were cancelled and are now being handled by two other applications that 
are not integrated with MERCURY.   
Nevertheless, the adaptation process made ERP paradigms, schemas, and logics 
consistent with each other. Emerging discrepancies between structural elements of ERP 
technology have diminished significantly, leading to the legitimacy of MERCURY and 
MINERVA among actors and hence the institutionalization of the ERP technologies in 
ALPHA. Actors in ALPHA habitualized their actions in relation with MERCURY and 
MINERVA. Users in particular are in a paradigmatic duality and not questioning the 
legitimacy and the functionalities of MERCURY. MINERVA users have habitualized the 
continuous re-interpretation of MINERVA functions and requesting new functionalities 
as part of their daily practice. Their actions implicate more a paradigmatic dualism with 
the structural elements and hence MINERVA is less institutionalized then MERCURY in 
ALPHA.  
According to the RDT model, the institutionalization of MINERVA and 
MERCURY in ALPHA can be disrupted by several sources. The users actions regarding 
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to ERP technology might “drift significantly” and “exert influence” on other levels of 
action, leading to decreased level of social integration.  At some point, such “drifts in 
action“ may “not be accommodated within multiple interpretations” of the ERP 
paradigms, schemas, and logics and may influence these structural elements to change, 
decreasing the level of system integration among them and partial de-institutionalization 
of technology due to increased structural contradictions, restarting adaptation.  For 
example, MINERVA users can demand a very significant change in its functionality or 
MERCURY implementers may decide to implement a new module of MERCURY. 
Another source that may re-start technology adaptation in ALPHA could be the 
structural contradictions between structural elements of ERP technologies in ALPHA and 
wider institutional context.  For example, “ERP paradigm” in the wider institutional 
context may change, with the rise of ERP II, a new type of ERP or ERP vendors who 
prepare these technologies may impose some technical changes on the system and force 
upgrades. This is actually quite probable for both ERP systems, because, MINERVA has 
not been upgraded at all and MERCURY has not been upgraded since 2001.  An upgrade 
means restarting a very significant adaptation, canceling some of the custom 
developments and returning most modules to their original states before the adaptation.   
 
5.2.2. Limitations of the RDT Model in ALPHA 
 
The RDT model has been very helpful in understanding, comparing, and 
contrasting adaptations of MERCURY and MINERVA in ALPHA over time. Differences 
between two technologies with respect to their hardness and softness produced 
meaningful results to understand the adaptation histories in ALPHA.  
The RDT model can be further improved to take into account the temporal nature of 
the adaptation. Although ALPHA provided number of change requests for both ERP 
systems over time as a proxy measure of technology adaptation, the RDT model does not 
provide any propositions regarding to the temporal nature of the adaptation to interpret 
and evaluate this data. 
Furthermore, at the stage where MINERVA implementation team transferred the 
authority for continuing implementation and modification of the ERP system to the user 
departments, users who were originally considered as micro actors in RDT, became meso 
actors.  This is not incorporated in the RDT model. 
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6  
 
 
TOTAL CUSTOMIZATION OF ERP TECHNOLOGY IN BETA 
CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the adaptation of an ERP software application in the 
BETA Corporation (BETA)  and explain how BETA has gone through an adaptation 
while establishing its ERP infrastructure.  First, I describe BETA and its ERP adaptation 
history.  Then, I discuss the immediate and wider institutional context and the process of 
adaptation.  I conclude with a theoretical discussion of the ERP adaptation in BETA. 
 
 
6.1. BETA Corporation  
 
 
BETA was established in 1987 as a 50-50 joint venture between a Turkish business 
group and a Belgium company.  BETA produces steel cord for the tire industry and 
various types of wires for industrial and individual consumers.  The foreign parent 
company of BETA is the world's largest independent producer of steel wires and cords 
with 65 plants in 21 countries worldwide.  Therefore, in addition to its own production in 
Turkey, BETA imports and markets cords and wires from its foreign parent company and 
also exports part of its production to the parent company’s other markets in the Middle 
East, the North Africa, the Balkans and the Turkish Republics of Asia.   
BETA is located in İzmit, together with a set of closely integrated industrial 
manufacturers.  Nearly 80% of all production of BETA is consumed by two large tire 
manufacturers who are in very close proximity to the BETA facilities in İzmit.  For 
BETA, there is not much competition in the Turkish market since there is only one 
competitor, which is a large scale cord-manufacturer, established by an Italian company 
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and is also located in İzmit and it serves mostly its own tire manufacturing at another 
plant.   
BETA is best known for its quality related initiatives in Turkey.  Its production 
lines have been certified under ISO 9002 Quality Management Systems and the company 
has been implementing “Total Quality Management” in its production and management 
processes since 1991.  BETA has been a member of the European Foundation of Quality 
Management (EFQM) since 1994 and received the European Quality Award for small and 
middle-scale companies in 1997.  Due to its history in quality management, continuous 
improvement, and participative management dominated company narratives and 
individual descriptions, and is frequently the subject of participant observation sessions 
and interviews. The ERP Adaptation chronology and a summary of the RDT model based 
dynamics of BETA are included in Appendix C.   
 
 
6.2. BETA Corporation  and ERP Technology 
 
 
PHAROS is the ERP software application developed by a Turkish software 
company named BLIX , which is also a part of the same business group, and also owns 
half of the shares of BETA. PHAROS aims to provide an integrated solution to 
accounting, logistics, sales, and, human resources related functions in compliance with 
Turkish regulations as well as the international financial reporting standards.  PHAROS 
has accounting modules (General Accounting, Accounts Receivable, Current Accounts, 
Banking, Fixed Asset, and Production Costing), logistics modules (Purchasing, Inventory 
Management, Inventory Accounting, Warehouse Management, Sales) and human 
resources modules (Human Resources, Payroll).   
BLIX developed PHAROS as an enterprise ERP solution for small and medium 
sized organizations, by further improving a prior host-based accounting and inventory 
application.  PHAROS is marketed as the first ERP solution in Turkey that has been 
awarded with the TS ISO IEC 12119 certificate for ERP software.  PHAROS is not a web 
based application but works in a client / server architecture.  Since web based applications 
became an industry standard, the technical architecture of PHAROS was partially 
outdated from the beginning of adaptation in 1999.  Together with another client 
belonging to the same business group, BETA is one of the first two clients who 
implemented PHAROS in Turkey.    
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During 2000, BETA evaluated the worldwide ERP applications such as SAP R3, 
Oracle Applications, Baan, and also the local ERP applications such as Logo and Link.  
The top managers received a series of corporate and ERP functionality related 
presentations from each vendor.  
In the beginning of 2001, BLIX Software Company approached BETA with their 
recently developed PHAROS ERP, which had not been implemented elsewhere 
previously. The developers of BLIX had almost finished developing PHAROS and they 
needed a beta-site for testing and proving the technology before its market launch and 
convinced BETA’s general manager to use BETA for this purpose. 
During the rest of 2001, BETA started implementing all the PHAROS modules 
across its functions.  They established an implementation team, which studied the existing 
PHAROS functionality, BETA’s business processes, and user requirements. BLIX was 
also asked to modify PHAROS in case of any discrepancies.   
BETA finished implementation and started the pilot use of PHAROS at the 
beginning of 2002.  The scope of PHAROS in BETA did not include production planning 
and shop-floor management, not only because PHAROS did not have those modules but 
also BETA was using specific systems developed by its European shareholder to 
implement its proprietary production related know-how.  Although BETA planned to 
integrate these systems with PHAROS, this did not take place until the beginning of 2005.   
 
6.2.1. The Wider Context  
 
When BETA started to discuss adapting an ERP system, ERPs were already 
institutionalized in the manufacturing industry. Employing an ERP system had become a 
social and technical norm. The sister companies of BETA in its business group had either  
already started using ERP systems or were in the process of implementation. In early 
stages of ERP adaptation, BETA frequently “benchmarked” the sister companies to learn 
from their experiences. Furthermore, the company that was purchasing more than half of 
BETA’s production was already in the process of ERP implementation and asking for 
some additional capabilities from BETA. This was a strong factor in favor of ERP 
adaptation.  
In addition, there were plans for functional and financial consolidation in the 
business group. They were planning to integrate financial ERP accounting modules of the 
business group companies to have easier data flow and central reporting. McKinsey & 
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Company, a major management consulting company, advised to centralize some of the 
support functions to benefit from “economies of scale”. Such a functional integration 
required an ERP-like application support at the end points for smoother flow and 
coordination between the central unit and subunits of each company. 
 
Table 6-1. Observations on the wider context of ERP adaptation in BETA  
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic forces in 
the wider environment.   
Normative • Having an ERP system became an industrial norm in the manufacturing industry and in the business group. 
Coercive 
• The business group was planning integration of financial ERP 
modules for financial consolidation and reporting. 
• The business group was planning integration of some support 
functions  
Mimetic • BETA frequently benchmarked sister companies in the business group to learn from their experiences. 
 
 
6.2.2. The Immediate Context 
 
ERP related discussions in BETA could be traced back to early investigations and 
presentations to top management that took place towards the end of 1999.  At that time, 
the company had been using stand-alone functional applications, complex spreadsheets, 
and small databases that were developed and maintained by users.  Since those 
applications and user developments were not integrated, there were many problems with 
data quality and timeliness of information.  For example, sales people could sell a 
discontinued product line or could commit to impossible delivery dates because of their 
stand-alone systems.   
One of those stand-alone software applications was the accounting application 
developed by BLIX.  However, all invoices, including the large shipments to two-big 
customers were manually prepared, creating significant error rates.  Since the systems 
were also open to modifications of the volumes, unit prices, and total prices, there were 
problems with data quality and risks of internal fraud.  Therefore, BETA technically 
needed an integrated application system. 
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BETA turned to BLIX when they decided to have an ERP system. Being a sister 
company in the same business group, BLIX had already been servicing BETA in 
information technology related issues and had earned the trust of the managers. 
Furthermore, BLIX was in need of a beta site for its recently developed ERP application 
and hence it not only offered a very low price but also promised to make every change 
needed “to fit their ERP software to BETA”. This supported both BETA’s ERP 
adaptation and BLIX politically, and quelled the general manger’s doubts regarding to 
having an ERP system. Furthermore, PHAROS' cost to BETA was 1/20 of NEPTUNE’s 
price proposal and was considered an extremely good price.  
The general manager of BETA was very powerful. However he also needed social 
acceptance to his decisions like ERP selection which impact majority of employees 
directly.  Participative decision-making had become a social corporate norm in BETA, 
long before the ERP project. BETA highly values participation of all managers in big 
decisions such as having an ERP system. Therefore, the general manager had to convince 
his subordinate managers of the PHAROS ERP. The participative decision making was 
also prevalent within the units of BETA, where unit heads share their decisions and views 
with their teams to discuss the contingencies of the issues on the agenda. Although this 
makes decision-making lasts a long time, it creates a socially receptive climate in the 
organization.  It can be claimed as the reason for smooth adaptations in BETA in the case 
of large scale changes and new issues. 
 
Table 6-2. Observations on the immediate context of ERP adaptation in BETA  
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with social, political, and technical organizational 
forces in the immediate environment.   
Social 
• Participative decision-making style creates a socially receptive 
climate in BETA. 
• BLIX had been providing information technology related services to 
BETA and had earned the trust of BETA managers. 
Political 
• BLIX promised to make all the modifications on PHAROS to make 
it perfectly fit BETA. 
• BLIX belongs to the same business group and also offered 
PHAROS at a very low price. 
Technical • BETA had been using stand-alone functional applications creating technical problems.  
 
 84
 
6.2.3. The Macro Level 
 
The ERP adaptation process at the macro level started with the selection of an ERP 
vendor and discussion of whether the ERP software should fit the company or the 
company should try to change itself to fit the ERP software in order to require minimal 
changes in the original system.  
The evaluation team mostly agreed on purchasing NEPTUNE.  However, the 
general manager of the company was highly critical of NEPTUNE in general.  Stating 
that BETA “shouldn’t try to fit into a software application”, he openly said that the ERP 
software should be custom built or customized extensively to fit the company.  He stated 
in several meetings that if they were to select NEPTUNE they wouldn’t be able to change 
the system as they needed since NEPTUNE “would impose an iron cage” on BETA. In 
addition, he considered the license cost of NEPTUNE excessive.  These discussions took 
more than a year and a complete consensus could not be achieved.  Plurality of 
perspectives regarding to whether ERP should or shouldn’t fit to the company and 
whether NEPTUNE is worth its cost remained afterwards. 
During the design Phase, where the general requirements and the fundamentals of 
the ERP system had been determined, BLIX consultants were actively involved in the 
BETA design teams. Since BLIX was also knowledgeable in and actively implementing 
NEPTUNE, NEPTUNE consultants in BLIX also joined the analysis, design, and 
development teams at several stages of the development.  As a result, BLIX and some of 
its clients including BETA, from time to time call PHAROS a “small NEPTUNE” due to 
minor functional resemblance to it. 
 
Table 6-3. Macro level observations in BETA  
Proposition 3: ERP paradigms dispose ERP design by dominating the designers when 
the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP 
technology.   
• Differences in understanding ERP among macro-actors created a major 
controversy on whether an ERP system should fit a company or not. 
• The general manager was convinced that NEPTUNE could not be modified 
according to the requirements of BETA and would impose an “iron cage”.  
• ERP design was made to perfectly fit the ERP solution to the current processes in 
BETA and PHAROS was selected. 
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6.2.4. Structuration of the Meso Level 
 
The decision made at the macro level to fit the ERP system to the existing practices 
in the organization actually created a very different route for implementation. The 
implementation team was given the existing business processes and were asked to  
implement necessary changes to fit PHAROS exactly to the current situation. Hence the 
implementation work became a gap-analysis of PHAROS comparing to the existing 
business processes and modification of PHAROS accordingly.  
 
Table 6-4 Macro-to-Meso level observations in BETA 
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize ERP paradigms into ERP schemas with force.   
• Despite the opposing views in the implementation team, top managers insisted on 
perfectly fitting PHAROS to the existing business practices without any changes. 
 
 
6.2.5. The Meso Level 
 
Following the ERP schemas forced by the macro actors in BETA, the 
implementation team, especially PHAROS engineers of BLIX did not have any option 
but to analyze the existing situation and modify the software accordingly. The 
implementation approach of BETA made the PHAROS ERP an almost infinitely soft 
technology, which could be changed to fit the existing operations. Hence PHAROS only 
provided a disciplinary framework for implementers to work on and this is what 
differentiated the implementation from custom software development. 
The most significant implementation changes on PHAROS were made in the 
accounting transactions.  In many ERP systems, such as MERCURY and NEPTUNE, 
transactions users perform create associated accounting records. Before implementation, 
PHAROS had the same design, where each transaction had a financial result that was 
directly recorded in the related company accounts.  However, the existing business 
practices in BETA were entirely different.  Only company accountants had the authority 
to create such accounting records. They demanded to keep the situation as it was and 
wanted BLIX to change PHAROS’ internal structure.   
Since the implementation strategy was to make the software fit the company, 
requested changes were accepted.  The coding of PHAROS was changed so that each 
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transaction that needed to create an accounting record was pre-recorded in a “pool”.  
Accountants than evaluated the entries in the pool and created each accounting record 
manually by finalizing the pre-recorded entries into financial accounts.  Since monthly 
cost calculations and allocations were very critical, the accountants had to empty the pool 
every month before cost calculations. However, what was developed in PHAROS was not 
exactly what the employees demanded.  It was not possible to not record any accounting 
related user transactions.  PHAROS provided an accounting discipline for user 
transactions. However, in order to satisfy the BETA accountants, PHAROS created a 
double-book keeping function, where every transaction was finalized in a temporary 
book, like any other ERP software and were later investigated by accountants and 
reconciled into the books. 
 
Table 6-5 Meso level observations in BETA 
Proposition 4: ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation by dominating the 
implementers when the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the 
subject is a soft ERP technology. 
• BETA interpreted PHAROS as a perfectly soft technology and changed totally. 
PHAROS only provided a disciplinary framework for developers to work on.  
• PHAROS disciplined BETA accountants and instead of simple book keeping, 
financial results of user transactions were first recorded in a temporary book and 
finalized later by accountants. 
 
Another significant change performed was about modifying or deleting transaction 
records from the ERP databases.  Usually in ERP systems, deleting or modifying records 
of previous transactions is simply not possible.  Instead of making deletions, users are 
allowed to make reverse transactions and the history of all transactions including such 
modifications are kept in the database for further reference and reporting.  PHAROS was 
also designed in this manner; however, the BETA implementation team had to change the 
software to incorporate the capability of making “corrections” (or modifications). 
PHAROS was changed and implemented so such that transactions could be updated until 
the middle of the next month, when accounts were closed. Although this change looked 
meaningless at first, the implementation team members convinced others that since the 
error rate was high, it would be difficult to use the system without this function.   
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6.2.6. The Micro Level 
 
Since the system was developed targeting a perfect match with the existing 
transactions, BETA users required minimal training on inevitable changes in the existing 
processes and the user interfaces. When BETA users were introduced with PHAROS, 
they accepted it quite easily, since most of their objections had already been taken into 
considered. However, users still had to learn the structural properties of the new system, 
the organization of the screens, its basic functions, and commands.  
Since ERP implementation was performed by modifying the software to exactly 
match existing business processes, minimal change had been introduced to the logic of 
daily practice in BETA. PHAROS implementation turned into a custom software 
application project and the existing PHAROS code just provided guidance for BETA. 
 
Table 6-6 ERP technology at the micro level in BETA 
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize ERP schemas into ERP logics with force.   
• The perfect match approach decreased the level of force required to create the 
ERP logics at the user side. 
Proposition 5: ERP logics dispose ERP use by dominating users when the subject is a 
hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP technology.   
• Since ERP implementation was performed following the current processes 
exactly, it also matched with the existing logic of performing daily tasks before 
the system. Therefore, it became perfectly soft for users and disciplining effect 
was missing. 
 
 
6.2.7. Changes at the Micro Level 
 
BETA finished implementation and started pilot use of PHAROS in the beginning 
of 2002.  During the first 10 months of 2001, both the old applications and PHAROS ran 
in parallel.  During the parallel run period, the new system was presented to the key users 
and their managers and their requests were collected to change the system. Change 
requests and other problems were attended to and customizations were further developed 
during this period. In the 10th month of the parallel run, the legacy systems were stopped 
and the new system was put into effect.  BETA had initially planned to continue with the 
parallel run during the last two months of 2001 and solve any problems that might have 
arisen during use.  However, since no such problems had been observed, the old system 
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was discontinued before the end of 2001. The financial year of 2001 was closed on the 
new system. This may also show that, BETA has achieved the goal of fitting PHAROS to 
existing practices.   
Since users had been entitled to express their needs regarding to the screens, reports 
and use of the system during implementation and parallel run stages, they had nearly no 
complaints about the functional details of the resulting system after the replacement. 
Therefore, they did not require too many modifications after implementation was 
complete.  In other words, when the logic of ERP use proposed by PHAROS had required 
a significant change in the current practice, users’ influence made PHAROS change its 
structure accordingly, during the parallel run. 
Among others, the sales department was mostly happy with PHAROS whereas the 
accounting department requested changes and adaptations mostly for designing new 
reports for the management and small insignificant modifications, as it is explained by 
one informant: 
Accounting department always had been using software, starting from the 
very early days.  Hence, accountants always compared PHAROS with 
their early small accounting software and, even after so much 
modification, they criticized it for being harder-to use.  However, the sales 
department never had any software, and lived with the problems of using 
multiple-disconnected spreadsheets.  They became the most satisfied users 
of PHAROS when they compared it with having nothing. (BETA 
Implementer Interviews, 2004)  
During the PHAROS implementation, in order to comply with requirements of 
BETA, the implementation team made some significant modifications on the system to 
enable some power users to delete or change some of the transactions that had occurred 
within an unclosed accounting period.  However, this functionality created problems in 
use. During the implementation, the implementation team had planned to have only a few 
authorized power users eligible to have such a privilege. Initially, the privilege of being 
able to delete a transaction was only for the “power users” in accounting. However, the 
power users started sharing their PHAROS passwords to use the privilege collectively. 
Later  logic of using this privilege turned into “any accountant could delete a transaction” 
and everybody in accounting had the rights to “correct” a transaction. 
As PHAROS use progressed, reporting functionality in PHAROS was perceived as 
insufficient, because, users who were used to doing their own analysis and reporting on 
spreadsheets and databases could not do it on PHAROS.  A development team prepared 
new reports according to users’ descriptions.  However, considering ad-hoc reporting 
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needs in detail in such a development cycle seemed unacceptable.  Hence, the information 
systems unit of BETA considered implementing a data warehouse technology and started 
evaluating “NEPTUNE Business Warehouse”. ‘The IS manager of BETA, who supported 
NEPTUNE at the initial stages wanted to implement and integrate “NEPTUNE Business 
Warehouse” with PHAROS, thinking that PHAROS could be replaced with “NEPTUNE” 
in the future”. 
 
Table 6-7 Observations on changes at the micro level in BETA  
Proposition 10: When drifts in ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple 
interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use modifies ERP logics through influence.  If ERP 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP use would eventually recede and be 
abandoned.   
• When the logic of ERP use proposed by PHAROS required a change in current 
practice, users’ influence made PHAROS change its own structure instead.  
• The privilege of being able to delete a transaction was only for the “power users” 
in accounting. However, the users started sharing their passwords.  
• Later the logic drifted so that “any accountant could delete a transaction” and 
everybody in accounting had the rights to “correct” a transaction. 
 
Currently, there are still some change requests regarding to the functionality of 
PHAROS. For example shipments without a price are not reported in PHAROS because it 
inherently requires that every shipment should have a price value greater than zero. 
However, shipments made for pilot uses, promotions or maintenance / repair are entered 
with zero prices hence cannot be shown on the reports of PHAROS. Currently the 
information systems department collects change requests on PHAROS annually and plans 
development needs for PHAROS and makes the budget for the coming year. 
 
6.2.8. Propagation of Changes to the Meso Level 
 
As described above, users increasingly demanded for ad-hoc analysis and reporting 
functionality from PHAROS. However, such functionality was not available and easy to 
build. Increasing demands from users influenced the implementation team to ask BLIX to 
create new data export mechanisms. The export mechanisms enabled users to transfer 
data of their choice to Microsoft Excel or Microsoft Access and create any report they 
wished on those applications. This change modified the implementation that aimed  at 
elimination of  user developed databases and complex spreadsheets. . 
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Table 6-8 Propagation of changes from micro to meso Level 
Proposition 8: When ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts influence 
on ERP implementation.   
• Users’ demand for ad-hoc reporting influenced implementation to create data 
export interfaces for further analysis on Access and Excel  
• Common use of transaction correction functionality influenced the 
implementation team to create a transaction freezing function to limit corrections. 
Proposition 13: When ERP logics and ERP schemas contradict, they regulate each other 
with domination. 
• Exporting data for ad-hoc reporting dominated schemas to modify initial plans of 
eliminating stand alone databases and complex worksheets. 
 
During use, more and more users in accounting were given rights to delete 
transactions to correct errors. Since accountants were using this function very frequently, 
some of them started printing and filing the screens for documentation and to follow the 
changes.  
This created a series of risks, due to the need for tracing the corrections and data 
integrity was in danger. Influenced by this user behavior, the implementation team further 
devised  “temporary term closing” functionality in PHAROS where the transactions were 
frozen after a few days limiting the correction rights to a limited group of users and all 
transactions of a month temporarily close at the end of the month. Until the accounting 
close of the month, only one power-user, the accounting manager, had the ability to 
correct a transaction.    
 
6.2.9. Changes at the Meso Level 
 
In 2004, the business group in control of BETA decided to centralize the purchasing 
activities of the business group. As a result, the majority of the purchasing department 
was transferred to the central purchasing unit. Only a couple of purchasing people were 
left in BETA to perform the urgent or special purchasing operations.  Initially the 
transferred employees tried to use PHAROS remotely, however it did not work.  
The significant change in the purchasing practice required significant changes in 
PHAROS and also required BETA to integrate its ERP system with the central purchasing 
unit’s ERP. However, a simple integration was not possible because the coding schemes 
of the two systems did not match with each other. Therefore, BETA had to change its 
coding scheme on PHAROS and alter the ERP schemas. To solve the problem without 
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changing its coding scheme, BETA appended the central purchasing unit’s product codes 
to PHAROS. Existing codes were mapped to the new codes to integrate the coding 
systems.  
Table6-9 Changes at the meso level in BETA 
Proposition 11: When drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies ERP schemas 
through influence.  If ERP schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP 
implementation would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• Purchasing practice fundamentally changed PHAROS, altering the ERP 
implementation towards integration with the central ERP system.  
• Since product coding schemes did not match, BETA altered its ERP schemas and 
appended the product coding of the central purchasing unit to PHAROS. 
 
Despite this solution, BETA faces mapping problems between the old and the new 
product codes.  At times purchase orders of users did not trigger a purchasing activity in 
the central system.  BETA devised a manual solution to this problem without making 
fundamental changes in the system. Whenever such a problem occurs, BETA asks for 
detailed purchase order reports from BLIX, which also provides administration and 
maintenance services. BETA performs detailed investigations on these reports to detect 
and resolve the problems.  
 
6.2.10. Propagation of Changes to the Macro Level 
 
Using two product-coding schemes concurrently was actually in contradiction with 
the ERP paradigm followed in ERP design, which requires one standard coding scheme 
for the whole company. One of the most daunting tasks of design was the development of 
a product coding scheme for PHAROS. Design team and top managers frequently 
mentioned that ERP was mainly for integration of different product naming and 
identification conventions that had been concurrently used in BETA previously. They 
were expecting that ERP would reduce them into a single coding scheme and an ERP 
design was prepared accordingly. However, after the integration with the central 
purchasing unit, the meso level schemas dominated the macro level ERP design 
paradigms.  Power of the central purchasing unit facilitated this domination. 
In addition, changes in PHAROS implementation encouraged users to export the 
data for further analysis and reporting outside. Because of multiple data sources created 
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by data exports from PHAROS at different times, critical data and numbers in various 
management reports started to contradict.  
Some of the managers ordered cross-checks of data obtained from PHAROS.  Some 
of the calculations like production costs available both on production (alternative) systems 
and PHAROS were compared for validation.  Inconsistencies were investigated and 
resolved mostly by changes on the PHAROS database, since the data integrity problems 
were attributed to problems in PHAROS. 
 
Table 6-10 Propagation of changes from meso to macro level in BETA 
Proposition 14: When ERP schemas and ERP paradigms contradict, they regulate each 
other with domination. 
• Using two coding schemes concurrently for purchasing was in contradiction with 
the ERP paradigm, but later meso level schemas dominated the previous 
paradigm. 
Proposition 9: When ERP implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts 
influence on the ERP design.   
• Data quality problems influenced the design and postponed integration of 
production systems, which were used for cross-checking. 
 
ERP was designed to decrease the number of data sources in BETA and improve 
data quality. However, after years of adaptation, the situation did not change with respect 
to these objectives. The implementation-related problems started to contradict with the 
design.  As the number of data sources increased and data quality problems were revived, 
the integration of production systems with PHAROS were postponed. Instead, production 
systems were used for cross checking the related reports taken from PHAROS and to 
locate problems. 
 
6.2.11. Changes at the Macro Level 
 
After years of adaptation, ERP paradigms in BETA have also changed significantly.  
Some of the managers requiring data warehouse functionality and related technical people 
were inclined to have NEPTUNE’s Business Warehouse solution and replace PHAROS 
with NEPTUNE.  
Since the general manager, who convinced BETA top managers to have PHAROS 
modified to fit the company has been promoted to a higher position in the business group, 
his close influence on daily company operations decreased. The information systems 
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manager now discusses more openly that the company “should have to evaluate whether 
it should continue investing in PHAROS or switch to NEPTUNE for better and larger 
functionality”.  Despite the reporting functionality expected from NEPTUNE, NEPTUNE 
integration requirement from the central purchasing unit and the managers who wanted to 
have R3 instead of PHAROS at the beginning, one manager described the conditions of 
replacement: 
PHAROS can only change if BLIX stops supporting it or one of our big 
customers demands a specific functionality from us.  If they asked us to 
provide supply chain integration over the Internet or digital data exchange 
that PHAROS cannot provide, then BETA would be forced to make 
changes in its ERP system.  In that case, we should evaluate whether it is 
worth it to keep on investing in PHAROS or change it entirely.  
Otherwise, with the current General Manager reporting to our ex-General 
Manager, it is almost impossible to change PHAROS without an external 
motive(BETA User Interviews, 2004) 
If BETA decides to replace PHAROS with NEPTUNE, paradigm of ERP might 
also change, since the current top managers are questioning their experience of perfectly 
fitting the software to the organization and say that it should have been the opposite.  
They complain regarding to PHAROS adaptation claiming that BETA did not learn 
anything during the process and did not improve much compared to its performance prior 
to ERP: 
It has been perfectly customized for BETA.  However, compared to other 
ERP applications in the market, it did not provide new functionalities and 
capabilities to us.  There is almost nothing new in it (BETA Implementer 
Interviews, 2004) 
 
Table 6-11 Changes at the macro level in BETA 
Proposition 12: When drifts in ERP design cannot be accommodated within the multiple 
interpretations of ERP paradigms, ERP design modifies ERP paradigms through 
influence.  If ERP paradigms cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP design would 
eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• Macro actors reached nearly a consensus that companies should use an advanced 
ERP package like NEPTUNE for a larger footprint and better functionality, 
• They also reached a consensus that ERP should not fit to the organization 
perfectly, but rather it can establish best practices and force organization to 
change. 
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6.3. Conclusion 
 
 
BETA is a special case of ERP adaptation, where the managers of the organization 
deliberately selected to perfectly change and customize the existing technology according 
to the organization’s current organization of work and relationships. BETA management 
interpreted PHAROS as perfectly flexible and triggered a different adaptation process. 
However, the adaptation again showed a process where several structural elements of 
technology are maintained or changed in a recursive manner at multiple levels. Even in 
the case of perfect customization (free interpretation) of technology, human action is 
enabled and constrained by organizational and technological structures, where these rules 
and resources are also partly the consequences of previous actions or structures.  
 
6.3.1. Institutionalization of PHAROS at BETA 
 
Although we say that PHAROS in BETA has reached some level of 
institutionalization, it is still vulnerable to the influence of some actors. Due to the top 
management’s decision to follow the existing business practices and empower users to 
give directions to meso actors regarding to ERP implementation, users habitualized 
PHAROS quite fast and it gained a legitimate status. Although users in BETA are in 
paradigmatic duality, some of the meso actors, implementation team members, are 
questioning the legitimacy of PHAROS and still favor NEPTUNE over PHAROS. 
However, due to top-manager’s commitment to PHAROS and its existing design, they 
cannot modify the ERP schemas.  Hence, feeling powerless to affect it, they are in 
syntagmatic dualism. Top manager’s ERP paradigm and contextualized ERP schemas and 
logics are coherent; level of system integration is high, leading to institutionalization of 
PHAROS in BETA 
However, as described towards the end of this case, a decrease in the intensity of 
the force applied by the general manager may lead to de-institutionalization of PHAROS 
and re-start adaptation. Such an event may even replace PHAROS with another ERP 
technology.  
Following these expectations, after I have finished preparing this case study, 
another visit to the case site revealed that meso level actors finally convinced new general 
manager to question the existing ERP paradigm in BETA and start evaluating NEPTUNE 
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to replace PHAROS. This is further fuelled by BLIX’s potential decision to discontinue 
PHAROS. 
 
6.3.2. Limitations of the RDT Model at BETA 
 
ERP adaptation in BETA had followed an “end-user” development scenario, where 
users became nearly the meso actors with the empowerment of the top management. The 
RDT model cannot explain how such changes in roles and authority among actors in an 
organization would affect the technology adaptation process.  
However, the RDT model is still helpful in understanding the BETA case and 
PHAROS adaptation that has been taking place in BETA for seven years and in 
explaining the future of ERP adaptation in BETA. 
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7  
 
 
THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGY ADAPTATION IN KAPPA 
CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the adaptation of an ERP software application in the 
KAPPA Corporation (KAPPA) and explain how KAPPA has undergone an adaptation 
process while establishing its ERP infrastructure.  First, I describe KAPPA and its ERP 
adaptation history.  Then, I discuss the immediate and wider institutional context and the 
process of adaptation. I conclude with a theoretical discussion of the ERP adaptation in 
KAPPA. 
 
 
7.1. KAPPA Corporation 
 
 
The KAPPA Corporation has been producing several chemicals and selling them to 
wholesale outlets and retail shops.  The company was established in 1940s and has been 
among the largest commercial enterprises of Turkey.  It was initially publicly owned and 
later privatized. Currently the majority of the shares of KAPPA belongs to two major 
holdings in Turkey. KAPPA has thousands of sales points all over Turkey with 55 office 
locations.  Due to the non-disclosure agreements with KAPPA, further details of the 
industry and the demographics of the company cannot be disclosed.   
After the privatization, the new owners transferred the general manager of a large 
European competitor in Turkey to KAPPA. Finance and accounting employees were 
recruited mostly from one of the owners’ holdings and the rest of the top management, 
especially in the sales & marketing related positions were mostly recruited from other 
foreign competitors in Turkey.  In the meantime the company moved its headquarters to 
Istanbul.   
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The majority of the existing employees were also dismissed and replaced after the 
privatization.   Today, the company has nearly 1.100 employees, only 250 of which were 
with the company prior to the privatization. When the headquarters was moved, the 
majority of the employees working at the headquarters did not want to move to Istanbul 
and left the company.  However, some of the employees in accounting and some key 
experts in information systems were persuaded to move to Istanbul, since they were 
critical for maintaining existing systems and operations.  The ERP Adaptation chronology 
and a summary of the RDT model based dynamics of KAPPA are included in Appendix 
C.   
 
 
7.2. KAPPA Corporation and ERP Technology 
 
 
After a very long initiation period with heated discussions and debates, KAPPA 
decided to establish its ERP system.  The company first prepared a “request for proposal” 
(RFP) for ERP consulting services and distributed it to major international management 
consulting companies working in Turkey.  Proposals were collected from three of them 
and finally DELOS was selected as the ERP consultant of KAPPA for ERP requirements 
analysis, RFP preparation, and evaluation. 
DELOS had worked with KAPPA for more than 6 months and prepared an RFP 
document. The proposals were evaluated and MERCURY was selected as the preferred 
ERP solution for KAPPA. The implementation started in June 2002 and finished in 18 
months, 6 months later than expected. 
 
7.2.1. The Wider Context  
 
In the specific industry that KAPPA operates, ERP had a bad reputation. Many 
worldwide companies had undertaken large-scale ERP projects, spent large amounts of 
money, time, and effort but eventually had to face major problems that led some of them 
to failure. Therefore, industry experts mostly expect failure from an ERP projects. This 
normative expectation had worked against ERP adaptation and effectively blocked an 
ERP project for more than a year in KAPPA. 
However, the industry in Turkey had been recently regulated and the players in the 
industry were increasing their pressure on KAPPA.  Although KAPPA had the leading 
position in the industry, its international competitors started to increase their market share 
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and profitability. The local competitors, on the other hand, all more recently established 
than KAPPA had newer systems. Hence, KAPPA expected the competition to increase 
and believed that the competitors had superior operations and supporting information 
systems. Despite the negative image of ERP projects, this expectation significantly 
effected KAPPA in its ERP decision. 
In addition to these normative forces, several coercive forces were also operating on 
KAPPA for adapting an ERP system. The regulatory authority of the industry was 
demanding precise and timely reports from KAPPA regarding to its market and business 
operations. Furthermore, since some of the KAPPA shares were traded in the stock 
market, KAPPA had to make detailed disclosures regarding to its operations to the public. 
Moreover, two owner holdings also demanded better corporate governance and accurate 
reporting from KAPPA. These forced KAPPA to adapt an ERP system to be able to 
control its operations and to make timely and precise reporting to the public, its 
shareholders, and the regulatory authority. 
 
Table 7-1 Observations on the wider context of ERP adaptation in KAPPA  
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic forces in 
the wider environment.   
Normative 
• ERP projects had faced significant problems and had a bad 
reputation, which effectively blocked ERP for more than a 
year. 
• KAPPA managers expected an increase in competition and 
believed that competitors had superior information systems.  
Coercive 
• The regulatory authority and the stock market required 
accurate reporting. 
• Holdings that own KAPPA demanded better corporate 
governance and accurate reporting. 
Mimetic 
• Other holding companies were implementing or already 
finished ERP their ERP projects. 
• All large companies in Turkey were implementing or already 
finished their ERP projects. 
 
KAPPA also perceived additional forces in its wider environment. Being one of the 
largest enterprises in Turkey, it had identified itself as a leading corporate entity in Turkey 
in their market. However, all other large companies in Turkey that KAPPA compared 
itself with already had or had been implementing some ERP system. This created an 
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image of KAPPA lagging behind the other large companies in Turkey.  Moreover, most 
of the other companies of the two owner holdings also already had or had been 
implementing some ERP system.  These comparisons with the other companies in same 
holdings or in Turkey also forced KAPPA to adapt an ERP system. 
 
7.2.2. The Immediate Context 
 
In addition to the forces in the wider context, the immediate organizational context 
of KAPPA also influenced the ERP adaptation. For example, the bad ERP reputation in 
the wider context influenced the KAPPA employees and almost nobody from KAPPA’s 
departments wanted to work on the ERP implementation team. There was a general belief 
in the company that the ERP projects were most likely to fail.  The KAPPA employees 
considered joining the project very risky for their careers and therefore, most of then 
avoided it.  Although the ERP project required the business experts who were experienced 
in KAPPA, due to the social disinterest to the ERP project, most departments assigned 
their most junior members to the project. Social forces worked mostly against the ERP 
adaptation. 
Political issues also operated on the ERP adaptation in KAPPA. First of all, since 
the management positions were divided between people supported by the two owner 
holdings, there were strong groupings and power games among managers. Managers that 
had powerful relations with either of the two holdings supported each other in corporate 
decisions.  Therefore, many operational issues had the tendency to turn into a political 
dispute at KAPPA.  The IT manager and his team that proposed the ERP project were 
influential and supported by one of the holdings. However, the other managers and 
directors, even those supported by the same holding, did not like the IT manager. As his 
deputy manager described in one of the interviews: “They did not like us. I didn’t know 
why, maybe it was because  we were treating them like dogs” (KAPPA Designer 
Interviews, 2004). 
Although the IT manager could start the ERP project, he and his team were replaced 
in the beginning of implementation. The new IT manager was previously working as the 
consulting manager of another consulting company that was a competitor of DELOS. 
Besides these, technical forces were also heavily affecting the ERP adaptation in 
KAPPA. The existing information systems of KAPPA were distributed over the entire 
country at the regional offices. They were mainly numerous standalone COBOL 
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applications running on VAX mainframe systems, keeping their data on flat text files 
instead of a database.  Most of the functional operations, even the complex financial ones 
such as budgeting, budget realization, and treasury were performed manually.  Since the 
applications were not integrated and distributed, the consolidation of regional data for 
reporting was also performed manually and the state of operations could not be closely 
followed and controlled centrally. The management always had an approximate view of 
the actual operational variables; such as the level of sales and inventories. Due to the non-
integrated and distributed nature, company assets were impossible to track over the 
numerous sites and projects of the company.  Dealer and distributor credit control could 
not be performed effectively, causing the company to take extra risks from problematic 
dealers.  Due to such problems, cost calculations and allocations of the products could not 
be performed; the company only knew its costs in approximation.   
 
Table 7-2 Observations on the immediate context of ERP adaptation in KAPPA  
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with social, political, and technical organizational 
forces in the immediate environment.   
Social 
• Due to the bad reputation of ERP, nobody wanted to work in the 
implementation team, believing that it was most likely to fail.  
• Due to the social disinterest, most units assigned their most junior 
members to the project.  
Political 
• The management team was divided between two owner holdings 
and strong groupings in the management emerged.  
• Most of the managers did not like the powerful IT director, who was 
supporting ERP.   
Technical 
• Legacy programs were disintegrated, distributed and overly 
problematic. They barely met the requirements. 
• Legacy programs were hard to support technically, without any 
documentation and there were few employees who knew them.  
• Project scope was very large due to geographical distribution of the 
company, making the ERP adaptation harder. 
• Later stages, KAPPA could not provide existing data for migration 
due to the technical problems of its legacy systems. 
 
In addition to the above operational problems, which have direct business 
implications, there were other technical problems related to the information systems 
infrastructure. All of the company applications were written in the COBOL programming 
language and were very old.  Since they were poorly documented or not documented at 
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all, the new information systems management had a hard time in tracking down what 
application was running for what purpose.  Maintaining the systems, making the 
necessary functional changes, and providing support to users had become very 
problematic. KAPPA had a hard time in preparing the system change requests originating 
from business needs and changing legal requirements in accounting.  There were only a 
few employees who were knowledgeable on legacy applications and they were moved to 
Istanbul with the headquarters. Therefore, the company technically faced the necessity of 
changing its entire system and an ERP seemed a viable option to the information systems 
management in KAPPA.   
The technical problems that pushed the ERP project had some adverse effects on 
the ERP project in later stages. KAPPA promised to make existing data available for 
migration at the end of implementation. However, due to the disorganized nature of the 
existing data in numerous applications, files and databases, KAPPA could not prepare the 
data for importing in time. For example, fixed asset data was available for migration one 
month after going live and frequently had integrity problems creating a need for manual 
updating of data in the ERP. This was a very complex process and created further 
problems in ERP. 
 
7.2.3. The Macro Level 
 
When the KAPPA IT manager explained his ERP plans with the top management, 
some managers showed resistance, because they had ERP failures in their former 
companies. The old accounting employees also joined the resisting managers and 
supported the existing processes.  Later, the coalition against ERP became so strong that 
using the term “ERP” was banned in KAPPA.  The IT manager could not convince the 
top management to proceed with an ERP project, and the design efforts were suspended 
for some time. Before the ERP project was resumed, the IT manager tried to convince the 
other managers of the necessity of ERP. However he couldn’t communicate with the 
Finance director and the Accounting manager who were the main figures behind the ban 
against ERP. So the IT manager also continued his efforts at several levels of the 
organization to release the ban. 
In order to increase social acceptance and exercise power, the IT manager started a 
number of other application projects with different names; such as Data warehousing 
(DWH), Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
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and Sales Force Automation (SFA). It looked irrational and infeasible to carry these out 
simultaneously. As he explained during one interview, this was more of a strategic move. 
For these projects, he demanded participants from every department in the company.  
This way, he wanted to increase his direct reach to employees in other departments. His 
main intention was not actually bring these projects to an end. However, if some of them 
proceeded faster than he expected, he planned to integrate it later with a central ERP 
system. Among those numerous projects, only the DWH project had reached an end. All 
other projects lingered at the analysis step. However, participation in the analysis step of 
these projects “warmed them up” for an ERP project.  One of his deputy managers 
described this move as: 
We had no alternatives but to go around the ban against ERP. Without 
using the name of ERP, we started all possible information systems 
projects congruently, to tear down the barrier. (KAPPA Designer 
Interviews, 2004) 
A couple of months later, the Finance director, who was against ERP, was replaced 
by the General Manager at the suggestion of the owner holdings for a different reason. 
The Accounting Manager was still in his office, however he could not block the project 
any longer. Some people believed that the IT director used his power in the owner holding 
to dismiss him (KAPPA Implementer Interviews, 2004).  The new director did not have 
any reservations against an ERP project in KAPPA. Hence, the ERP ban was released 
towards the middle of 2001 and the project officially started. 
Although the director who was against ERP was replaced before the start of the 
project, the accounting manager, who was against ERP together with his team of 
accountants, was given the responsibility of ERP design. The General Manager wanted to 
make sure that the ERP design team considered his reservations and made him 
accountable for the success of the project. However, at the end of the design phase, he 
was also replaced due to his attitudes during the ERP design phase.  
 
Table 7-3 Observations at the macro level in KAPPA  
Proposition 3: ERP paradigms dispose ERP design by dominating the designers when 
the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP 
technology.   
• ERP was troublesome and should be avoided. Hence ERP was banned. 
• ERP was designed to cover all company operations to get the “best practices” 
through the ERP system. Minimal customization was aimed.  
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During the ERP design, DELOS was requested to analyze all operations of the 
company with the intention of replacing all of the legacy applications. DELOS analyzed 
and documented all major business processes and listed their functional requirements for 
an ERP system with the participation of related managers of KAPPA. DELOS proposed 
that the ERP system for KAPPA should include as much functionality as possible to  
support the whole company and prepared an RFP document for distribution to the ERP 
vendors. DELOS was also requested to emphasize only the critical functional 
requirements, because the management stated that they were expecting the ERP system to 
provide them with worldwide operational best practices. KAPPA management did not 
want to change what ERP provides as best practices much, but rather wanted KAPPA to 
match the requirements of ERP.  Hence, DELOS tried to focus on the critical functional 
requirements that are special to KAPPA. 
The RFP was distributed to three major ERP vendors and the RFP questions 
regarding to the functional capabilities of the ERP systems were collected with a 
“technical proposal” as well as an additional, closed-envelope “financial proposal” 
covering the licensing and maintenance cost.  
The consulting services of DELOS also covered analyzing the technical answers 
about functional requirements and prioritizing the alternatives in terms of their technical 
proposals. Two of the three alternatives were assessed as being almost equal at the end of 
technical evaluation; however, this result was not announced to the companies, formally. 
Before opening the financial proposal of the two top-performing vendors in 
technical evaluation, KAPPA asked for their implementation proposals covering both 
their implementation costs and their proposed implementation partners. MERCURY 
offered DELOS as its implementation partner, whereas NEPTUNE was reluctant in 
cooperation with DELOS and offered alternative partners. After a very harsh price 
negotiation over the total cost, MERCURY made a very large price cut and was awarded 
the project. 
 
7.2.4. Structuration of the Meso Level 
 
The ERP design for KAPPA included sales, marketing, finance, manufacturing, and 
human resources modules, as suggested by DELOS. ERP design team and top 
management.  They decided that implementation should be performed in two phases. In 
the first phase the sales, marketing, and finance modules were to be implemented and the 
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second phase would cover the implementation of the manufacturing and human resources 
modules. This schema created the basis of the implementation structure. 
KAPPA top managers who participated in the design wanted a very quick 
implementation, which would carry out only necessary modifications and customizations 
and mostly roll out of the prepackaged software. Therefore they set the project deadlines 
accordingly, making the implementation schedules very tight.  
When the implementation team questioned this, the management team rejected their 
arguments and warned them that in case of late delivery of the project, they would not be 
entitled to their annual bonus payments and DELOS could be subject to contractual fines. 
 
Table 7-4 Observations on how macro level actions are relating to the structural 
properties of meso level in KAPPA 
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize ERP paradigms into ERP schemas with force.   
• Top managers asked for a very quick implementation considering only necessary 
modifications and customizations, leading to very tight schedules. 
• Management rejected any arguments and warned them that in case of late delivery 
of the project, the implementation team may not receive the annual bonus 
payments or may be subject to contractual fines. 
• The schema of the implementation was to collect critical requirements, get their 
approval from the design team, prepare and rollout the implementation. 
 
 
7.2.5. The Meso Level 
 
The implementation strategy defined by the ERP schemas dominated the 
implementation team. Tight implementation schedules mostly disposed the nature of 
MERCURY implementation. Since the implementation team did not have much time to 
analyze the existing business processes in detail and decide on exact process designs, they 
had to accept what the informants said regarding to the necessity of a functional 
requirement. Furthermore, the ERP technology itself did not impose many hard 
constraints over implementation because of the nature of the ERP package. MERCURY 
is a configurable ERP technology, where by choosing several parameters in the software, 
the nature and flow of the business processes within the software can be controlled 
without changing its basic design. Therefore, the implementation team could not 
differentiate between the criticality of the functional requirements and start accepting 
what they had been told. 
 105
The KAPPA design team wanted to approve all the modifications and 
customizations, in order to control the changes performed during implementation. 
However, when they were consulted by the implementation team, the designers were slow 
in deciding on the modifications and mostly backed the stated requirements. Therefore, 
many new developments were implemented with the approval of design team. The 
implementation team considered that arguing about their necessity was more time 
consuming than actually implementing the developments. 
 
Table 7-5 Observations on ERP technology at the meso level in KAPPA 
Proposition 4: ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation by dominating the 
implementers when the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the 
subject is a soft ERP technology. 
• ERP schemas dominated the implementation team, hence they did not have much 
time to analyze the current processes in detail and decide on the implementation.   
• During implementation, KAPPA participants claimed numerous critical 
requirements and hence extensive customization was required. 
• Designers who were backing the requirements were slow in providing approvals 
that they required at the beginning. 
 
With the implementation, MERCURY was integrated with the existing 
maintenance, sales, and logistics applications, which were developed before ERP.  The 
order – shipment – billing – collection process was entirely moved to ERP, enabling 
detailed recording and following of the results.  The books were developed for two 
currencies (USD and TRL) and receivable controls, interests, and valuations were kept in 
both currencies.   
In the beginning of the implementation, the implementation team agreed with 
KAPPA to make at maximum 40 add-ons or software revisions and prepare150 custom 
reports and 10 workflows. The DELOS and MERCURY implementation contract was 
prepared accordingly. However, even at the end of first phase, the implementation team 
already prepared 86 add-on programs and software revisions and 67 custom reports and 5 
workflows on the system.  Therefore, during the second phase, no additional programs 
and software revisions were made.  In order to compensate the difference, a number of 
reports to be prepared in the second phase was also decreased to 37.   
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7.2.6. Structuration of the Micro Level  
 
Towards the end of the implementation stage, extensive trainings were given to 
users to describe how MERCURY would be used in KAPPA.  A very large training team 
composed of 40 KAPPA employees was formed and given 960 hours of training on the 
program. Then, the training team made a tour of the country and trained all the ERP users, 
screen by screen.  
The users had been instructed on what ERP was and how it should be used.  The 
daily practices of users were designed and provided in training sessions and user manuals.  
These provided the basics of initial practice for the users. 
Online and on time performance of transactions was emphasized in the training 
material, together with “use-case scenarios” that describe typical daily activities on the 
system and workshop type screen trainings. The implementation team, constantly and 
repeatedly gave the message that, after ERP, all data should be entered online and all the 
transactions should be made on the system.  
User trainings heavily emphasized the side effects of batch-data entry and off-line 
accumulation of transactions for processing later. Being “fast and reliable together” was 
the key message in the training sessions. Users also stated that if they wouldn’t follow the 
advised practice, the side effects of such a behavior would be “no good for themselves”. 
Hence, the implementation team forced the users to follow the scheme without any 
exceptions.  
 
Table 7-6 Observations on how meso level actions are relating to the structural 
properties of micro level in KAPPA 
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize ERP schemas into ERP logics with force.   
• A very comprehensive training program for all of the users all over the country. 
• Detailed use-case scenarios and workshop type screen trainings to make users 
accept the logic of using ERP.  
• The users were asked to enter the data online and not to create any batch data 
entry which would “have serious side effects for everybody”. 
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7.2.7. The Micro Level  
 
When the implementation was complete, the system became operational, without 
any parallel runs with the old systems. The old systems were closed at night and the next 
day started with the MERCURY ERP system. The result was a total disaster. Despite the 
fact that the system went through extensive testing prior to operation, it faced a major 
operational break down. On the very first day, KAPPA could not print any invoices, 
perform any wholesale transactions or make any distributions to the retail shops. The 
truck drivers who performed the logistics on behalf of the customers were annoyed with 
the situation and argued with the KAPPA employees.  Some of the truck drivers even 
broke the windows of wholesale facilities of KAPPA.  KAPPA was able to resume its 
operations at the end of the first day and could not perform normally for several months. 
 
Table 7-7 Observations on ERP technology at the micro level in KAPPA  
Proposition 5: ERP logics dispose ERP use by dominating users when the subject is a 
hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP technology.   
• At the beginning of use, ERP was working much slower than what was planned.  
• Centralization of operational control and reporting was achieved. 
• Many of the manual tasks were eliminated with the ERP use. 
 
Despite difficulties, in the use, KAPPA was capable of centralizing many of its 
operations and eliminated a majority of its manual transactions after ERP implementation. 
It followed budgeting, budget realizations, inventory levels, shipments, dealer credits 
centrally and online.  With the use of MERCURY, KAPPA was capable of tracking its 
assets on the basis of locations and projects. Project and product costing was also based 
on production locations and products.   
 
7.2.8. Changes at the Micro Level 
 
Since the beginning of system operation the whole thing was a major disaster, since 
it created a lot of changes at the micro level. To resume normal production, the users had 
to devise new ways of performing the transactions without using ERP. Since opening of a 
typical screen took nearly 5 minutes, it was impossible to make any sales transaction 
using the MERCURY system. 
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Unlike what was instructed during trainings, they had to devise new logics of doing 
manual work, creating invoices manually and entering the job orders and related 
transactions at the end of the day. KAPPA could not solve the operational performance 
problem for several months and the users had to do business in their own ways.   
However, this created further problems. Since all of the jobs were performed 
manually and entered into the system later, there were serious reconciliation problems.  
Like a bank branch, if reconciliation were not achieved, none of the employees were 
allowed to leave the sales offices, in order to be able to close up the daily accounting.  
However, this turned into a nightmare. KAPPA employees who were working in branches 
had a hard time in returning their homes at the end of the day. They had to work hard and 
late hours, to be able to finish data entry, find the problems, and correct them to achieve 
reconciliation of the transactions. The implementation team, who were trying to tune the 
system to improve performance, had problems with restarting the system, even after 
midnight hours, because many branch employees were working at those times. 
 
Table 7-8 Observations on changes at the micro level in KAPPA  
Proposition 10: When drifts in ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple 
interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use modifies ERP logics through influence.  If ERP 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP use would eventually recede and be 
abandoned.   
• Since the sales locations had to complete reconciliation of their daily accounts, the 
users had to work very long hours every workday for 3 months. 
• Due to the slowness of the system, users had to devise new ways of using 
MERCURY. Unlike the instructions, they had to make batch data entries for 3 
months. 
• Some of the user groups devised Microsoft Excel workbooks for recording 
manual transactions and data entry methods to MERCURY. 
 
While trying to devise manual forms of working without  application support, some 
of the users started recording their transactions over several Microsoft Excel workbooks. 
Some of them even devised some basic data entry controls and reconciliation functions in 
those workbooks. They used these workbooks to generate reports to prepare for later data 
entry into MERCURY. Some user groups even went further and standardized these 
workbooks among themselves. Although, those workbooks had limited controls over data 
entry, they maintained the new logic of using the system and sustained it, since the system 
was not working properly. Other than those changes due to performance problems there 
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was not much re-interpretation of use or change requests at the user side that requires 
changes in logics of ERP use, since, most of the user requests were taken care of during 
the implementation. 
 
7.2.9. Propagation of Changes to the Meso Level 
 
Apparently, the speed of using ERP was considered unacceptable and the 
implementation team started performance tuning and changes in of MERCURY system. 
Some of the processes and technical customizations were cancelled to speed up the 
system. Hardware and processor sizes were changed and more powerful hardware was 
ordered to improve the system performance.  After 4 months, the system performance 
reached to an acceptable level. 
Prior to system use, no parallel running of the legacy systems together with 
MERCURY was planned. However, since improving the system’s performance took so 
long and the users switched to manual, unsupported ways of working, some of the legacy 
systems were restarted to provide some support to critical users.  
 
Table 7-9 Changes at meso level in KAPPA 
Proposition 8: When ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts influence 
on ERP implementation.   
• Speed of using ERP was not acceptable and implementation was changed to 
increase performance.  
• Users had to perform everything manually with user-invented methods, the 
schemas of implementation changed and some of the legacy systems resumed. 
• User groups who devised new uses with Microsoft Excel influenced the 
implementation team to integrate their Excel files with MERCURY.  
Proposition 11: When drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies ERP schemas 
through influence.  If ERP schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP 
implementation would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• ERP schemas were updated to allow Excel workbook integrations as legitimate 
forms of data entry. 
 
Many user groups, who devised new logics of using Microsoft Excel to record and 
prepare manual transactions for data entry, influenced the implementation team to 
integrate their Excel files to MERCURY. Since there were a great many problems, the 
implementation team could not reject such demands and established Excel integrations 
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and additional data integrity methods on MERCURY interfaces. When the performance 
problem was resolved, implementation team revised related system documentation to 
describe Excel integrations as a proper and legitimate form of data entry to the 
MERCURY system. 
 
 
7.3. Conclusion 
 
 
This case study illustrates the RDT model, emphasizing the importance of the 
political engagement of structural and agency components of technological adaptation at 
multiple levels in the shaping and reshaping of a technology in an organization.  It 
demonstrates how the shaping and reshaping of the ERP adaptation covers power based 
interactions between structural and agency-based aspects at multiple levels. Such an 
interaction is clearly a part of ongoing political debates and relationships in an 
organization.  Individuals or collectives may exert power on others as a political process 
to reflect their interests and perceptions of the technology to accommodate individual or 
group interests.  
 
7.3.1. Institutionalization of MERCURY at KAPPA 
 
The case emphasizes the importance of building coalitions, developing and 
sustaining networks of relationships and removing “blockers” if possible or incorporating 
them into the change process towards institutionalization. All these political facets are 
part of the technology adaptation in organizations. However, besides political action, 
structural and technical aspects have also played their part in KAPPA towards 
institutionalization of MERCURY.  
Structural aspects of MERCURY and organizational context of KAPPA also had a 
significant role in the adaptation process. During the political debate in the early and later 
phases of adaptation, agents in KAPPA reflected on what they were doing and they 
created structures for lower level of agents, deliberately as part of their political agenda, 
following the RDT model propositions.  
Besides political moves, there were also unintended consequences of action in 
KAPPA, where individuals created and sustained organizational practices on MERCURY 
that eventually became institutionalized, and in doing so maintained, took part, or 
modified the structural properties of MERCURY at their level. Hence, despite the heavy 
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political action at the early stages of adaptation, MERCURY became institutionalized, 
gaining legitimacy with increased level of coherence between paradigms, schemas, and 
logics. Actors in KAPPA are in paradigmatic duality, and currently unthinkingly enacting 
rules imposed by the structural elements of MERCURY.  
 
7.3.2. Limitations of the RDT Model at KAPPA 
 
The RDT Model has been very helpful in understanding and explaining adaptation 
of MERCURY in KAPPA. Political focus of the RDT model actually helped to detangle 
the power-based contests and conflicts among actors and structures. However, the RDT 
model provided very limited help in understanding how the technical properties of 
MERCURY acted as a powerful vehicle for promoting preferences of the designers and 
implementers in a “neutral” fashion to the rest of the employees. Therefore, the RDT 
model can be further improved to have a closer look at the technical aspects and its value-
laden relationships with actors at various levels of the organization. 
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8  
 
 
ERP ADAPTATION IN A STABLE GOLIATH:  ZETA CORPORATION 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the adaptation of an ERP software application in the 
ZETA Corporation and explain how ZETA has undergone adaptation while establishing 
its ERP infrastructure.  First, I describe ZETA Corporation and its ERP adaptation 
history.  Then, I discuss the immediate and wider institutional context and the process of 
adaptation. I  conclude with a theoretical discussion of the ERP adaptation in ZETA.      
 
 
8.1. ZETA Corporation 
 
 
ZETA is the largest tire manufacturer in Turkey and the sixth biggest tire 
manufacturer in Europe. Manufactured tires are marketed in 33 countries worldwide, 
primarily in Europe with 2,700 sale points. The company was originally established in the 
1970s by a large business group in Turkey, under the license of an American company.  
The company initially was a 100% Turkish investment and had a different name at that 
time.  Production started in 1977 at the factory with a covered area of 90,000 m2 and the 
sales extended to 60 provinces in Turkey with 186 dealers.  Until 1988, the Company 
produced tires under its own brand with a product range covering tires for passenger cars, 
trucks and buses to farm and off-the-road vehicles.   
In 1988, the company established an equal-share joint venture with a large Japanese 
tire manufacturer and was renamed as “ZETA Corporation”.  Following this joint venture, 
a new manufacturing plant was completed in 1990 using Japanese tire manufacturing 
technology.  The new joint venture and the new plant investment are described as “a new 
concept of management, production, and quality which has been as important as the 
advanced in technology and new machinery” in the corporate website.  After that, the 
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joint venture became a primary example of Japanese technology and management 
techniques in Turkey, favoring the consensus-based decision-making, at least among 
managers. ZETA implemented many Japanese management techniques including quality 
circles and total quality management.  The ERP Adaptation chronology and a summary of 
the RDT model based dynamics of ZETA are included in Appendix C.   
 
 
 
8.2. ZETA Corporation and ERP Technology 
 
 
 
8.2.1. The Wider Context  
 
There were strong contextual factors supporting an ERP system in ZETA.  Both the 
Turkish business group and the Japanese company, who own ZETA, had been using ERP 
systems extensively for their material requirements planning, production planning & 
execution, financial reporting, and consolidation purposes. Just before ZETA announced 
its decision to start an ERP project, the Turkish business group had asked ZETA to 
comply with the new financial reporting standards that would make financial reporting in 
the business group easier.  However, the business group did not specifically required 
ZETA to have an ERP system for the specified reporting standards, but “there was an 
expectation in the business group that ZETA should have its ERP system soon, being that 
it was one of the largest companies of the business group” (ZETA Senior Management 
Interviews, 2004).   
 
Table 8-1 Observations on the wider context of ERP adaptation in ZETA  
Proposition 1: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with the normative, coercive, and mimetic forces in 
the wider environment.   
Normative 
• New financial reporting standards to comply for the business 
group. 
• Major shareholders had ERP systems, expecting the same. 
Coercive • Large customers wanted to connect their ERP systems with ZETA for data exchange. 
Mimetic • Sister companies had been implementing ERP with BLIX corp. as their consultant. 
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Customers of ZETA have been mostly large-scale car manufacturers. They have 
purchase large volumes making up nearly 80% of all production. Car manufacturer 
customers had already implemented their ERP systems and were asking business-to-
business connections between their ERP systems and ZETA for data exchange. In 
addition to these forces, almost all the sister companies in the business group  had been 
implementing or already had various ERP systems, mostly with the consulting of  the 
BLIX Company, which was also a member of the same business group.   
 
8.2.2. The Immediate Context 
 
ZETA had been an “institutionalized company” (ZETA ERP Designer, 
Implementer and User Interviews, 2004) where there were strong traditions and rituals 
which were established after long years of experience. The average tenure of employees 
was 12.3 years which had been considered as very high compared to other industrial 
companies (ZETA Senior Management Interviews, 2004).  Furthermore, the company 
had been focusing on Total Quality Management (TQM) for many years and consensus 
decision making had been an established norm within the company, which made the 
company a very stable place, where even minor changes had not happen frequently. 
In addition, ZETA had been a very formalized company.  Job descriptions were 
written in a very detailed manner and employees and workers had been rotating between 
critical jobs and operations in order to maintain availability of backup employees for 
those positions.  The human resources manager described this as a way of “decreasing 
variability and being able to replace people more easily” (ZETA Senior Management 
Interviews, 2004).  Hence the company operations were very well-defined and 
documented.  
ERP technology related discussions intensified in ZETA in the beginning of 2000.  
Just after management offices had been moved from the headquarters in Istanbul to the 
plant site in İzmit, a series of “search conferences” had performed. The topic was “how to 
sustain growth and leadership” and aimed to point out areas of problems collectively.  
One of the issues that were raised in these search conferences was improving ZETA’s  
“deficiencies in Information Technology”. 
After the recognition of information technology and systems as a deficient area, the 
company conducted another search conference with a special focus in technology. This 
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time ZETA information systems people together with participants from ZETA sales and 
production departments were invited to the search conference together with several 
outside consultants, including some ERP consultants from BLIX.  
The second search conference focusing on information technology resulted in a 
recommendation to acquire an ERP and E-business technologies. These search 
conferences, actually informed their participants that changes should be expected in 
information systems infrastructure of ZETA. Although the company decided on an ERP 
and E-business collectively during search conferences, rumors of the ERP project were 
heard before the formal announcement.  Especially the accounting department where 
employees were very concerned, because they heard that, “a new software project would 
make life easier in the offices and there would be downsizing in the accounting 
department” (ZETA ERP User Interviews, 2004).   During the study, the managers also 
stated that they were expecting NEPTUNE to decrease the need for the number of people 
working in ZETA; however that did not happen after NEPTUNE implementation (ZETA 
ERP Designer Interviews, 2004).   
The workers’ union was very strong, and once effectively blocked the initiation of 
TQM activities in ZETA. To start TQM, ZETA had to convince the union that TQM was 
also for the benefit of the workers.  Since it was still powerful, the union had a potential to 
resists ERP, if they considered it a threat for ZETA workers.  However, the union did not 
show any resistance, since they deemed the implications of ERP in the shop floor workers 
negligible. 
BLIX Corp., being the member of the same business group and serving ZETA for 
information technology for a long time, had been politically very strong within ZETA. 
ZETA did not consider any alternative company as their implementation consultant and 
asked directly to BLIX to specify ERP software that would fit them best. After some 
discussions, NEPTUNE was selected, in the middle of 2000, because it was the only 
large-scale ERP application that BLIX previously implemented and was experienced 
with. The political power of BLIX actually made the ERP selection easier for ZETA and 
supported ERP adaptation. 
Before  the ERP, ZETA had been operating materials requirements planning, order 
management, and accounting processes using old custom-build application software on 
the MVS operating system.  These legacy systems were old and there were problems in 
making developments and connecting with new systems to increase functionality. 
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ZETA was not selling directly to end-users but to car manufacturers and tire 
dealers, most of which were working with both ZETA and brands of other manufacturers.  
Especially dealers always had the flexibility to turn to the competitor if they did not 
receive good service from ZETA.  During the second search conference, one of the 
advantages ERP would provide was identified as “being able to give fast response to 
dealers”.  ERP was expected to improve the experiences of dealers with ZETA 
Corporation for ordering, payment, and reporting.   
 
Table 8-2 Observations on the immediate context of ERP adaptation in ZETA  
Proposition 2: Institutionalization of the technology paradigms, schemas, and logics in 
an organization is positively related with social, political, and technical organizational 
forces in the immediate environment.   
Social 
• Very stable and formal company with infrequent changes. (-) 
• Some users believe ERP could make them loose their jobs. (-) 
• ERP had been expected among the employees. 
Political 
• ERP was considered to have negligible influence at the shop floor 
by the worker union  
• BLIX supported selection of NEPTUNE ERP without any 
questioning in ZETA. 
Technical 
• Functional development and business partner integration problems 
for the existing systems.   
• Need for being responsive to dealers. 
 
 
8.2.3. The Macro Level 
 
BLIX had performed a series of presentations on ERP to ZETA top managers. One 
of the key concepts that were accepted during those presentations was that “to have 
maximum benefits the ERP shouldn’t be customized much”.  The designers were also 
thinking that NEPTUNE process templates are the “best-practice” models and ERP 
should work as “the central data repository to provide timely and correct data” (Zeta 
Designer Interviews, 2004).   
ERP Design for ZETA had been prepared using these high-level principles. 
NEPTUNE process templates were taken as “best-practices” and ZETA business 
processes were intended to be changed accordingly. Since the ERP was understood to be 
the central data repository, it was decided to replace all related legacy applications and 
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cover the entire company including accounting, finance, sales, production planning, 
purchasing, operations, reaching towards the shop-floor. 
 
Table 8-3 Observations at the macro level in ZETA 
Proposition 3: ERP paradigms dispose ERP design by dominating the designers when 
the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP 
technology.   
• NEPTUNE process templates were “best-practice” models and ZETA should 
change to fit NEPTUNE. 
• NEPTUNE is the consolidated and central data repository that provides timely and 
correct data for the whole company. 
 
 
8.2.4. Structuration of the Meso Level 
 
Using the principles and the high level design, implementation blueprints of 
NEPTUNE were prepared after an extensive analysis of the business processes and 
functional requirements by BLIX consultants in July 2000.  Later, a full-time internal 
team was established with experts from various functions. The internal team, which had 
been trained by BLIX on NEPTUNE, briefly joined the analysis of the existing business 
processes.   
Towards the end of 2000, the team finished analyzing the existing business 
processes and designed schemas of “to-be” processes for the implementation of 
NEPTUNE.  They were mostly the same with the “manufacturing” process templates of 
NEPTUNE with minimal changes to fit NEPTUNE best-practices to the local context. As 
it is described by one implementation team member:  
We were told not to change NEPTUNE, wherever possible. Actually 
asking a major customization required the approval of the IT manager and 
even CIO! I did not try to convince them of any other options while 
preparing new business processes (ZETA ERP Implementer Interviews, 
2004). 
 
Table 8-4 Observations on how paradigms are contextualized into schemas 
Proposition 6: Designers contextualize ERP paradigms into ERP schemas with force.   
• Initial designs were followed and minimal changes planned   since each major 
change had to be explained and agreed with senior managers.  
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8.2.5. The Meso Level 
 
In the ERP industry, NEPTUNE ERP had been known to be a harder technology, 
compared to other leading ERP software (META Group, 2002). Instead of making 
detailed functional customizations, NEPTUNE ERP recommends configuring the existing 
business process templates available. NEPTUNE ERP had many alternative ways of 
configuring the existing process flows; however changing the process flows 
fundamentally is not advisable. Therefore, the job of the implementation team was only to 
select between numerous alternative configuration options available to change the nature 
of the business processes in NEPTUNE. Therefore, the implementation schemas and 
business process templates prepared during design according to available business 
processes in NEPTUNE had dominated the implementation team. 
 
Table 8-5 Observations on ERP technology at the meso level in ZETA 
Proposition 4: ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation by dominating the 
implementers when the subject is a hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the 
subject is a soft ERP technology. 
• The process designs prepared according to NEPTUNE business process templates 
were strictly followed.  
• Product definitions and software integrations were performed according to the 
ERP implementation schemas. 
 
The team implemented NEPTUNE, following the prepared designs and available 
business processes.  Bill-of-Materials that described structure and ingredients of a product 
and its sub-assemblies on NEPTUNE were defined very precisely for every product.  To 
follow the processes on NEPTUNE, an inherent order-production-confirmation schema 
was set up in the software, where every order was followed by a production order 
according to a schedule or user interaction and confirmed to be closed at the end of the 
process.  Reporting schemas were prepared according to the current structure of the 
accounting plan.   
 
8.2.6. Structuration of the Micro Level 
 
As implementation progressed, the changes in the daily business processes became 
evident to users and managers in ZETA, before the system became operational.  Like 
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most of the other ERP systems, operational transactions with a financial result, such as 
purchasing or sales, had automatically created their respective accounting records. Most 
probably provoked by the accountants who were feeling themselves in danger of loosing 
their jobs, users in several departments started complaining regarding to “the 
responsibility of creating an accounting record”. Several key users from various 
departments, such as sales, finance and budgeting, argued that this would cause problems 
in company accounting and operations. The resistance also continued after the system 
became operational.  However, since it was impossible to change this fundamental 
functionality in NEPTUNE, the users were forced to follow this change.  Unlike the prior 
practice, the new logic required the automatic creation of the accounting records from the 
transaction data entered by the users. Therefore users who performed transactions with 
financial impact had to enter data correctly on their screens since any errors would cause 
flawed accounting or lead to tedious correction tasks.  This had created an initial anxiety 
in using the NEPTUNE system.  Some users again asked for this to be changed on 
NEPTUNE.  However, they were forced by their managers to use the system because it 
was very fundamental in NEPTUNE.  Therefore, the new logic of using the ERP system 
had conflicted with ERP implementation. 
The NEPTUNE ERP implementation finished and the system became operational 
on January 1, 2002.  Before starting with the new system, extensive formal training 
sessions were carried out to teach users how to use the system. Every user had to attend at 
least a two-hour training program, to make ZETA users ready to use the new system. 
ZETA planned to have a pilot-run period, and run both NEPTUNE and legacy systems in 
parallel to observe and solve any problems during use.   
  
Table 8-6 Observations on how meso level actions are relating to the structural 
properties of micro level in ZETA 
Proposition 7: Implementers contextualize ERP schemas into ERP logics with force.   
• Despite initial resistance, users were forced to accept that the NEPTUNE ERP 
system automatically creating accounting records for some transactions.  
• Operational data should be handled with care on the screens like financial data, 
changing the logic of ERP use. 
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8.2.7. The Micro Level 
 
Despite the general positive earlier expectations, significant operational problems 
had arisen when NEPTUNE ERP system became operational. The situation was very 
problematic, despite being trained extensively, users had many problems in using the 
system correctly. As one user described: 
They told me this screen is for this, that screen is for that, enter that 
number here, this number there. However, I couldn’t understand  that was 
such a tedious job. When the time came, I simply couldn’t follow the new 
pattern of working, and so do many others (ZETA ERP User Interviews, 
2004). 
Users could not switch their pattern of working overnight. This was partly expected, 
by the implementation team, and the situation was expected to improve over a few days. 
However, it did not improve after several days. Instead, users started asking for more and 
more changes to the system, claiming that their tasks could not be performed that way, 
leading to hard discussions regarding to the performance and the capabilities of the 
implementation team and NEPTUNE.  The required change was so big that a majority of 
the employees got into fierce discussions with the implementation team.  After a few 
days, some of the users continued with the new processes on NEPTUNE. However some 
employees rejected using it and continued with the legacy systems.  Such a partial use 
was totally unacceptable and could cause a total failure of NEPTUNE project.  Therefore, 
non-accepting users were forced by their managers to use NEPTUNE as instructed but 
also were asked to report their fundamental change requests. 
Users in various departments of ZETA demanded numerous changes in NEPTUNE.  
The overwhelming volume of change requests blocked the implementation team and 
developers could not analyze, design, and develop most of the change requests, some of 
which were also in conflict with each other.  In order to resolve the situation, several 
meetings were organized that brought together all parties that required a change regarding 
to each transaction in NEPTUNE. The implementation team and consultants from BLIX 
also attended these meetings. The team and the request owners discussed the nature of the 
changes, agreed on the priorities of the change requests and planned the changes in 
NEPTUNE accordingly.  Later, they explained that the majority of the change requests 
were not feasible on NEPTUNE and the users were convinced to withdraw most of their 
change requests.  After resolving operational issues on NEPTUNE, the implementation 
team progressed with an attempt to resolve reporting issues on NEPTUNE.  There were 
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also many report design requests from users. Later, users were also convinced to 
withdraw or to delay some of their report design requests. After this temporary settlement 
with the users, the old MVS system was closed down and NEPTUNE modules became 
the primary system for its operations.   
 
Table 8-7 Observations on ERP technology at the micro level in ZETA  
Proposition 5: ERP logics dispose ERP use by dominating users when the subject is a 
hard ERP technology and disciplining them when the subject is a soft ERP technology.   
• The amount of required change created resistance among employees, but they 
were forced by their managers to use and also report their change requests. 
• The implementation team later convinced request-owners to withdraw or delay 
their requests, claiming they were infeasible 
 
 
8.2.8. Changes at the Micro Level 
 
After MVS were closed and NEPTUNE became the primary system, it created a 
sense of project success amongst the implementation team members, since the problems 
reported were also dropped, as described by one implementation engineer: 
We were done. After days and days of quarrels, and meetings, everybody 
accepted using the system as we designed it. It was a hard changeover, but 
we thought that we were finished (ZETA ERP Implementer Interviews, 
2004). 
Despite the initial positive expectations regarding to the successful completion of 
the project, a new line of problems started to appear from another group of users, workers.  
Workers were asked to enter job orders and completion progress in their terminals, which 
they tended to postpone until the end of the shift.  Sometimes, workers could not enter the 
data at the end of their shifts and transferred it to the next shift worker at the same 
location.  Therefore, the data about the shop floor was late by 1 - 2 shifts.  Since the 
workers’ union was quite strong, the management tried to solve this problem with hiring 
some data entry contractors and placing them around the shop floor. However, employing 
contractors to perform data entry criticized by the union was later dismissed by the 
management. They could not force the workers to enter data on time, either. Hence, 
having shop-floor data 1-2 shift late was accepted and users were informed to consider 
shop-floor data with this reservation.   
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Table 8-8 Observations on changes at the micro level in ZETA  
Proposition 10: When drifts in ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple 
interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use modifies ERP logics through influence.  If ERP 
logics cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP use would eventually recede and be 
abandoned.   
• Workers started entering shop-floor data late. ZETA could not solve the problem 
and accepted to have shop-floor data 1-2 shifts later.  
 
 
8.2.9. Propagation of Changes to the Meso Level 
 
During implementation of NEPTUNE, the purchasing process had changed and an 
additional control step added.  Previously, all purchasing orders were approved by the 
purchasing department.  However, with this modification, the new purchasing process on 
NEPTUNE required an approval of the requesters’ immediate manager.  The change is 
accepted by users and the managers, as a “measure to implement better controls on 
expenses” (ZETA User Interviews, 2005).   
 
Table 8-9 Propagation of changes to meso level in ZETA 
Proposition 8: When ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts influence 
on ERP implementation.   
• A more complex workflow was demanded by management for purchasing and 
sales orders which required acquiring a new NEPTUNE module.  
Proposition 13: When ERP logics and ERP schemas contradict, they regulate each other 
with domination. 
• Complex flows deemed as necessary and initiated on paper forms, which were 
used before NEPTUNE... 
• The implementation team had taken those processes out of NEPTUNE and 
manual integration was required. 
• Later, some other flows also followed the scheme and switched to paper, just like 
their original flow before NEPTUNE. 
 
However, as users continued using it, they demanded a more complicated, risk-
based flow. Depending on the volume and the type of the purchase, approval of a higher 
level manager would also be required in addition to the immediate manager of the request 
owner before purchase orders were sent to the purchasing department.  However, this 
process was complicated and required purchasing another NEPTUNE module, which was 
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not available to the implementation team.  However, users deemed such a flow as 
necessary and returned to the prior paper forms.  The ZETA implementation team could 
not convince the users to use the existing flow. Therefore, it was decided that these flows 
be taken out of NEPTUNE. The Implementation team agreed with the users for manual 
entry at the beginning and in the end decided on paper-based for flow of accounting and 
data integrity purposes.   Later on, the same scheme was also applied to sales orders, 
where depending on the risk level of the dealer, an appropriate sales manager had to 
approve selling to that dealer.   
 
8.2.10. Changes at the Meso Level 
 
Around August 2002, some of the shop-floor transactions in NEPTUNE were 
interrupted, since the work-in-process inventory went down to zero, although there was 
enough work-in-process inventory on the shop-floor, sporadically NEPTUNE could not 
complete some production related transactions, due to lack of inventory and recorded 
such transactions in incomplete tasks logs.  The problem was considered to be partially 
because of shop-floor data being 1-2 shift late.  Since, there should have been enough 
buffers on the shop-floor and the problem had just emerged recently, the implementation 
team decided to analyze the technical causes of the problem. 
While analyzing this problem, the implementation team discovered that due to the 
nature of the production process, the actual material use in production was not as clear-cut 
as it was described in BOMs on NEPTUNE.  For example, while producing one type of 
tire, if the worker was not satisfied with the quality of the work-in-process, (s)he could 
scrap the material and use it for some specified other tires in the future. There were 
actually some pre-defined quality limits on the amount of scrap that could be used in 
another tire.  Using the scrap material as the raw material in some other tire created 
problems in following the material consumption with NEPTUNE using BOMs. 
First, the length of incomplete tasks log was not large.  An administrator was 
allocated to investigate those logs and manually complete them.  In addition the work-in-
process inventories, side-inventories were counted and manually updated on NEPTUNE 
weekly, in order to resolve misalignments due to scrap re-use.  However, the problem was 
not solved and incomplete tasks log kept increasing.  To solve this, ZETA increased the 
number of stock-counts at the shop-floor to 3 – 4 times each week.   
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At the beginning of 2003, the incomplete transaction problems caused a production 
interruption.  The interrupted and uncompleted transactions hid the fact that an important 
raw material was actually in short.  In order to not stop the production, ZETA imported a 
large amount of (60 tons) chemicals that was vital for production by air cargo, at 
significant cost to the company.   
The large cost of the incident attracted the attention of the top management and the 
board of directors.  The implementation team and BLIX consultants were called to 
explain the causes of the problem directly to the board of directors and general manger.  
After a hard meeting, it was decided to implement a scheme that modifies volumes in bill-
of-materials dynamically with some expected scrap-reuse rates, considering the nature 
and the composition of the short-term production plan.  However, such a solution was 
considered as infeasible in NEPTUNE. Therefore, ZETA decided to increase stock levels 
of some of the items in order to not have another production interruption. ZETA also 
decided to hire other consultants to analyze the problem and propose alternative solutions.   
The implementation team then decided to cancel following the work-in-process 
inventory and production at the shop-floor with NEPTUNE.  Related implementations 
and developments were cancelled and the shop-floor was treated as a black-box.  Data 
was entered into NEPTUNE at the beginning and at the end of production, sometimes 1 – 
2 shifts late.  This change solved the problem by decreasing the scope of NEPTUNE 
design.  However, after this, the implementation team went further in influencing the 
design and cancelled the order-production-confirmation schema and related business 
processes in NEPTUNE.  An add-on that automatically processed the incomplete 
transactions log and completed them to avoid the possibility of further operational 
problems was set up.   
The implementation has started with the intention to implement the NEPTUNE 
blueprints to create a single system for the company.  However, after the problems in use 
and changes in the implementation, middle managers of different groups, such as 
production and sales resisted to consolidate their systems into NEPTUNE, which were 
planned to take place in phase two of the project.  SPECS and TIME systems were 
recently implemented and MICRON implementation had actually started just before 
NEPTUNE.  Therefore, the system owners rejected to salvage their systems, before their 
economical and technical end-of-life and declined to replace them with NEPTUNE.   
Meantime, ZETA decided to acquire Manufacturing Execution System (MES), 
which connects to production lines directly to collect data and control the production 
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facilities.  In the beginning of 2004, implementation of MES started.  Just as other 
systems that NEPTUNE was integrated with, MES was also planned to be in loose 
integration with NEPTUNE, only sending its data to NEPTUNE for reporting purposes.   
 
Table 8-10 Changes at meso level in ZETA 
Proposition 11: When drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated within 
multiple interpretations of ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies ERP schemas 
through influence.  If ERP schemas cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP 
implementation would eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• In order to update NEPTUNE data with actual situation, shop-floor counts 
planned first as weekly then almost daily. 
• Later, temporary adjustments on BOMS according to the short term production 
plan attempted in implementation.  
• However, NEPTUNE schemas could not be modified to enable this and hence the 
implementation change had to be abandoned.  
• The order-production-confirmation schema was cancelled and planned level of 
inventories increased. 
Proposition 9: When ERP implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts with and exerts 
influence on the ERP design.   
• In order to avoid re-occurrence of significant implementation problems, some 
design items have changed significantly. 
• Following of the production and WIP inventory cancelled, shop-floor started to be 
considered as a black-box. 
 
Hence, the ERP paradigm being a central system that would replace legacy systems 
was significantly modified, due to changes in the ERP schemas.  Legacy systems which 
were used for several different purposes and integrated with the old MVS system were 
designed not to be replaced with NEPTUNE but to be integrated with NEPTUNE 
replacing their old integration with MVS. 
 
Table 8-11 Propagation of changes to macro level in ZETA 
Proposition 14: When ERP schemas and ERP paradigms contradict, they regulate each 
other with domination. 
• The ERP paradigm of being a central system replacing legacy systems was 
significantly modified, due to the cancellation of order-production-confirmation 
schema making it a central reporting medium, rather than an operational system. 
 
In the middle of 2004, a workflow application was purchased and some of the other 
business processes were also taken out of NEPTUNE, since then it became a less-
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operational system and the number of active users significantly decreased.  Towards the 
end of 2004, ZETA decided to recalculate the number of end-user licenses.  Due to 
decreases in scope, the number of end-user licenses decreased by 90 users and those end-
user licenses were sold to a sister company in the business group, which was starting to 
implement NEPTUNE.   
 
Figure 8-1 Information systems architecture in ZETA 
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Currently NEPTUNE is not used for production planning and does not replace any 
other legacy systems other than MVS, but only consolidates data from several sources for 
reporting.  Hence, NEPTUNE, became the financial accounting software and the central 
reporting medium of ZETA, which is not only very different compared to initial ERP 
paradigm and design but also quite different from the prepared schemas and 
implementation of NEPTUNE.  Although it was initially planned to consolidate all legacy 
systems into NEPTUNE, centralizing the information systems architecture, the resulting 
architecture were not much different from the original state (See Figure 8.1). 
 
Table 8-12 Changes at macro level in ZETA 
Proposition 12: When drifts in ERP design cannot be accommodated within the multiple 
interpretations of ERP paradigms, ERP design modifies ERP paradigms through 
influence.  If ERP paradigms cannot be modified, then drifts in ERP design would 
eventually recede and be abandoned.   
• NEPTUNE was initially considered as operational software. However, changes in 
its design influenced macro-actors understanding of ERP. 
• Initially the focus had been on operational integrity and consolidation of legacy 
systems for the whole company. 
• Lately, the focus was on reporting integrity and central data repository for related 
functions. 
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8.3. Conclusion 
 
 
The ZETA case provides a useful demonstration of how the shaping and reshaping 
of the technology adaptation (in this instance ERP technology) involves interaction 
between conceptions and artifacts of technology at multiple levels. Such an interaction is 
clearly a part of an ongoing social dynamic and an organizational context. While human 
action is enabled and constrained by organizational and technological structures, these 
rules and resources are also partly the consequences of previous actions.  
 
8.3.1. Institutionalization of NEPTUNE at ZETA 
 
In the ZETA case, action during the technology adaptation process has been 
situated within a manufacturing company where structural components are rather durable. 
Hence, at the end of the adaptation, while NEPTUNE becomes finally institutionalized 
after a series of “crises”, it did not trigger any major changes in the way work and systems 
were organized. Usually the initial structures have been maintained, and technology 
related change remained as a façade, replacing only one central system, without many 
changes in the way work has been organized. In this sense, NEPTUNE became 
institutionalized in PHAROS, leading to a paradigmatic duality among the actors. 
In the case of ZETA, rigidity of the adaptation was directly related with ZETA 
Corporation’s immediate context and the structural features of NEPTUNE ERP 
technology. This was further supported by a stance among the employees that stressed the 
necessity of stability and consensus in order to maintain working relationships. In this 
sense, the attempts to institutionalize ERP were partly rejected in favor of the existing set 
and state of relations to maintain the stability of ZETA with structural properties of the 
organization and political action of the individuals. ZETA employees resisted to change 
or questioned the new work arrangements, as a direct social consequence of the structural 
properties. 
In this example, the substance of technology was also shaped the process and 
outcomes of adaptation, the ERP technology itself. However, the technical properties of 
NEPTUNE, not only dominated individuals by enabling and constraining their action, but 
also it acted as a powerful vehicle for promoting preferred options of the designers and 
 128
implementers in a “neutral” fashion, even though the process was politically charged and 
shaped by a range of social and political factors and assumptions. Although the process 
started in a participative manner with “search conferences”, both NEPTUNE technology 
and the approach of ZETA management and the implementation team, provided little 
opportunity to users to participate in discussion earlier over the design, implementation, 
and modification of NEPTUNE system. Designers and implementers attempted not to 
open NEPTUNE adaptation to interpretative debate. 
However, the collective resistance to maintain the status quo and further technical 
problems which are also indirectly related with the employee resistance necessitated the 
debates around NEPTUNE. Macro and meso level agents also treated the interpretive 
suggestions selectively and requests coming from higher levels of management were 
applied whereas, other request owners were rejected claiming technical infeasibility.  
Although NEPTUNE may appear as fixed and determined, the lack of interpretive 
flexibility is not determined structurally but is part of the political process of adaptation, 
which became clearer with the selective and fundamental changes performed in 
NEPTUNE “in order to solve technical problems”. Therefore, this case illustrates that the 
substance of technology adaptation overlaps and interacts with the political process and 
structural context in the shaping and reshaping of a technology and an organization. 
 
8.3.2. Limitations of the RDT Model at ZETA 
 
This case study illustrates the RDT model, emphasizing both the importance of 
structural components and artifacts of technological adaptation.  The RDT model has 
been helpful in understanding and explaining adaptation of NEPTUNE in ZETA. The 
case study shows that the rigidity and flexibility of the adaptation process is more a 
consequence of the intertwined relationship of action and structural components of 
technology adaptation, represented in the RDT model.  
Similar to the situation in KAPPA, the RDT model provided limited help in 
understanding how technical properties of NEPTUNE, acted as a powerful vehicle for 
promoting preferences of the designers and implementers in a “neutral” fashion to the rest 
of the employees.  
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9  
 
 
RECURSIVE DUALISM OF TECHNOLOGY: A PROCESSUAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON TECHNOLOGY ADAPTATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, our goal was to develop a comprehensive understanding of how 
technology is experienced and the way technology adaptation unfolds in organizations. I 
aimed to better understand and explain how different technologies are locking 
organizations in particular logics and patterns of practice and at the same time, how a 
technology is enacted to unlock and destabilize established logics and practices in 
organizations. I present a literature review on technology adaptation in organizations and 
consider the process both as structuration and institutionalization of technology. I devised 
the RDT model analytically using institutional and structuration theories of organizations 
and selected the case research strategy for the empirical evaluation of the RDT model, 
which are presented in several case studies in Chapters 5 through 8 for ERP technology 
adaptation in organizations.  
Deployment of large-scale information systems in organizations, such as Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) software applications, has been a major trend over the last 
decade; however, there is also a lack of understanding as to what the adaptation of these 
ERP software applications in organizations involves and how they evolve over time. 
Therefore, I selected ERP as the case technology to empirically study the RDT model 
considering impacts of such systems on individuals, organizations. 
In this chapter, an overall restatement of the RDT model and its theoretical basis 
including propositions derived from the RDT model is offered.  The chapter also 
summarizes and compares the case studies according to the RDT model propositions, 
which are introduced in chapters 5 through 8. In addition to this, contributions of this 
dissertation to the accumulated knowledge in Organization Studies and Operations 
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Management fields are presented together with a discussion of limitations of the research 
method and design of the study and an exploration of directions for future research. 
 
 
9.1. Adaptation of ERP Technology in Organizations  
 
 
In this study, I have investigated ERP Adaptation in five different cases in four 
different organizations. In ALPHA, two different ERP technologies were adapted with 
two different adaptation strategies; however, both ERP packages evolved differently to 
achieve different results than had been planned. While, MERCURY decreased its 
footprint significantly with numerous problems and “crises”, MİNERVA evolved from 
being an asset management platform and become a site management platform of ALPHA, 
while users were almost completely free to adapt the software according to their wishes.  
BETA Case is similar to MERCURY case in ALPHA, since the adaptation was mostly 
ruled by the micro actors to make the software fit existing business processes, who were 
supported by the general manager, who did not want to be constrained with the limits of a 
packaged software application and forced the implementation team to modify PHAROS, 
as per users’ requests. KAPPA case was characterized by heavy conflicts between agents 
and significant political action in the organization around ERP adaptation. Whereas, 
ZETA case was an interesting example, was a very stable organization attempted to 
change by using ERP adaptation. The cases represent polar organizational situations for 
the study where I make use of the RDT model to better understand and explain ERP 
technology adaptation. 
 
9.1.1. Structural Context of ERP Adaptation 
 
The RDT model incorporates several forces in the structural context of ERP 
adaptation and considers the wider context and immediate context of technology 
adaptation in two similar propositions. 
 
9.1.1.1. Wider Context 
 
The first proposition of the RDT model considers the wider context of technology 
adaptation and argues that favorability of normative, coercive and mimetic isomorphic 
forces are positively related to the ERP adaptation. Table 9-1, 9-2 and 9-3 summarizes the 
normative, coercive and mimetic forces observed in cases. Since, all cases took place in a 
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Turkish business context; the wider context is expected to be similar across cases. 
However, since some of the organizations have different contextual relations, some of 
them also fall under the influence of different forces. Having an ERP system became 
norm both for ALPHA and BETA. However, the same norm turned into a negative issue 
for KAPPA, where the ERP technology had a bad reputation in KAPPA’s industry.  
Ownership and stakeholder expectations also normatively influenced ERP adaptation in 
ALPHA, BETA and ZETA (See Table 9-1). 
 
Table 9-1 Normative forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Having an ERP system was the industry norm.  
• Stakeholders had been expecting an ERP system. Later, some of them 
integrated their systems for data exchange.  
BE
TA
 
• Having an ERP system became an industrial norm in the manufacturing 
industry and in the business group. 
K
A
PP
A
 • ERP projects had faced significant problems and have a bad reputation, 
which effectively blocked ERP for more than a year. 
• KAPPA managers expected an increase in competition and believed that 
competitors had superior information systems.  
ZE
TA
 • New financial reporting standards to comply for the business group 
• Major shareholders had ERP systems, expecting the same. 
 
Being in the same business context is most clear in coercive forces, where the 
companies had to follow similar legal and regulatory rules, especially for ALPHA and 
KAPPA, since their industries are more regulated, compared to other cases. business 
groups who own the majority of the shares also coercively forced the cases to have an 
ERP system in BETA and KAPPA. It was also an issue for ALPHA.  However, for 
ZETA, major customers were the coercive force for the organization to have an ERP 
system (See Table 9-2). 
Mimetic forces were also noticed in the case studies which were mainly motivated 
by the organizations desire to manage uncertainty involved in ERP adaptation. Each 
company acknowledged that most of other companies that they compare their 
organization were working with an ERP system, and indicated this as a factor for their 
decisions related to ERP adaptation.  ALPHA also made formal site visits to other 
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companies in the same industry in Europe; whereas all other cases were mostly influenced 
by their sister companies (See Table 9-3). 
 
Table 9-2 Coercive forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Legal and regulatory requirements of precise and timely reporting of 
financial results and operational metrics 
• Later, with significant fines due to reporting problems supported ERP 
implementation to overcome some barriers. 
• A large shareholder wanted to integrate its ERP system. When the 
shareholder had an option to increase its shares, related phase of ERP 
project had restarted.  
BE
TA
 • The business group was planning integration of financial ERP modules for 
financial consolidation and reporting. 
• The business group was planning integration of some support functions  
K
A
PP
A
 • The regulatory authority and the stock market required accurate reporting. 
• Holdings that own KAPPA demanded better corporate governance and 
accurate reporting. 
ZE
TA
 
• Large customers wanted to connect their ERP systems with ZETA for data 
exchange. 
 
 
Table 9-3 Mimetic forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Site visits to European companies in the same industry and taking them as 
role models during the adaptation. 
• Largest competitor’s ERP announcement increased the speed of decision 
making in ALPHA. However, in order to differentiate itself ALPHA 
switched to the alternative ERP vendor. 
BE
TA
 • BETA frequently benchmarked sister companies in the business group to 
learn from their experiences. 
K
A
PP
A
 • Other holding companies were implementing or already finished ERP their 
ERP projects. 
• All large companies in Turkey were implementing or already finished their 
ERP projects. 
ZE
TA
 • Sister companies had been implementing ERP with BLIX corp. as their 
consultant. 
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9.1.1.2. Immediate  Context 
 
Immediate context represents the local structural context and covers most 
situational factors of an organization. Similar to the wider context, the RDT model posits 
that the favorability of social, political, and technical organizational forces are positively 
related with  ERP adaptation. Table 9-4, 9-5 and 9-6 summarizes the social, political, and 
technical factors organized in case studies. 
Expectations of agents represent significant social forces for ERP adaptation in all 
of the cases. Regardless of the actual situation, social expectations mostly enabled and 
constrained the organizational action around their ERP adaptation. This worked against 
the ERP adaptation in KAPPA where macro users’ expectations effectively blocked ERP 
adaptation for some time. In ZETA and ALPHA, these expectations regarding to ERP 
were also related to job security issues. While in ALPHA, users did not feel any 
uncertainty about these issues.  In ZETA, some of the users thought that the ERP may 
make them loose their jobs and acted to keep their positions in the organization and 
influenced ERP adaptation to accommodate their way of working (See Table 9-4). 
 
Table 9-4 Social forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Existing applications did not meet the user expectations.  
• Strong expectation among people that the “status-quo” had to change. 
• ERP had not been considered in relation to savings in headcount hence no 
employee anxiety had developed about job security. 
BE
TA
 • Participative decision-making style creates a socially receptive climate in 
BETA. 
• BLIX had been providing information technology related services to BETA 
and had earned the trust of BETA managers. 
K
A
PP
A
 • Due to the bad reputation of ERP, nobody wanted to work in the 
implementation team, believing that it was most likely to fail.  
• Due to the social disinterest, most units assigned their most junior members 
to the project.  
ZE
TA
 • Very stable and formal company with infrequent changes. (-) 
• Some users believe ERP could make them loose their jobs. (-) 
• ERP had been expected among the employees. 
 
Political forces clearly influenced the ERP adaptation in all of the cases. 
Organizational groups that were supporting or rejecting ERP established informal 
coalitions to coordinate their actions in ALPHA and KAPPA.  Whereas in BETA and 
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ZETA, the implementation consultant company were the same and its relations with the 
general manager and existing relationships with the organization, being a sister company, 
also significantly supported the ERP adaptation (See Table 9-5). 
 
Table 9-5 Political forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Two strong groups within ALPHA (Finance and IT) demanded ERP for 
various reasons.  
• Finance manager wanted to control spending and operations in the IT 
department but the IT manager did not want to be controlled by Finance. 
BE
TA
 • BLIX promised to make all the modifications on PHAROS to make it 
perfectly fit BETA. 
• BLIX belongs to the same business group and also offered PHAROS at a 
very low price. 
K
A
PP
A
 • Management team  was divided between two owner holdings and strong 
groupings in the management emerged.  
• Most of the managers did not like the powerful IT director, who was 
supporting ERP.   
ZE
TA
 • ERP was considered to have negligible influence at the shop floor by the 
worker union  
• BLIX supported selection of NEPTUNE ERP without any questioning in 
ZETA. 
 
Technical forces represent the technical conditions of the organization. Most 
organizational analyses overlook the technical aspects of the organizational setting, 
leaving the issue to the operations management field. The disciplinary division, prevents 
developing a comprehensive understanding of the technology phenomena in 
organizational settings. The RDT model considers both the substance of the technology 
and the technical aspects of the organizational situation.  In all cases, problems and 
insufficient capabilities due to the disintegrated nature of the prior applications were 
noticed (See Table 9-6).   
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Table 9-6 Technical forces observed in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Previous problems in tracking, controlling, and coordinating its technical 
infrastructure, equipment inventory and related financial accounts.  
• Later, ALPHA switched to MERCURY on January 1st, 2000 to survive 
against the Y2K software digit problem.   
BE
TA
 
• BETA had been using stand-alone functional applications creating 
technical problems.  
K
A
PP
A
 
• Legacy programs were disintegrated, distributed and overly problematic. 
They barely met the requirements. 
• Legacy programs were hard to support technically, without any 
documentation and there were few employees who knew them.  
• Project scope was very large due to geographical distribution of the 
company, making the ERP adaptation harder. 
• Later stages, KAPPA could not provide existing data for migration due to 
the technical problems of its legacy systems. 
ZE
TA
 • Functional development and business partner integration problems for the 
existing systems.   
• Need for being responsive to dealers. 
 
 
9.1.2. Disposition of ERP System 
 
According to the RDT model, structural aspects of technology dispose their 
respective organizational action. The ERP paradigms dispose ERP design actions and 
artifacts of macro actors, whereas ERP schemas dispose ERP implementation actions and 
artifacts of meso actors. Respectively, ERP logics of micro actors dispose actions and 
artifacts of ERP use. The RDT model differentiates between levels of hardness of ERP 
technology; when the subject is a hard technology, the structural elements of ERP 
technology dominates the actors. However, for softer technologies, the interpretive 
flexibility is higher and structural elements of ERP technology acts more as a disciplining 
factor and the actors have more options to perform within the structural bounds 
determined by the technology. 
 
9.1.2.1. Macro Level  
 
Our observations across the cases for macro actors reveal that the general ERP 
paradigm is prevalent in the environment and infused into macro actors with their prior 
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training and education, and socialization dominated the ERP design activity. General ERP 
paradigm suggests that ERP is an application that covers the whole organization, uses the 
same database to provide timely and correct information to business users. Furthermore, 
ERP software applications are prepared packages that suggest certain ways of working 
and claims that these are best practices. Hence, for superior performance, organizations 
should make minimal or no modifications in their ERP system.  
 
Table 9-7 ERP paradigms disposing ERP design in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• Designers considered ERP as an application repository and the two ERP 
applications were designed to operate in tight integration. 
• Designers considered ERP as a business backbone covering the whole 
company. All MERCURY modules were purchased, although there were 
no plans of implementing all of them. 
• Designers considered as a data repository, asset BOMs and locations 
defined with great detail in MINERVA. 
• Almost no modification was planned for MERCURY in design. Minimal 
modification was planned for MINERVA. 
BE
TA
 
• Differences in understanding ERP among macro-actors created a major 
controversy on whether or not an ERP system should fit a company and 
select NEPTUNE or not. 
• The general manager convinced that NEPTUNE could not be modified 
according to the requirements of BETA and would impose an “iron cage”.  
• ERP design was made to perfectly fit the ERP solution to the current 
processes in BETA and PHAROS was selected. 
K
A
PP
A
 • ERP was troublesome and should be avoided. Hence ERP was banned. 
• ERP was designed to cover all company operations to get the “best 
practices” through the ERP system. Minimal customization was aimed.  
ZE
TA
 • NEPTUNE process templates were “best-practice” models and ZETA 
should change to fit NEPTUNE. 
• NEPTUNE is the consolidated and central data repository that provides 
timely and correct data for the whole company. 
 
In ALPHA, KAPPA and ZETA, this paradigm dominated the macro actors’ 
decisions. This was also widely discussed in BETA as well.  However in BETA, both the 
prior socialization of the general manager and the soft nature of PHAROS, ERP design 
followed a different paradigm. As an industrial engineer, BETA General Manager argued 
that “a successful company should keep its unique operations for competition” and 
“companies that operate with similar or same operations cannot compete with their core 
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processes”.  Since BLIX promised to entirely modify PHAROS, its structural feature 
became infinitely soft and its disciplining nature became just a guideline for the ERP 
design (See Table 9-7). 
 
9.1.2.2. Meso Level  
 
Similar to the mechanism in macro level structures, meso level structures also 
dominate and discipline respective actors during ERP implementation. ERP Schemas 
were followed by the actors during implementation. However, since ERP design was to 
follow existing operations and fulfill users’ requirements, respective ERP schemas 
provided a guideline for ERP implementation.  
 
Table 9-8 ERP schemas disposing ERP implementation in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• ERP Schemas were implemented with minimal changes and turnarounds 
devised to make the software act differently without making changes in the 
software itself. 
• A software development company was hired for customization according 
to requirements described by the implementation team using MINERVA as 
a framework 
BE
TA
 
• BETA interpreted PHAROS as a perfectly soft technology and changed 
totally. PHAROS only provided a disciplinary framework for developers to 
work on.  
• PHAROS disciplined BETA accountants and instead of simple book 
keeping, financial results of user transactions were first recorded in a 
temporary book and finalized later by accountants. 
• Decision on total modification of PHAROS to perfectly match the current 
practices significantly decreased the disciplining effect. 
K
A
PP
A
 
• ERP schemas dominated the implementation team, hence they did not have 
much time to analyze the current processes in detail and decide on the 
implementation.   
• During implementation, KAPPA participants claimed numerous critical 
requirements and hence extensive customization was required. 
• Designers backed the requirements however were slow in providing 
approvals that they required at the beginning. 
ZE
TA
 • The process designs prepared according to NEPTUNE business process 
templates were strictly followed.  
• Product definitions and software integrations were performed according to 
the ERP implementation schemas. 
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Furthermore, similar to BETA case, in later stages of ALPHA – MINERVA case, 
ERP implementation continued with user’s orders and micro agents assumed the roles of 
a meso actor. This decision also made MINERVA nearly a perfectly soft technology and 
made the schemas to provide a guideline rather than a dominating or disciplining factor 
for the meso level actors (See Table 9-8). 
 
9.1.2.3. Micro Level  
 
Similar to Macro and Meso levels, observations at Micro level also follows the  
RDT model arguments. In all of the cases, ERP logics are imposed on users and users had 
to adapt to the changes in their use required by the new logic. Such changes were minimal 
for BETA and relatively low for later stages of ALPHA-MINVERVA, compared to 
ALPHA-MERCURY.  
 
Table 9-9 ERP logics disposing ERP use in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• Users had no option but use the system as implemented, since it wasn’t 
easy to change MERCURY. 
• Integrity of a financial transaction could be damaged, if users did not 
follow the described sequences of MERCURY use. 
• MINERVA users were devising their own routines of using the system 
with the guidance of peers and informal training. 
• MINERVA changes that wouldn’t be harmful for another system 
component were readily accepted. 
BE
TA
 • Since ERP implementation was performed following the current processes 
exactly, it also matched with the existing logic of performing daily tasks 
before the system. 
K
A
PP
A
 • At the beginning of use, ERP was working much slower than what was 
planned.  
• Centralization of operational control and reporting was achieved. 
• Many of the manual tasks were eliminated with the ERP use. 
ZE
TA
 
• The amount of required change created resistance among employees, but 
they were forced by their managers to use and also report their change 
requests. 
• The implementation team later convinced request-owners to withdraw or 
delay their requests, claiming they were infeasible 
 
In KAPPA, introduction of the ERP system caused significant technical problems 
and hence, the new logics became infinitely soft, since the users had to create their own 
ways of using the system, irrespective of what logics were designed and instructed, in 
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order to decrease the impact of the technical problems. The dominance of the logics was 
most observable in ZETA, where the changes required compared to prior behaviors of 
users were highest. However, ZETA users were dominated by the new logic of ERP use. 
Similar to ZETA, also ALPHA-MERCURY users had to follow their new logics due to 
the nature of the performed operations (See Table 9-9). 
 
9.1.3. Contextualization of ERP Concept 
 
Following the arguments of Mouzelis (1989), the RDT model argues that actions of 
higher-level agents create the structural aspects for the lower level agency. More 
specifically, the RDT model posits that ERP Designers (macro actors) contextualized 
their ERP paradigms into ERP schemas (for meso actors) with force. Similar to Macro – 
Meso interface, a similar mechanism is expected at Meso – Micro interface. ERP 
implementers (meso actors) contextualize their ERP schemas into ERP logics with force. 
 
9.1.3.1. Macro Level to Meso Level  
 
Case study observations suggest that Macro actors in these organizations apply 
varying levels of force to form the structural properties for lower level agents and to 
contextualize their paradigm into schemas of meso level actors. For example, macro 
actors in all of the cases either rejected or strongly disfavored change requests of 
implementers and wanted the implementation to take place without any changes 
following schemas prepared. In KAPPA, application of force even went to the level of 
financially threatening the implementation team with not getting bonuses or application of 
fines. (See Table 9-10). 
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Table 9-10 Contextualization from macro level to meso level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • The ERP Steering Committee and the implementation team leaders rejected 
change requests in implementation. 
• ERP Steering Committee ordered the implementation team to immediately 
start implementation, without any modifications in implementation plans 
and designs. 
BE
TA
 • Despite the opposing views in the implementation team, top managers 
insisted on perfectly fitting PHAROS to the existing business practices 
without any changes. 
K
A
PP
A
 
• Top managers asked for a very quick implementation considering only 
necessary modifications and customizations, leading to very tight 
schedules. 
• Management rejected any arguments and warned them that in case of late 
delivery of the project, the implementation team may not receive the annual 
bonus payments or may be subject to contractual fines. 
• The schema of the implementation was to collect critical requirements, get 
their approval from the design team, prepare and rollout the 
implementation. 
ZE
TA
 
• Initial designs were followed and minimal changes planned   since each 
major change had to be explained and agreed with senior managers.  
 
 
9.1.3.2. Meso Level to Micro Level  
 
Similar to observations between Macro – Meso interface, agents apply force to 
contextualize their schemas into micro-level logics in case studies. Implementers applied 
force in the form of structured training programs, using a forcing-language that states 
using the system as compulsory and even relocating the resisting users in the 
organization.  However, since the target of the ERP implementation in BETA was to 
match ERP system with the existing business processes, the changes remained minimal 
and application of force became unnecessary.  
Just as macro-actors, in a way threatened the meso level actors in KAPPA, meso 
level actors in turn also used a threatening language with micro level actors to force them 
to follow the logic presented. In ALPHA-Minerva case, since the users did not have a 
prior logic for using a system for those specific tasks, the implementation team did not 
need to apply force to micro actors to make them follow designed logics. However, for 
ALPHA-Mercury, many of the users resisted in their use of the system, but the 
implementation team forced the users to accept the system and even relocated a power-
user, who was the champion of the resistance (See Table 9-11). 
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Table 9-11 Contextualization from macro to meso level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• The users had been instructed on what MERCURY and MINERVA were 
and how they should be used.   
• Resisting users were forced to use and the person who resisted the system 
most was relocated to a different position. 
• MERCURY change took place on the New Year day without a concurrent-
run, to force the users to use the system as described.  
• MINERVA users did not have an option to act otherwise because this was 
their first system and they were not experienced. 
BE
TA
 • The perfect match approach decreased the level of force required to create 
the ERP logics at the user side. 
K
A
PP
A
 
• A very comprehensive training program for all of the users all over the 
country. 
• Detailed use-case scenarios and workshop type screen trainings to make 
users accept the logic of using ERP.  
• The users were asked to enter the data online and not to create any batch 
data entry which would “have serious side effects for everybody”. 
ZE
TA
 
• Despite initial resistance, users were forced to accept that the NEPTUNE 
ERP system automatically creating accounting records for some 
transactions.  
• Operational data should be handled with care on the screens like financial 
data, changing the logic of ERP use. 
 
 
9.1.4. Conflicts in ERP Systems 
 
The RDT model posits that when an agent drifts significantly in its actions, it 
creates a conflict with actions at the next level(s) and exerts influence it to reconcile this 
conflicted. Observations in these case studies supports these arguments and described in 
detail below. 
 
9.1.4.1. Micro Level to Meso Level 
 
Between Micro and Meso level relationships, the RDT model argues that when 
ERP use drifts significantly, it conflicts with ERP implementation and exerts influence, 
trying to change it. For example, drifts in use influenced implementation team to cancel 
some of the modules and functionalities in the ALPHA-MERCURY, ALPHA-
MINERVA and ZETA cases and integration of new functionalities into design in the 
ALPHA-MINERVA, BETA and KAPPA cases. The interaction between MERCURY 
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and MINERVA was especially interesting because, differences in using MERCURY and 
MINERVA, influenced the implementation team to move some of the functions from 
MERCURY to MINERVA, where users were more accepting towards the system. 
Whereas, changes in the KAPPA case were mostly due to drastic problems in the 
introduction of the system, where the system performance were unacceptably slow and 
users could not even use the system due to technical problems. Hence, users had to invent 
new methods of doing their tasks and using the system, which later influenced the 
implementation team to incorporate these new methods into ERP implementation (See 
Table 9-12). 
 
Table 9-12 Conflict in ERP systems at the micro level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• MERCURY inventory module was canceled due to problems in use and 
site related parts of the inventory functionality were transferred to a new 
module in MINERVA. 
• Other site-related issues such as recording site-related invoices for 
accounting that were actually planned on MERCURY were transferred to 
MINERVA. 
• Due to modifications in use, preventive maintenance and resource planning 
modules of MINERVA could not be implemented. 
• Modifications in MINERVA use motivated some non-users to influence 
the implementation team to integrate their work with MINERVA.  
BE
TA
 • Users’ demand for ad-hoc reporting influenced implementation to create 
data export interfaces for further analysis on Access and Excel  
• Common use of transaction correction functionality influenced the 
implementation team to create a transaction freezing function to limit 
corrections. 
K
A
PP
A
 • Speed of using ERP was not acceptable and implementation was changed to increase performance.  
• Users had to perform everything manually with user-invented methods, the 
schemas of implementation changed and some of the legacy systems 
resumed. 
• User groups who devised new uses with Microsoft Excel influenced the 
implementation team to integrate their Excel files with MERCURY.  
ZE
TA
 
• A more complex workflow was demanded by management for purchasing 
and sales orders which required acquiring a new NEPTUNE module.  
 
 
9.1.4.2. Meso Level to Macro Level   
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Between Meso and Macro level relationships, the RDT model argues that when 
ERP implementation drifts significantly, it conflicts with ERP design and exerts 
influence, trying to change it.  In the ALPHA-MERCURY case, since a number of 
MERCURY modules could not be implemented, the scope of the ERP design was later 
revised and those unimplemented modules were taken out of the implementation.  
Designs were also updated in the ALPHA-MINERVA case, which had been targeting to 
follow the assets precisely. However, since the data in MINERVA was not up-to-date and 
the level of detail in recording the assets decreased, the MINERVA design was changed 
to accommodate these differences. Whereas, the BETA, design was prepared with the aim 
of integrating all the systems with PHAROS; however, implementation changes also 
revised the design at the macro level and integration with the shop-floor systems was 
postponed. The design changes were most drastic with ZETA, where implementation 
problems influenced the design to have a very fundamental change and ERP features that 
were acknowledged as “the most important” previously, were cancelled (See Table 9-13). 
 
Table 9-13 Conflict in ERP systems at the meso level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• Many of the MERCURY modules had not been implemented and the 
design was updated. Some functions were taken out of the scope to other 
applications.  
• The data in MINERVA was not up-to-date and the level of detail 
decreased. This influenced updating the ERP design and arranging annual 
asset counts.  
• MINERVA evolved into a site management platform, some of the 
fundamental financial functions about sites were transferred from 
MERCURY to MINERVA. 
BE
TA
 
• Data quality problems influenced the design and postponed integration of 
production systems, which were used for cross-checking. 
ZE
TA
 • In order to avoid re-occurrence of significant implementation problems, 
some design items have changed significantly. 
• Following of the production and WIP inventory cancelled, shop-floor 
started to be considered as a black-box. 
 
 
9.1.5. Modification of the ERP System 
 
The RDT model accommodates that ERP related actions were not entirely 
determined by the respective structural elements, but actors had a capacity to make 
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different interpretations of the same structural element of the technology and act 
accordingly. Hence, actions of different actors may differ significantly under same 
structural conditions. However, the RDT model posits that when drifts in action cannot be 
accommodated within the multiple interpretations of structural elements, the actions try to 
influence their structural element. If the respective structural element cannot be modified, 
then drifts in action would eventually recede and be abandoned. Following sections 
summarize observations at different levels in the case studies. 
 
9.1.5.1. Micro Level  
 
Following the arguments of RDT, in case studies, I observed that when drifts in 
ERP use cannot be accommodated within multiple interpretations of ERP logics, ERP use 
modifies ERP logics through influence. However, I also observed that such drifts 
eventually recede and are abandoned if they couldn’t influence ERP logics.  
For example, ALPHA-MERCURY users stopped using some of the side 
functionalities that were heavily emphasized during design and implementation. Despite 
the prior emphasis in using those functions, since this did not overwhelm ERP logics, it 
did not created any problems and users were allowed to change their pattern of using the 
system. Whereas for ALPHA-MINERVA during the evolution of MINERVA into a site-
management platform, users started storing site-specific documents by creating valueless 
assets on sites to be able to store documents on each site. However, this was beyond the 
logic of using the system.  However, adding some of the documents into MINERVA later 
became a legitimate way, so the way of using the system and the logic was influenced by 
the use. Whereas, for BETA, the aim of matching the ERP system to the existing user 
practice made users was very influential on the logics of using the system. Whenever the 
logic of ERP use proposed by PHAROS required a change in current practice, users’ 
influence made PHAROS change to its own structure instead, even in regard to financial 
transactions. For KAPPA, ERP introduction problems made users devise their own logics 
to be able to use the system. However, when the technical problems had been resolved, 
some of these invented logics became incorporated into the system and the others recede 
and were abandoned later (See Table 9-14). 
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Table 9-14 Modification of the ERP system at the micro level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• MERCURY users stopped using some of the side functionalities that were 
heavily emphasized during design and implementation. 
• Since this change did not threaten any critical function of MERCURY it 
was allowed within the existing logic of system use.  
• MINERVA users modified their logic of using the system shortly after they 
became familiar with the system and started storing some site-specific 
documents by creating valueless assets on locations.  
• Later this modified use created performance problems, reviewed by the 
implementation experts and partially prevented but some documents 
allowed making the modified logics a legitimate use of MINERVA. 
• Although, users were asked to immediately enter any changes in asset 
information into MINERVA, they started making batch data entries, which 
the implementation team later accepted.  However, users became neglectful 
later and ALPHA started making annual asset counts all over Turkey to 
update data. 
BE
TA
 
• When the logic of ERP use proposed by PHAROS required a change in 
current practice, users’ influence made PHAROS change its own structure 
instead.  
• The privilege of being able to delete a transaction was only for the “power 
users” in accounting. However, the users started sharing their passwords.  
• Later the logic drifted so that “any accountant could delete a transaction” 
and everybody in accounting had the rights to “correct” a transaction. 
K
A
PP
A
 
• Since the sales locations had to complete reconciliation of their daily 
accounts, the users had to work very long hours every workday for 3 
months. 
• Due to the slowness of the system, users had to devise new ways of using 
PHAROS. Unlike the instructions, they had to make batch data entries for 3 
months. 
• Some of the user groups devised Microsoft Excel workbooks for recording 
manual transactions and data entry methods to MERCURY. 
ZE
TA
 
• Workers started entering shop-floor data late. ZETA could not solve the 
problem and accepted to have shop-floor data 1-2 shifts later.  
 
 
9.1.5.2. Meso Level  
 
We also observed that when drifts in ERP implementation cannot be accommodated 
within multiple interpretations of  ERP schemas, ERP implementation modifies the ERP 
schemas through influence at the meso level. However, I also observed that such drifts 
eventually recede and abandoned if they couldn’t influence the ERP schemas.  
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Table 9-15 Modification of the ERP system at the meso level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• MERCURY implementation had reduced to a functional minimum. 
Schemas were modified and reduced into what was accepted and therefore 
“completed”. 
• MINERVA schemas were turned into a “site management platform” and 
they asked other site management related teams to get integrated with 
MINERVA. 
• Some power-users were given the authority to make changes on the user 
interfaces of MINERVA and non-proper uses of screens and fields were 
accepted. 
• A user division was given the authority to continue with the MINERVA 
implementation, as they deemed appropriate, with the help of a contractor.  
BE
TA
 • Purchasing practice fundamentally changed PHAROS, altering the ERP 
implementation towards integration with the central ERP system.  
• Since product coding schemes did not match, BETA altered its ERP 
schemas and appended the product coding of the central purchasing unit to 
PHAROS. 
K
A
PP
A
 
• ERP schemas were updated to acknowledge Excel workbook integrations 
as legitimate forms of data entry. 
ZE
TA
 
• In order to update NEPTUNE data with actual situation, shop-floor counts 
planned first as weekly then almost daily. 
• Later, temporary adjustments on BOMS according to the short term 
production plan attempted in implementation.  
• However, NEPTUNE schemas could not be modified to enable this and 
hence the implementation change had to be abandoned.  
• The order-production-confirmation schema was cancelled and planned 
level of inventories increased. 
 
For example, in ALPHA-MERCURY, due to changes in implementation, schemas 
were modified to be able to “complete” the project. Whereas, for ALPHA-MINERVA, 
the ERP system became the “site management platform” and the related schemas were 
updated to integrate other site-related information sources in MINERVA. In BETA, 
changes in the implementation of purchasing operations, changed PHAROS schemas and 
a central ERP system was integrated with PHAROS, updating all the coding schemes for 
product description for purchasing. In KAPPA, implementation changes made to 
accommodate users influence also influenced ERP schemas and the plans were updated to 
reflect changes in the implementation. The situation were also similar in ZETA, where the 
meso-level changes in implementation to avoid further problems also reflected in the ERP 
schemas and the plans were updated accordingly (See Table 9-15). 
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9.1.5.3. Macro Level  
 
At the macro level, I also observed that when drifts in ERP design cannot be 
accommodated within multiple interpretations of  ERP paradigms, ERP design tries to 
influence ERP paradigms at the organizational level. However, I also observed that such 
drifts eventually recede and are abandoned if they couldn’t influence ERP paradigms 
carried by macro actors.  For example, in ALPHA, revision in the ERP schemas and 
contradictory problems created doubts and questions about the ERP systems among top 
managers. Site Management, which was once denied as an ERP task by some of the top 
managers, later became a part of the ERP functionality.   
 
Table 9-16 Modification of the ERP system at the macro level in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 • Revision in the ERP schemas and contradictory problems created doubts 
and questions about the ERP systems especially among top managers.  
• Site Management, which was once denied as an ERP task by some of the 
top managers, was later accounted for as part of the ERP functionality. 
• ALPHA revised its perception of ERP from being “enterprise-wide” and 
“tightly-integrated” to be more receptive to the current state of the system.  
BE
TA
 • Macro actors reached nearly a consensus that companies should use an 
advanced ERP package like NEPTUNE for a larger footprint and better 
functionality,. 
• They also reached a consensus that ERP should not fit to the organization 
perfectly, but rather it can establish best practices and force organization to 
change. 
ZE
TA
  • NEPTUNE was initially considered as operational software. However, 
changes in its design influenced macro-actors understanding of ERP. 
• Initially the focus had been on operational integrity and consolidation of 
legacy systems for the whole company. 
• Lately, the focus was on reporting integrity and central data repository for 
related functions. 
 
ALPHA revised its perception of ERP from being “enterprise-wide” and “tightly-
integrated” to be more receptive to the current state of the system.  Whereas for BETA, 
after the general manager’s leaving the company for a higher-level position in the 
business group, remaining macro actors reached nearly a consensus that “all the 
companies should use an advanced ERP package like NEPTUNE” and “ERP should not 
fit to the organization perfectly, but rather it represents a medium of best practices that 
needs to change the organization”. On the other hand, in ZETA, while ERP was initially 
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considered as operational software, the changes in design also influenced macro-actors 
understanding of ERP and they started using ERP technology not for operations but for 
reporting and consolidation. Although such changes did not modify the general ERP 
paradigm, the ERP paradigm infused in macro-actors became modified at the 
organizational level (See Table 9-16). 
 
9.1.6. Contradictions and Reconfiguration in ERP Concept 
 
In addition to the above processes of technology adaptation, the RDT model also 
considers the structural interaction between structures at multiple levels in an 
organization. The RDT model argues that different structural components at different 
levels may dominate each other and later regulate each other with domination. According 
to RDT, a lower level structural component may also dominate a higher-level structural 
component if it dominates the other forms of structuring of the technology. 
 
9.1.6.1. Micro and Meso Levels 
 
According to the RDT model, when ERP logics and ERP schemas contradict, they 
regulate each other with domination. For example, in the ALPHA-MINERVA case, the 
“Site Management Platform” term dominated the other forms of describing the 
MINERVA system at higher levels. Implementers followed the logic of the users and the 
schemas were updated to reflect the new way of understanding the MINERVA system as 
a site management platform, rather than an asset management platform. Whereas, for 
MERCURY, the logic of not using some of the functions and modules, later dominated 
the schemas and the schemas were updated without questioning the lower level logics of 
using MERCURY. Similarly, PHAROS implementation schemas, which were aiming to 
consolidate all user workbooks and user developed small databases for reporting, were 
dominated by the users’ logic of using MERCURY as the data source for their reports and 
data export / import mechanisms were planned in schemas to enable users to continue 
using their workbooks for reporting (See Table 9-17).  
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Table 9-17 Contradictions between micro and meso levels in case studies 
A
LP
H
A
 
• Some MERCURY users did not use certain functionalities. Therefore some 
of the modules were postponed and cancelled.  
• Due to problems in use, some of the MERCURY functions such as 
workflow and human resources were moved to the best-of-breed 
independent applications. 
• MINERVA was an “asset management platform” but with alternations in 
its use, it is now perceived by the implementation team as a “site 
management tool”. 
• Users’  logic of “all information in one screen” dominated MINERVA  
schemas, changing the application implementation accordingly.   
BE
TA
 • Exporting data for ad-hoc reporting dominated schemas to modify initial 
plans on  eliminating stand alone databases and complex worksheets. 
ZE
TA
 • Complex flows deemed as necessary and initiated on paper forms, which 
were used before NEPTUNE... 
• The implementation team had taken those processes out of NEPTUNE and 
manual integration was required. 
• Later, some other flows also followed the scheme and switched to paper, 
just like their original flow before NEPTUNE. 
 
 
9.1.6.2. Meso and Macro Levels 
 
In addition to the Micro-Meso interface, the RDT model also considers the conflicts 
between the Meso and Macro levels. According to the RDT model, when  ERP schemas 
and ERP paradigms contradict, they regulate each other with domination. For example, in 
the ALPHA case, ERP paradigms later dominated ERP schemas of  MERCURY and 
MINERVA when the steering committee ordered an audit of the system. According the 
results of the audit, ERP schemas were partially updated and the adaptation restarted. 
While this adaptation continued, macro actors in ALPHA also ordered a more 
comprehensive audit of the system from APOLLO Consulting which would reassure 
dominance of ERP paradigms available in the institutional environment. Whereas, BETA, 
with the technical and political forces coming from structural environment, ERP Schemas 
for new purchasing dominated the existing ERP paradigm in BETA and the purchasing 
functions were taken out of the ERP system, dominating the pre-existing ERP paradigm 
in the organization. On the other hand, in the  ZETA case,  ERP paradigm of being a 
central system replacing legacy systems was significantly modified making it a central 
reporting medium, rather than an operational system (See Table 9-18). 
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Table 9-18 Contradictions between meso and macro levels in cases  
A
LP
H
A
 
• MERCURY related issues that contradict with ERP schemas were taken to 
the ERP Steering Committee, which ensured the domination of ERP 
paradigms.  
• ERP Steering Committee arranged an audit team and later ordered the 
cancellation of some of the changes schemas. Hence  ERP paradigms 
dominated. 
• ALPHA ordered an ERP post-implementation audit from APOLLO, 
covering MERCURY and MINERVA to reassure domination of ERP 
paradigms. 
BE
TA
 • Using two coding schemes concurrently for purchasing was in 
contradiction with the ERP paradigm but  later meso level schemas 
dominated the previous paradigm. 
ZE
TA
 • The ERP paradigm of being a central system replacing legacy systems was 
significantly modified, due to the cancellation of order-production-
confirmation schema making it a central reporting medium, rather than an 
operational system. 
 
 
 
9.2. Recursive Dualism of Technology in Organizations  
 
 
Recursive Dualism of the Technology Model is constructed while making use of 
Duality of Technology (Orlikowski, 1992), combination of structuration and 
institutionalization (Barley and Tolbert, 1997), and dualism of actors and structures at 
multiple levels (Archer 1995, Mouzelis 1995), it also describes the interrelations of actors 
and structures in relation to a set of power relations (Lawrence, Winn and Jennings, 
2001). The RDT model combines these ideas and approaches and different forms of 
power processes are the linking concept of the duality and the dualism of technology 
adaptation. 
According to the RDT model, a macro actor contextualizes the technology and 
creates the structural element for the meso actor (schema) by force. Through mediation of 
the force in schemas of technology, meso level actor gets disciplined or dominated 
depending on the durability of the schema depending on the hardness and softness of the 
technology. If the agency of meso level actors could be accommodated within the 
interpretive flexibility of schemas, the limits of action (implementation) would be 
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structurally determined whereas, if meso-level actors’ drift in implementation could not 
be accommodated within the multiple interpretations of schemas, the implementer would 
have to either influence macro-level actions (design) to change the force applied that 
contextualizes schemas for the meso actor or try to directly influence to change the 
schemas.  However, while macro-level actors were applying power, meso-level actors 
may not influence the structural element since it would be the same as questioning the 
legitimacy of the force applied by  higher level agents. On the other hand, when the 
intensity of the force decreases over time, the meso level actor would have more freedom 
to influence schemas. If meso level actors could find an opportunity to change schemas, 
then a structural contradiction between structural elements would start to appear. 
Similar to above mechanism, a meso actor contextualize the technology and 
implement the structural elements for the micro actor (logic) by force. Through mediation 
of the force in logics of technology, micro level actors get disciplined or dominated, again 
depending on the durability of the logics depending on the hardness and softness of the 
technology. If the agency of micro level actors cannot be accommodated within the 
interpretive flexibility of logics, the limits of action (use) will be structurally determined. 
However, if the micro-level actors’ drift in use cannot be accommodated within the 
multiple interpretations of logics, the user has to either influence meso-level actions 
(implementation) to change the force applied that contextualize logics for the micro actor 
or try to directly influence them to change the logics.  Similar to macro-meso level 
interaction, questioning the legitimacy of the force applied by implementers, micro-level 
actors may not influence logics of technology use. However, as the intensity of the force 
decreases over time, micro level actors would have more opportunity to influence the 
logics. If micro level actors could find an opportunity to change logics, then a structural 
contradiction between structural elements would start to appear. 
When these mechanisms work concurrently, different types of phenomena become 
observable. For instance, if a meso-level actor is not effectively dominated or disciplined 
by schemas, then the force (s)he applies to contextualize logics may or may not be based 
on schemas prepared. The Meso-level actor may take the opportunity to dominate higher 
level structures and actors by trying to contextualize logics based on his/her target. Such 
pragmatic moves might increase structural contradictions and agency conflicts or can help 
meso level actor to influence schemas with the domination of contextualized logics to 
further dominate paradigms and influence design. When an actor is in this paradigmatic 
dualism (Mouzelis, 1995), institutionalization is not complete and legitimation of 
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technology has not been achieved. A technology cannot be institutionalized, while the 
structuration continues and the actors are in paradigmatic dualism. 
Although in all of the cases above that there are similar tendencies at work 
throughout the technology adaptation process, what emerges in each case is contingent 
upon the situationality of actors and structures. The RDT model is able to provide an 
explanation to both dramatic and emergent changes due to technology adaptation in 
organizations. The RDT model does not view the non-linear dynamics of change only as 
taking place in turbulent environments, nor does it reject the notion of planning. However, 
it recognizes that there are often critical moments that enable actors to influence change. 
According to the RDT model, processes of change occur within organizations that operate 
in relatively stable environments as well as those operating in dynamic turbulent business 
contexts at different paces and with different procedural dynamics.   
According to the RDT model, power and politics have a central role in 
understanding stability and change during technology adaptation. The RDT model 
considers both the contextual political forces in the immediate environment and the 
internal political mechanisms employed during technology adaptation. In this sense, it can 
also be criticized by privileging the political perspective while investigating technological 
adaptation in organizations.  
 
9.2.1. Meta-Theoretical Discussion of the RDT Model 
 
The RDT model posits that technologies are predecessors of human action. It is 
"realistic" in the sense that it presupposes the pre-existence of structure in understanding 
the agency and model tends to be explanatory rather than descriptive.  It considers 
technology adaptation as a process of structuration and institutionalization, which is 
nondeterministic in nature. Unlike the extant models of structuration and 
institutionalization (e.g., Orlikowski 1992; Kling and Iacono 1989; Hanseth and Monteiro 
1997), the RDT model asserts that the process of technology adaptation is rather 
unpredictable and dynamic rather than pre-determined and stationary. A new technology 
put in use will have both designed and emergent characteristics. Therefore, changes due 
to technology adaptation rarely satisfy the prior intentions of those who initiate the 
adaptation and may not be controlled precisely. 
The RDT model offers an understanding of technology as a social institution that is 
"inter-subjective" (Fay, 1996) rather than purely "subjective" or "objective". It is 
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epistemologically interpretive and to some extent critical. Being interpretive assumes that 
"people create and associate their own subjective and inter-subjective meanings as they 
interact with the world around them" (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, p. 5) and being 
"critical" aims "to critique the status quo, through the exposure of what are believed to be 
deep-seated, structural contradictions within social systems ..." (p. 5-6). Furthermore, 
consideration of power mechanisms opens a door to investigate not only structures of 
significance and legitimization but also domination, during technology adaptation in 
organizations. 
The RDT model is "institutional" in that it opposes purely individualistic 
approaches to the technology phenomenon. According to the RDT model, organizations, 
individuals, and technologies are situated within institutional contexts and hence 
technology design, implementation, and use need to be studied and understood within 
their respective institutional contexts.  Furthermore, according to the RDT model, 
technologies, like social institutions, should be understood in terms of both their material 
and virtual dimensions. As an institution, a technology is simultaneously local and global, 
and simultaneously pervasive and idiosyncratic. Thus, the paradoxical findings from 
different cases of technology deployment are quite understandable. 
The ontological basis of the model is that agents and structures are hierarchically 
located and variable. Therefore, the RDT model is a "multi-level" model since it 
integrates the local and the global and aims its analysis of social reality and technology 
phenomenon. Then, the interplay between technology related structures and agencies 
becomes much more complex and dynamic than what extant approaches suggest. 
Technology and human action may enable and constrain each other differently having 
different capacities and mechanisms of power.  
The RDT model is "dual" in the sense that it assumes the duality of structures and 
actors using the concept of "recursive dualism". "The duality of technology" (Orlikowski, 
1992) that depicts technology as macro structures and humans or organizations as micro 
agencies which cannot provide an accurate understanding of the technology phenomena. 
The model incorporates both the notions of dualism and duality. This acknowledges a 
temporal division between structural preconditions and the moment of agency (Archer 
1995). Structural aspects and human action are conceived as two different entities and 
studied separately for analytical and conceptual purposes.  
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9.3. Contributions of the Study 
 
 
This study attempts to develop a comprehensive model of technology adaptation in 
organizations to enrich the accumulated knowledge in technology, especially in 
Operations Management (OM) related technologies such as Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP), Total Quality Management (TQM), Just-In-Time Manufacturing (JIT) and 
Knowledge Management Systems (KMS) from an Organization Studies (OS) perspective. 
The study also provides critiques of extant approaches and offers insights into how 
such technologies unfold in organizations.  Although organizations began to adapt ERP 
systems (ERPs) in the 1980s (Hayman 2000), academic interest in them has just gained 
momentum and there is relatively little research on packaged large-scale information 
systems such as ERP systems (e.g., Robey et al. 2002; Markus 2000). Moreover, most 
current ERP studies are positivist and descriptive; there is only one interpretive study and 
one critical study up until now. Dong et al (2002) claim that while previous studies have 
provided interesting findings, only limited aspects of ERP systems have been explored, 
and our understanding of enterprise systems is still preliminary. Based on the literature 
review the authors note, "what we have studied focuses primarily on the iceberg above the 
sea, ignoring what is going on under the water"(p.862). It should be noted that there are 
several other studies of large-scale organizational technologies, which tend to focus on 
how large-scale information systems get developed.  However, unlike this study, they pay 
little attention to how these technologies get adapted in organizations. This is a serious 
issue since the deployment of ERP technologies has long been a major trend in almost 
every industry. This dissertation attempts to respond to the need of theoretical frameworks 
that will help better understand the adaptation of large-scale packaged software 
technologies in organizations, such as ERP technology. It does so analytically through the 
RDT model and empirically through studying five different cases to investigate the major 
aspects of technology design, implementation and use in organizations, based on RDT. 
The RDT model attempts to contribute to organization studies by combining 
structuration and institutionalization to expand the understanding of social institutions and 
the process of construction and maintenance of a social institution at the organizational 
level. As Scott (2001) noted, early theorists tended to assume that institutional 
frameworks were monolithic and unified and that institutional forces external to the 
organizational systems affected and determined the outcomes. The RDT model 
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recognizes the existence of diverse institutions and different agencies, and stresses the 
non-determinant, interactive nature of the institutional processes.  
Finally, the dissertation also contributes to theory building in organization studies 
and operations management by presenting the RDT model as a meta-theoretical 
framework, which considers both local, contingent aspects of socio-technical change, and 
the dynamics in the broader social structures simultaneously and its empirical 
investigation.  The model itself can also be used as a guide to design research and data 
collection and further as a meta-framework for data analysis. 
 
9.3.1. Practical Contributions 
 
The increasing number of failure of organizational change initiatives with  
technology adaptation has drawn attention to the inadequacy of a one-best-way approach 
of technology and organizational development consultants. In seeking to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of how change unfolds, the RDT model, also provides 
insight into the process of continuity and change in technology adaptation.  Although the 
RDT model enables us to point out some practical aspects of technology adaptation, it is 
far less prescriptive than what is available in the practitioner-oriented literature (e.g. 
Kotter, 1996). 
The RDT model offers some practical implications for living with technology 
adaptation and change in organizations. Recognizing the potential contradictions in 
structure and the conflicts in action realms may help organizational actors to understand 
points of tension and triggers of change regarding to technology in organizations. 
However, projecting how dynamics of technology adaptation may interact to produce 
change and transform organizations and prepare exact plans of organizational change may 
not be feasible. Following March and Olsen (1989), the RDT model supports that 
technology design “rarely satisfies the prior intentions of those who initiate it, change 
cannot be controlled precisely” (March and Olsen 1989, p. 65-66). Hence, a set of 
managerial prescriptions on how to successfully implement change cannot be developed 
and offered for the actors’ use at this time. Considering the complex nature of 
relationships during technology adaptation a viable strategy for actors at different levels 
would be to have a contextual grasp of the modes of technology adaptation and be 
sensitive to contradictions in structure and conflicts in action while navigating within the 
dynamics of technology and organization. Therefore, in offering conclusions for practice, 
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the study is in agreement with what Palmer and Dunford (2002, p. 245) describes as a 
“navigating approach”: 
In the navigating approach to change, control is still seen as the heart of 
management actions, although a variety of factors external to managers 
mean that while they may achieve some intended change others will also 
occur over which they have little control. Outcomes are often emergent 
rather than planned and result from a variety of convergent influences, 
competing interests, and processes. 
However, in this way, the RDT model does not deny the importance of planning for 
change, but rather it points out that technology adaptation and organizational change are 
unpredictable and therefore that there will be a need to accommodate and adapt to the 
unexpected. The unforeseen turns and revisions are part of managing the technology 
adaptation in an organization.  
 
 
9.4. Limitations of the Study  
 
 
The main limitations of this study stems from the research method and design used. 
First of all, it should be noted that no research strategy is superior to all others (Benbasat 
et al 1987), and case study research is no exception. Case research was considered the 
most appropriate research strategy for this dissertation. However, the research strategy 
itself has some limitations that should be acknowledged (Yin 2002). 
One limitation is with two generic weaknesses of theory building from cases 
pointed out by (Eisenhardt 1989). Eisenhardt noted, "a hallmark of a good theory is 
parsimony, but given the typically staggering volume of rich data, there is a temptation to 
a build theory which tries to capture everything. The result can be theories which is very 
rich in detail, but lacks the simplicity of the overall perspective" (p. 547). Another 
weakness is that building theory from cases may result in a narrow and idiosyncratic 
theory. "Case study theory building is a bottom-up approach such that the specifics of the 
data produce the generalizations of the theory. The risks are that the theory describes a 
very idiosyncratic phenomenon or that the theorist is unable to raise the level of generality 
of the theory" (p. 547). In my opinion these weaknesses come from "the process of 
inducing theory using case studies" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 532). The author's understanding 
of "theory building" from case studies follows a grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin) 
tradition, which utilizes induction (or "theory from data"). These weaknesses have been 
addressed in the dissertation by taking an analytical generalization perspective where the 
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model developed analytically from prior research and it is further evaluated with 
empirical data collected during multiple, comparative case studies performed with the 
“replication logic”.  
Our attempt to study technology and change in an organization over time and in 
context guided us to the development of certain theoretical concepts and link theoretical 
concerns with methodological considerations. Since I aimed to see the empirical reality 
regarding to technology adaptation in organizations in several case sites, being limited as 
to time and resource availability of a dissertation, I selected a cross-sectional research 
design that covers multiple sites, where history of technology adaptation was collected 
with multiple retrospective interviews.  
The retrospective nature of interviews may lead to post-hoc rationalizations of 
changes described during the interviews. In order to handle this problem, the research 
openly searches for and uncovers the different views and experiences of individuals and 
groups at all levels within the organizations. The intention is to provide a framework for 
exploring the contemporary experience of change in the workplace for a range of different 
employees. Furthermore, the accounts and experiences described during interviews are 
also attempted from a cross-checking using secondary sources and archival data.  
However, in order to critically examine the process of technology adaptation in 
organizations, longitudinal field studies can be further performed in the future to capture 
the dynamic processes of adaptation as they happen, together with people’s experiences 
regarding to the past, interpretations of the current and expectations about the future, as a 
continuous process. 
 
 
9.5. Directions for Further Studies 
 
 
In this study the RDT model has been applied to technology adaptation in 
organizations.  The model can also be applied to investigate other technology-related 
organizational phenomena such as technology innovation where it can offer new insights.  
It can also be applied to other large-scale software technologies such as KMS, CRM, 
which are cited with high failure rates, like ERP. It has been already recognized that 
knowledge management systems have failed mainly because of technologists’ lack of 
understanding of the situated work practices and human elements of the systems' user 
communities (Schultze and Boland, 2000). KMS often clash with corporate culture, pay 
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insufficient attention to people management practice (Swan, Newell and Robertson 1999), 
organizational politics and other organizational issues (Alavi and Leidner, 2001). The 
RDT model posits that KMS should be understood as a technology to be institutionalized 
that have both virtual and material elements. Several authors (e.g., Bowker 1997; Schultze 
and Leidner 2002; Brown and Duguid, 2000; Boland and Tenkasi, 1995; Schultz and 
Boland, 2000; Swan et al. 1999; Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Braa and Rolland, 2000) in KM 
research have already recognized the virtual elements of KMS are equally important as 
the actual elements of such systems. 
Technologies such as ERP, CRM and KMS are all based on pre-packaged software 
solutions that are to be implemented.  The RDT model can also be used to explain other 
software technologies such as rapid-prototyping or end-user development.  This may lead 
to interesting results and reveal more about the validity and explanatory power of RDT. 
However, the RDT model is not limited with software-based technologies only. Using the 
RDT model to explain other technologies, like hardware or knowledgeware, may be of 
interest for further research. 
Throughout the dissertation, I emphasized the dual nature of institution and 
institutionalization. Unlike early theories, the RDT model offers a dynamic view of 
institutions and institutionalization in regard to both stability and change. It is my 
understanding that the development and implementation of a technology contains two 
opposing forces. This aspect needs further development in a theoretical framework. A 
potential basis of this theoretical framework is dialectical theory (Van de Ven and Poole 
1995). However, unlike extant understanding of dialectical theory as a theory of "change", 
the dialectic of two opposing forces in the development and implementation of 
technology seems to be the source of stability also. To my knowledge, this aspect of a 
dialectical process has not been the subject of much research.  
In this study, I conceptualized technologies as social institutions. This re-
conceptualization of technology can offer an alternative theoretical framework for 
analyzing technology failures. There have been two prevailing approaches to technology 
failure; one focuses on the material dimension of an information system and the other on 
its virtual dimension. The first tends to explain technology failure as failure of "system 
integration" (Lockwood 1964) or failure in functional performance (Offe, 1996) while the 
other as a failure of "social integration" or failure in socialization and preference 
formation. Both approaches are dichotomous and do not provide an adequate answer to 
technology failures. The RDT model suggests that both virtual and material dimensions 
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should be considered in the analysis of technology failure. Then, technology failure can 
be more accurately explained through both social and system integration.  
Finally, the constructs in the RDT model should be further defined and 
operationalized in a survey instrument that would enable a more precise data collection. 
This would enable devising further propositions and testing them statistically to 
strengthen and/or revise the model. Development of constructs in the RDT model will 
also enable us to utilize alternative research methodologies, like organizational modeling 
and agent-based simulations in the future. 
 
 
9.6. Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation explored the prior understanding on technology adaptation in 
organizations and proposes an alternative theoretical conceptualization called the 
Recursive Dualism of Technology (RDT). Causal theoretical propositions are postulated 
for further empirical use without adopting a view of structural determinism or 
omnipotence of agency over social structures. The RDT model can be used empirically as 
a guide to design research, perform data collection, and analysis to study technology 
adaptation in organizations. 
The RDT model underscores the dual nature of technology as an objective reality 
and a socially constructed product, without conflating the structural (objective) and 
agency based (subjective) sides of technology into the same whole. The RDT model 
allows researchers to understand technology as enacted by human agency as well as 
institutionalized in the social structure and relates technological implementations with 
their immediate wider context over time and space. Structuration is understood as a set of 
dynamic relationships embedded historically and contextually into the action realm 
whereas institutionalization is another set of dynamic relationships embedded into the 
structural realm. The structural changes may originate from each realm, propagating the 
other since both realms are recursively implicated, and considered as dynamic and 
dialectical (Orlikowski 1992, Seo & Creed, 2002). However, the RDT model follows the 
criticism put forward by Archer (1982, 1989, and 1995) and presupposes the pre-
existence of structure before agency. 
While the main component and relationship in this model can be considered as 
relatively stable, their range, content, and relative power will vary over time during 
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technology adaptation. Unlike linear causal models, this model assumes a dynamic and 
highly non-linear nature due to feedback relationships between action and structure 
realms of technology, supporting or undermining each other's effects. Technology in an 
organization is considered as both stable and changing, both local and global. Therefore 
the RDT model is capable of explaining both emergent and discontinuous changes in the 
process of technology adaptation, making it a comprehensive account of technology 
adaptation in organizations. 
It is impossible to conceive of an approach that is suitable for all types of 
technology and organizational relationships of all types of situations for different types of 
organizations. Some approaches may be too narrow in applicability while others may be 
too general. Some may be complementary to each other while others are clearly 
incompatible. The RDT model also does not claim completeness and capability of 
explaining all types of technology related issues in organizations. Although the model is 
inevitably limited by the authors’ beliefs and interests, I submit that it overcomes some of 
the fundamental theoretical problems that are inherited in some of the prior perspectives 
on technology and organizations, and opens up new research venues for further empirical 
research, and provides ideas on living with technology adaptation in organizations.  
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APPENDIX A. QUESTIONS FOR ELEMENTS OF THE RDT MODEL FOR ERP 
ADAPTATION 
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CONTEXTUAL FORCES 
Normative Forces about ERP  Coercive Forces about ERP  Mimetic Forces about 
• What do your business partners 
expect from the ERP technology in 
your company?  
• What do your customers expect 
from the ERP technology in your 
company?  
• What do your competitors expect 
from the ERP technology in your 
company?  
• What are your suppliers / customers’ 
requirements for the ERP technology in 
your company?  
• What are your shareholders 
requirements for the ERP technology in 
your company?  
• What are the legal and regulatory 
requirements for the ERP technology in 
your company?  
• What is your assessment on your 
competitors’ ERP technology?  
• What is your assessment on other 
companies’ ERP technology?  
• Which companies are considered as 
example sites of ERP technologies?  
ORGANIZATIONAL FORCES 
Social Forces about ERP Political Forces about ERP Technical Forces about ERP 
• What do the employees expect from 
the ERP technology in your 
company?  
• How is the ERP technology in your 
company expected to influence daily 
work and work load? 
• How is your ERP technology 
expected to influence employee’s 
roles and responsibilities and job 
descriptions? 
• Which organizational units have been 
supporting the ERP technology in your 
company? Why?  
• Which organizational units resist the 
ERP technology in your company? 
Why?  
• How does the ERP technology in your 
company function for organizational 
control?  
• How does the ERP technology in 
your company relate with the 
company performance?  
• How does the ERP technology in 
your company relate with the 
information systems infrastructure?  
• How does the ERP technology in 
your company relate with the 
managerial decision making?  
 
171 
 
 
MACRO LEVEL MESO LEVEL MICRO LEVEL 
ERP Paradigms ERP Schemas ERP Logics 
• How do you assess the ERP design 
in your company? 
• What has been planned for the ERP 
design in your company?   
• What changes are expected in the 
ERP design, in your company? 
• How do you assess the ERP 
implementation in your company?  
• What has been planned for the ERP 
implementation in your company?   
• What changes are expected in the ERP 
implementation, in your company? 
• How do you assess the ERP use in 
your company?  
• What have been planned for the ERP 
use in your company?   
• What changes are expected in the 
ERP use, in your company? 
   
Design ERP Implement ERP Use ERP 
• How do you develop the ERP 
system design in your company?  
• Which software modules are 
included in the ERP system design? 
• Which business processes and 
functions are covered in the ERP 
system design? 
• What integrations have been 
designed for the ERP system? 
• What are your main tasks in the ERP 
design? 
• How do you perform the 
implementation of the ERP system in 
your company?  
• Which software modules are 
implemented in the ERP system? 
• Which business processes and 
functions are covered in the ERP 
implementation? 
• What integrations have been 
implemented in the ERP system? 
• What are your main tasks in the ERP 
implementation? 
• How do you use the ERP system in 
your company?  
• Which software modules are used in 
the ERP system? 
• Which business processes and 
functions are used in the ERP 
system? 
• What integrations have been used in 
the ERP system? 
• What are your main tasks in the ERP 
use? 
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MACRO LEVEL MESO LEVEL MICRO LEVEL 
Dispose ERP Design Dispose ERP Implementation Dispose ERP Use 
• What are your references in your ERP 
design? 
• How does the ERP design relate to 
your understanding of the ERP 
system?  
• What are your references in your ERP 
implementation? 
• How does the ERP implementation 
relate to your understanding of the 
ERP system? 
• What are your references in your ERP 
use?  
• How does the ERP use relate to your 
understanding of the ERP system?  
   
Modify ERP Paradigms Modify ERP Schemas Modify ERP Logics 
• What alternatives did you have in 
designing ERP system? 
• How were your initial understanding 
and plans on the ERP design changed 
or confirmed later? 
• Can you identify any critical 
moments or incidents in the ERP 
design, which changed your 
understanding of the ERP system? 
• What alternatives did you have while 
implementing ERP system? 
• How were your initial understanding 
and plans on the ERP implementation 
changed or confirmed later? 
• Can you identify any critical 
moments or incidents in the ERP 
implementation, which changed your 
understanding of the ERP system? 
• What alternatives did you have while 
using the ERP system? 
• How were your initial understanding 
and plans on the ERP use changed or 
confirmed later? 
• Can you identify any critical 
moments or incidents in the ERP use, 
which changed your understanding of 
the ERP system? 
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MACRO – MESO INTERFACE MESO – MICRO INTERFACE 
Contextualize ERP schemas Contextualize ERP Logics 
• How do the schemas of ERP implementation relate to the 
prior ERP design? 
• How are the schemas of ERP implementation aligned with 
the prior ERP design? 
• How do the logic of the ERP use relate to the prior ERP 
implementation? 
• How is the logic of the ERP use aligned with the prior ERP 
implementation? 
Conflict ERP design Conflict ERP Implementation 
• How was the ERP design followed and changed in the ERP 
implementation? 
• What are the main challenges in the ERP implementation that 
conflict with the ERP design? 
• How have the conflicting issues between the ERP design and 
the ERP implementation been resolved?  
• How has the ERP implementation followed and changed in 
the ERP use? 
• What are the main challenges in the ERP use that conflict with 
the ERP implementation?  
• How have the conflicting issues between the ERP 
implementation and the ERP use been resolved?  
Contradict ERP paradigm Contradict ERP schemas 
• What were the main contradictions between the 
understanding of the ERP technology during the ERP 
implementation and the ERP design? 
• How have these contradicting issues been resolved?  
• What were the main contradictions between the understanding 
of the ERP technology during the ERP use and the ERP 
implementation? 
• How have these contradicting issues been resolved? 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 
Interview Protocol – ERP Designers 
Personal Details: 
1. Age 
2. Position & grade 
3. Place of birth 
4. Previous employment 
5. How long have you been with the company? 
6. When did your association with the ERP project start? 
Reflecting back on the very first days of the ERP: 
A. What external forces or motivators you had acknowledged for your company 
to have an ERP? 
7. What had your business partners expected from you concerning the ERP 
technology in your company?  
8. What had your customers expected from you concerning the ERP technology in 
your company?  
9. What had your competitors expected from you concerning the ERP technology in 
your company? 
10. What had your suppliers / customers’ requirements been concerning the ERP 
technology in your company?  
11. What had been your shareholders requirements concerning the ERP technology in 
your company?  
12. What were the legal and regulatory requirements had been concerning the ERP 
technology in your company? 
13. How did you view your competitors’ ERP technology?  
14. How did you consider any other companies’ ERP technology?  
15. Which companies had been considered as example sites of ERP technologies? 
B. How did these factors change later and effected ERP in your company?  
C. What internal forces or motivators had been acknowledged by your company 
to have an ERP? 
16. What did the employees expected from the ERP technology in your company?  
17. How did the ERP technology in your company expect to influence daily work and 
work load? 
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18. How did your ERP technology expect to influence employee’s roles and 
responsibilities and job descriptions?
19. Which organizational units had been supporting the ERP technology in your 
company? Why?  
20. Which organizational units resisted the ERP technology in your company? Why?  
21. How did the ERP technology in your company function for organizational 
control?  
22. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the company 
performance?  
23. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the information 
systems infrastructure?  
24. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the managerial decision 
making? 
D. How did these factors change later and effected ERP in your company?  
Remembering times before the ERP design had started: 
25. How did you consider the ERP design in your company? 
26. What hadbeen planned for the ERP design in your company?   
27. What changes were expected about the ERP design, in your company? 
Moving forward into the ERP design: 
28. What references did you take into account for your ERP design? 
29. How did the ERP design relate to your understanding of the ERP system? 
Reflecting back the ERP design: 
30. How did you perform the design of the ERP system in your company?  
31. Which software modules were designed in the ERP system? 
32. Which business processes and functions were covered in the ERP design? 
33. Which integrations were designed in the ERP system? 
34. What were your main tasks in the ERP design? 
Moving forward to the ERP implementation: 
35. Which schemas of the ERP implementation were related with the prior ERP 
design? 
36. Which the schemas of the ERP implementation were aligned with the prior ERP 
design? 
 
Considering later times in the ERP: 
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37. How did the ERP design follow and changed in the ERP implementation? 
38. What were the main challenges in the ERP implementation that conflicted with 
the ERP design? 
39. How the did the conflicting issues between the ERP design and the ERP 
implementation get resolved? 
40. What were the main contradictions between the understanding of the ERP 
technology during the ERP implementation and the ERP design? 
41. How were these contradicting issues resolved? 
 
E. Is there any unfinished business? Which hurdles/issues remain? 
 
F. What are your personal views on ERP concept and systems in general? 
 
G. How do you feel about the ERP concept and system in your corporation?  
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Interview Protocol – ERP Implementers 
Personal Details: 
1. Age 
2. Position & grade 
3. Place of birth 
4. Previous employment 
5. How long have you been with the company? 
6. When did your association with the ERP project start? 
Reflecting back on the very first days of the ERP: 
a. What external forces or motivators had you acknowledged for your company 
to have an ERP? 
7. What had your business partners expected from you concerning the ERP 
technology in your company?  
8. What had your customers expected from you concerning the ERP technology in 
your company?  
9. What had your competitors expected from you concerning the ERP technology in 
your company? 
10. What were your suppliers’ / customers’ requirements concerning the ERP 
technology in your company?  
11. What were your shareholders requirements concerning the ERP technology in 
your company?  
12. What were the legal and regulatory requirements concerning the ERP technology 
in your company? 
13. How did you consider your competitors’ ERP technology?  
14. How did you consider any other companies’ ERP technology?  
15. Which companies had been considered as example sites of ERP technologies? 
B. How did these factors change later and effected ERP in your company?  
C. What internal forces or motivators had been acknowledged for your 
company to implement an ERP? 
16. What did the employees expect from the ERP technology in your company?  
17. How did the ERP technology in your company expect to influence daily work and 
work load? 
18. How had your ERP technology been expected to influence employee’s roles and 
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responsibilities and job descriptions?
19. Which organizational units had been supporting the ERP technology in your 
company? Why?  
20. Which organizational units resisted the ERP technology in your company? Why?  
21. How the ERP technology in your company had been functioned for organizational 
control?  
22. How was the ERP technology in your company related with the company 
performance?  
23. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the information 
systems infrastructure?  
24. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the managerial decision 
making? 
D. How did these factors change later and effected ERP in your company?  
Remembering times before the ERP implementation had started: 
25. Which schemas of the ERP implementation were related with the prior ERP 
design? 
26. Which schemas of the ERP implementation were aligned with the prior ERP 
design? 
27. How did you consider the ERP implementation in your company?  
28. What was planned for the ERP implementation in your company?   
29. What changes were expected about the ERP implementation, in your company? 
Moving forward into the ERP implementation: 
30. What references did you take into account for your ERP implementation? 
31. How was the ERP implementation related to your understanding of the ERP 
system? 
Reflecting back the ERP implementation: 
32. How did you perform the implementation of the ERP system in your company? 
33. Which software modules were implemented in the ERP system? 
34. Which business processes and functions were covered in the ERP 
implementation? 
35. Which integrations were implemented in the ERP system? 
36. What was your main tasks in the ERP implementation? 
Moving forward to the ERP implementation: 
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37. What alternatives did you have while implementing the ERP system? 
38. How were your initial understandings and plans of the ERP implementation 
changed or confirmed later? 
39. Could you identify any critical moments or incidents in the ERP implementation 
which changed your understanding of the ERP system? 
40. How was the ERP design followed and changed in the ERP implementation? 
41. What was the main challenges in the ERP implementation that conflicted with the 
ERP design? 
42. How werebthe conflicting issues between the ERP design and the ERP 
implementation resolved?  
43. What were the main contradictions between your understanding of the ERP 
technology during the ERP implementation and the ERP design? 
44. How were these contradicting issues resolved? 
Considering later times in the ERP: 
45. How was the logic of the ERP use related with the prior ERP implementation? 
46. How was the logic of the ERP use aligned with the prior ERP implementation? 
47. How was the ERP implementation followed and changed in the ERP use? 
48. What have been the main challenges in the ERP use that conflicted with the ERP 
implementation?  
49. What were the conflicting issues between the ERP implementation and the ERP 
use resolved?  
50. What have been the main contradictions between the understanding of the ERP 
technology during the ERP use and the ERP implementation? 
51. How were these contradicting issues resolved? 
 
E. Is there any unfinished business? What hurdles/issues remain? 
 
F. What are your personal views on ERP concept and systems in general? 
 
G. How do you feel about ERP concept and system in your corporation?  
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Interview Protocol – ERP Users 
Personal Details: 
1. Age 
2. Position & grade 
3. Place of birth 
4. Previous employment 
5. How long have you been with the company? 
6. When did your association with the ERP project start? 
Reflecting back on the very first days of the ERP: 
a. What external forces or motivators do you think made your company want 
to have an ERP? 
7. What did your business partners expect from you concerning the ERP technology 
in your company?  
8. What did your customers expect from you concerning the ERP technology in your 
company?  
9. What did your competitors expect from you concerning the ERP technology in 
your company? 
10. What had been your suppliers’ / customers’ requirements concerning the ERP 
technology in your company?  
11. What were your shareholders requirements concerning the ERP technology in 
your company?  
12. What were the legal and regulatory requirements concerning the ERP technology 
in your company? 
13. How did you considered your competitors’ ERP technology?  
14. How did you considered any other companies’ ERP technology?  
15. Which companies had been considered as example sites of ERP technologies? 
B. How were these factors change later and effected ERP in your 
company?  
D. What internal forces or motivators had been acknowledged for your 
company to have an ERP? 
16. What were the employees expecting from the ERP technology in your company?  
17. How did the ERP technology in your company expected to influence daily work 
and work load? 
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18. How did your ERP technology expect to influence employee’s roles and 
responsibilities and job descriptions?
19. Which organizational units had been supporting the ERP technology in your 
company? Why?  
20. Which organizational units resisted the ERP technology in your company? Why?  
21. How has the ERP technology in your company functioned for organizational 
control?  
22. How did the ERP technology in your compan relate with the company 
performance?  
23. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the information 
systems infrastructure?  
24. How did the ERP technology in your company relate with the managerial decision 
making? 
D. How did these factors change later and effected ERP in your company?  
Remembering times before the ERP use had started: 
25. What were the logics of the ERP use related with the prior ERP implementation? 
26. What were the logics of the ERP use aligned with the prior ERP implementation? 
27. How did you consider the ERP use in your company?  
28. What was the plan for the ERP use in your company?   
29. What changes were implemented about the ERP use in your company?? 
Moving forward into the ERP use: 
30. What references did you take into account for your ERP use?  
31. How was the ERP use related to your understanding of the ERP system? 
Reflecting the ERP use: 
32. How did you use of the ERP system in your company?  
33. Which software modules are used in the ERP system? 
34. Which business processes and functions were used in the ERP system? 
35. Which integrations have been used in the ERP system? 
36. What are your main tasks in the ERP use? 
Moving forward to the ERP use: 
37. What alternatives did you have while using the ERP system? 
38. What were your initial understanding and plans on the ERP use changed or 
confirmed later? 
182 
39. Can you identify any critical moments or incidents in the ERP use which changed 
your understanding of the ERP system? 
Considering later times in the ERP use:  
40. What was the logic of the ERP use as it related with the prior ERP 
implementation? 
41. What was the logic of the ERP use in regard to how it aligned with the prior ERP 
implementation? 
42. How did the ERP implementation followed and changed in the ERP use? 
43. What were the main challenges in the ERP use that conflicted with the ERP 
implementation?  
44. What were the conflicting issues between the ERP implementation and the ERP 
use resolved?  
45. What are the main contradictions between the understanding of the ERP 
technology during the ERP use and the ERP implementation? 
46. How were these contradicting issues resolved? 
 
E. Is there any unfinished business? What hurdles/issues remain? 
 
F. What are your personal views on ERP concept and systems in general? 
 
G. How do you feel about ERP concept and system in your corporation?  
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APPENDIX C. ERP ADAPTATION CHRONOLOGIES AND THE RDT MODEL 
SUMMARIES OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
 
 
ALPHA CORPORATION 
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